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SENATOR ROBERT S. KERR AND THE ARKANSAS RIVER 
NAVIGATION PROJECT: A STUDY IN
LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP
INTRODUCTION
Chiding Congress for its heavy spending on pork 
barrel projects, Will Rogers once asked why an Oklahoma 
senator couldn't "get me a harbor on the Verdigris at 
Oologah." Today, 47 years later, the laugh is on the famed
humorist. On the Verdigris River only a few miles south of
Oologah, Oklahoma, a harbor is indeed being built. It is 
part of a massive public works project that has been under 
way for 15 years— the $1.2 billion Arkansas River Navigation 
Project which is to open up both Arkansas and Oklahoma to
barge traffic from all over the world.
The Army Corps of Engineers is accomplishing what 
once seemed impossible— its biggest domestic civil works 
project in history is close to completion. More extensive 
than the Panama Canal and the Saint Lawrence Seaway projects, 
the Arkansas-Verdigris Navigation System is an inland
aQuoted in "Oklahoma's Stairway to the Sea," Busi­
ness Week, No. 1964 (April 22, 1957), p. 185.
2
waterway 450 miles long and nine feet deep, passing through 
17 locks and dams across the states of Arkansas and eastern 
Oklahoma from the Mississippi River to the small town of 
Catoosa, near Tulsa. Originally authorized by Congress in 
the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1946, the project received its 
first real impetus in 1948 with the election of Robert S. 
Kerr to the U. S, Senate from the state of Oklahoma. While 
others before him had "dreamed" of ocean going ships and 
barges plying up and down the meandering Arkansas River, 
Robert Kerr turned the dream into reality. This is an 
account of what one Senator was able to do for his State; 
of how one Senator was able to tap the sources of political 
power in this country.
Purpose and Scope 
Historians differ radically in their estimates of 
the impact leaders have on important events. Some see deep 
and inexorable social forces as the key determinants; others 
argue that particular men in places of power create and 
direct the energies of their time. The answer undoubtedly 
lies somewhere between these positions, in a complex set of 
multiple relationships among leaders, subleaders, activists, 
followers and outsiders— and the conditions they confront. 
Because of these complexities, Henri Peyre describes leader­
ship as one of three topics (the others being love and 
genius) "on which no wise man should ever attempt to
write.”2
Undismayed by such warnings, writers continue to 
examine and evaluate the inif. . u specific men have on 
specific events. It is the purpose of this study to examine 
the role of Robert S. Kerr in bringing about one of the most 
extensive civilian public works projects in U. S. history—  
the Arkansas River Navigation Project. We intend to focus 
upon the power of one of the Senate’s most influential 
members and to reveal how one man significantly affected the 
policies of the nation— at least in one important area of 
public policy. We believe that by thus examining the career 
of a major political leader, we can better understand the 
nature of political leadership and the workings of the 
American political system.
Methodology
Types and Sources of Data 
An attempt has been made to discover and record the 
specific actions and characteristics of Robert S. Kerr as 
they relate to his public career, his leadership role in the 
United States Senate, and his efforts to bring to completion 
the Arkansas River Navigation Project. This information has 
been drawn from several sources:
(1) Interviews with Senators, Representatives,
2Quoted in James D. Barber, Political Leadership in 
American Government (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1964),
p. 4.
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staff members, friends and others with an intimate knowledge 
of Bob Kerr— both before and during his days in the Senate. 
These interviews were conducted primarily during the winter 
and spring of 1971 and were semi-structured in nature. 
Although the majority of those interviewed were willing to 
be quoted for the record, in several instances the person 
interviewed requested that he not be quoted by name. In 
instances where this material appears in the paper it will 
be designated "confidential communication."
(2) Questionnaires were used to supplement the 
interviews when time or circumstance did not permit an 
adequate interview. Some thirty-one questionnaires were 
left with or mailed to senators who knew Kerr best during 
his fourteen years in the Senate. Sixteen questionnaires 
were answered and returned. A copy of the questionnaire is 
included as Appendix A.
(3) Records of roll-call votes have been widely 
used to identify voting patterns in the Senate during the 
period of Kerr’s service there. Since this investigation is 
concerned primarily with Bob Kerr's influence in the area of 
public works and the Arkansas River Navigation Project only 
roll-call votes are dealt with in these specific areas.
(4) Data from official journals and records, 
especially Senate hearings, conference committee reports and 
debates recorded in the Congressional Record, has been 
gathered and used extensively.
5
(5) A wealth of data has been obtained from exten­
sive use of the Kerr Papers located in the Manuscripts 
Division of the University of Oklahoma Library in Norman. 
Consisting of the bulk of Robert Kerr's official and per­
sonal papers, the documents proved invaluable in revealing 
many activities and attitudes of Bob Kerr and in providing 
a deeper understanding of this important, and often contro­
versial, man.
(6) Various secondary sources have been used to 
supplement the primary ones. In addition to numerous 
newspaper articles, books and periodicals dealing with 
various aspects of the subject, three Ph.D. dissertations 
and three M.A. theses concerning Robert Kerr or the Arkansas 
River Navigation Project have been of value. Although these 
studies have not dealt with the same specific topic as dealt 
with in this paper, they have been helpful primarily in 
leading to sources of information hitherto unknown and in 
substantially confirming suppositions previously held by the 
author.
Techniques of Analysis
The type of analysis used by a researcher is dic­
tated by such considerations as research strategy (questions 
to be attacked), reseeirch economics (availability of time, 
personnel and money) and the like. Belknap argues that 
while many different techniques of analysis might be 
utilized "the fundamental requirement is only that each
6
researcher know what he seeks— and how reliable his findings 
are."^
Several methods are used in our consideration of the 
problem. The historical-descriptive method is used to 
examine the political career of Robert Kerr and the growth 
of the Arkansas River Project from a "dream" into a concrete 
reality. An attempt is made to critically analyze Kerr's 
effectiveness in the Senate, to determine his sources of 
power, and to observe his use of power. The study endeavors 
to use certain elementary statistical techniques, such as 
roll-call analysis, to make possible findings that might not 
be readily discernible by less quantitative methods.
Organization of the Paper 
Chapter I is a brief account of the life of Robert 
Kerr prior to his election to the U. S. Senate in 1948. A 
brief sketch of his early life is given with emphasis upon 
his developing character and upon his early interest in the 
conservation and development of natural resources. After 
discussing his tenure as governor of Oklahoma and his growing 
interest in the development of a comprehensive, multi­
purpose water project for the state, the chapter concludes 
with an account of his election to the Senate in 1948 and 
his stated goals and ambitions upon entering the Senate.
OGeorge M. Belknap, "A Method For Analyzing Legisla­
tive Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science, Vol. 2, 
No. 4 (November, 1958), p. 390.
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Chapter II is an attempt to evaluate Kerr's effec­
tiveness as a United States senator and to determine his 
relative influence and power within that body during his 
fourteen years of service. Several methods are used to 
measure his influence. Statements about the Senator from 
his colleagues in the Congress, from Congressional staff 
members, from reporters, and from others who knew him well 
are used to rank him in relationship to his Senate peers in 
overall influence. A method of organizational power base 
analysis, based on an index developed by Lawrence K. Pettit, 
is used to evaluate Kerr's relative power potential based 
on organizational positions held by the Senator during his 
last year in office, 1962. In addition, a method of roll 
call analysis, developed by Robert Dahl and James March, is 
used to measure Kerr's effectiveness in the specific area 
of Public Works legislation and to rank him in regard to 
other senators serving with him from 1949 through 1962. And 
finally, Kerr's ability to obtain needed appropriations for 
the Arkansas River Navigation Project is examined in some 
detail. An attempt is made to measure his success in 
getting funds approved by the Senate and accepted in con­
ference by the House.
While Chapter II attempts to tell us hov; effective 
Kerr was as a senator, Chapter III attempts to analyze why 
he was effective. After a general discussion of the require­
ments for leadership in the Senate, the chapter examines
8
Kerr's sources of power— both institutional and personal—  
and his use of these resources to enable him to accomplish 
his desired ends.
Chapters IV and V present a detailed account of 
events from 1949-1962 in regard to the Arkansas River 
Navigation Project and Kerr's role in these events. Emphasis 
is placed upon the conflicts that developed over the project 
involving the Congress, the executive branch, the states, 
various interest groups and individual citizens. The 
chapters focus upon the Senator's attempts to "push through" 
needed legislation to bring the project to completion, the 
difficulties encountered along the way, and his successes 
and failures. The chapters serve as a brief case study 
illustrating Kerr's effectiveness as a Senate leader in a 
specific area of legislative decision-making.
Chapter VI attempts to summarize and analyze the 
findings that were revealed by the research and to draw 
appropriate conclusions regarding Robert Kerr and his Senate 
leadership. Emphasis is placed upon an examination of the 
importance of personality as a determinant of political 
behavior based on various propositions developed by Fred 
Greenstein in his recent work Personality and Politics.
CHAPTER I
ROBERT S. KERR: PORTRAIT OF A LEADER
The untimely death of Robert Kerr on January 1, 1963
ended a career of public service "unequaled by any Oklahoman,
1a career that deeply affected the course of our nation."
Eulogized as a "giant," "a prince that has fallen," a man
who "dominated the present and future of his beloved state"
and "the most influential man ever to sit in Congress from
this State," Kerr's sudden death left a void in the Senate
and in the State of Oklahoma. As an Oklahoma newspaper put
it, "historians of the future will record that Robert S.
Kerr was a giant in those days in which he lived to manhood
and carved out a career of achievements . . . .  If Will
Rogers was Oklahoma's most loved citizen, then Kerr was its 
2most powerful."
The climb to this position of influence was slow but 
determined for Bob Kerr. Born in a log cabin near Ada, 
Oklahoma, on September 11, 1896, Robert Samuel Kerr was the
1Tribute to Senator Kerr by Senator Mike Monroney. 
U. S. Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 1963, 
CIX, Part 3, p. 3334.
2The Cushing Daily Citizen, January 4, 1963, p. 1.
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second of seven children of Samuel and Margaret Kerr.
Kerr’s grandfather was killed by Quantrill's raiders during 
the Civil War in Missouri and his father left Missouri at 
the age of seventeen to seek his fortune— and safety. The 
young emigrant went south to Ellis County, Texas, where he 
worked as a sharecropper. In Texas, Sam Kerr met and 
married Margaret Wright, a recent emigrant from eastern 
Oklahoma. Unable to prosper on the cotton fields of Texas, 
the Kerrs in April, 1894 moved north to Indian territory. 
Three miles southwest of Ada, Oklahoma, on an Indian lease, 
they set up housekeeping temporarily in a boarded tent. Sam 
built a windowless one-room log cabin on this spot and it
3was in this cabin that Robert, their first son, was born.
Kerr weighed close to twelve pounds at birth, and
grew to be 6’3" and weigh some 250 pounds. This gigantic
physical stature was to serve him well in the days that lay
ahead. He remained on his father's 160 acre farm during his
early years and admitted to being greatly influenced by his
frontier background.
Living in the comparative isolation of the frontier, 
our family developed the closest ties. We enjoyed each 
other and appreciated our surroundings. We were taught 
a reverence for God and a love of the soil. Water was 
the life-blood of our existence. Often, I helped my 
mother at the spring. For recreation, I swam in the 
water holes, or my father took us fishing at nearby 
creeks.4
^Robert S. Kerr, Land, Wood and Water (New York: 
Fleet Publishing Corp., 1960), p. 31.
^Ibid., p. 32.
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Bob Kerr's concern for the preservation of natural
resources was evident in his early childhood. He remarked,
There on this farm chopped out of the wilderness I 
could plainly see our existence. As I grew to manhood 
I realized that this trio of natural wealth (land, wood 
and water) is the foundation of all prosperity and 
essential to a better way of life everywhere,5
Undoubtedly, Sam Kerr played a major role in his son's 
interest in conservation. He told young Bob that when he 
settles he should choose a homestead where the land would 
be fertile and one with plenty of wood and water. As a con­
servationist himself, Sam Kerr told his son, "Bob, I want 
you to help refurbish the land that men have stripped, and 
clear the streams that they have muddied,"^
Sam Kerr was farmer, rancher, merchant, and cotton 
buyer. Though he was a man of little formal education, he 
was by nature a student. He was the first teacher employed 
in the Ada schools after the building was erected in 1897,
He later served on the first school board and the first city 
council. His interest in education led him to serve on the 
committee that pushed through the legislature the bill
7establishing East Central State Normal at Ada,
Education was not Sam Kerr's only civic interest.
Cited in Pamphlet "Senator Kerr Appreciation Dinner" 
located in the Robert S, Kerr Collection, Division of Manu­
scripts, University of Oklahoma Library, Hereafter cited 
as Kerr Papers.
^Kerr, Land, Wood and Water, p, 355,
7Laura M, Messenbaugh, "William Samuel Kerr," The 
Chronicles of Oklahoma, XIX (September, 1941), p, 250,
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He was a staunch Democrat, and actively participated in
local politics. He served the first term as county clerk of
Pontotoc County after Oklahoma's admission to statehood in
1907. Sam encouraged his sons to enter the political arena,
and this they did with great success. Aubrey served as
state representative from Pontotoc County from 1935 to
1939. Billy was a representative from Oklahoma County from
1937-1949. These were notable achievements, but Sam Kerr
had higher ambitions for his eldest son. Bob walked into
the office of his father one day and declared, "I want to be
Governor of Oklahoma." His father answered:
Fine, son. Keep your eye on that goal, and you will 
get there. But first establish yourself in some kind 
of business or profession, so that you will have some­
thing substantial besides the salary of your office on 
which to fall back, and thus be able greatly to increase 
your opportunity for service.8
While Sam Kerr was busy stressing the virtues of
hard work, education and financial independence, Margaret
Kerr concerned herself with making sure that the children
were taught God's word and participated actively in the
affairs of the Southern Baptist Church. The Baptists wielded
enormous political power in Oklahoma during this period and
membership in the church, or endorsement by the church,
9meant almost certain political gain.
QU. S. Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 
1963, CIX, Part 3, p. 3342.
QEdwin C. McReynolds, Oklahoma: A History of the
Sooner State (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954),
p. 391.
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Bob Kerr’s loyalty to the Baptist Church was deep
and long standing. Active in the church from a vary early
age, he began teaching a Sunday School class in Ada and 
continued as a "teacher of the Bible" in Oklahoma City, even 
while he was Governor. After his election to the Senate in
1948, he served as teacher of the Men's Bible Class of the
First Baptist Church of Washington, D. C. He served at 
various times as president of the Oklahoma Baptist General 
Convention, as vice-president of the Southern Baptist 
Foundation and as a member of the board of directors of the 
Southern Baptist Foundation. He spearheaded campaigns to 
raise money for numerous church-related activities and is 
reported to have regularly contributed thirty percent of his 
income to the church and related activities.
Kerr was also a model of restraint— in terms of the
Baptists' concept of the chief sin, "old demon rum." He was
not only a personal and political dry, but he always refused
to serve liquor at his gatherings, preferring instead to
entertain with fruit juice or soft drinks. One writer
referred to him as "The Tall Teetotaler from Indian Terri­
lltory." Kerr often criticized drinkers in Washington,
particularly those with important jobs.
Hard liquor dulls wits and clouds the vision. Official 
Washington must be at its best when the lives of our
10The Daily Oklahoman, September 23, 1962, p. 14A,
11Arthur Krock, "The Tall Teetotaler From Indian 
Territory," The New York Times, February 7, 1952, p. 26.
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men are at stake and the future of the nation hangs
in the balance.Ï2
Kerr began his formal education in the common 
schools of Ada, and like many other pioneer boys walked 
many miles to and from the schoolhouse. He attended the 
public schools of Ada through the eighth grade, and then 
obtained his ninth and tenth grade education at East Central 
Normal College, located in Ada. He did his eleventh grade 
work at Oklahoma Baptist University, located in Shawnee, 
before returning to East Central in Ada to complete the 
twelfth grade.
Upon graduating from the twelfth grade, he was 
automatically qualified for a teaching certificate and at 
the age of 17 took a job teaching at a small country school 
in Bebee, Oklahoma, for the fine sum of sixty dollars a 
month. During his two years as a teacher, Kerr also managed 
to complete two years of college work at East Central and 
in 1915 was graduated with the first class completing the 
two-year normal school program. Another member of the 1915 
graduating class v/as Ernest McFarland— a friend who would 
later represent the state of Arizona in the U. S. Senate and 
who served as Senate Majority Leader from 1951 to 1953. He 
and Kerr were close friends, and McFarland promoted Kerr's 
political career whenever he could.
By selling magazines and borrowing $300, Kerr
1?Kerr Papers. Notes from interview by Joseph Rypley 
of the Christian Science Monitor, January 15, 1951.
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managed to secure enough funds to enter the University of
Oklahoma in the fall of 1916. He took an immediate
interest in athletics and wrote his father for permission
to play football. His father's reply— "I would rather have
made Bryan's Cross of Gold speech in 1896 than to have won
13every athletic contest which has taken place since" —
ended Bob's football career before it began and was perhaps
the embryonic stage of his interest and success in public
speaking. Kerr joined the University debate team and
remained active in public speaking of some sort until the
end of his life.
Kerr's law studies at the University came to a close
at the end of his first year. In need of more money to
continue his formal education, he resumed his career as a
magazine salesman. One of his customers told Kerr, "I
don't want any of your magazines, but you impress me and
14I'd like you to work for me." Kerr promptly went to work 
in the law office of B. Robert Elliot of Webb City, Missouri, 
until he entered military service later in 1917.
Kerr entered the first officers' training camp 
established at Port Logan H. Roots near Little Rock,
Arkansas. Commissioned a Second Lieutenant in the field
13Marquis W. Childs, "The Big Boom From Oklahoma," 
Saturday Evening Post, CCXXI (April 9, 1949), p. 23.
14Quoted in Ray Geist Ewing, "An Analysis of 
Selected Speeches of Robert S. Kerr" (unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. Southern Illinois University, 1968), p. 33.
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artillery, he was sent overseas in August of 1918 but the
Armistice was signed before he went into active combat. He
remained in the Officers' Reserve Corps after returning to
civilian life. In 1921, he joined the Oklahoma National
Guard, and reached the rank of major. He was active in
forming a local American Legion post at Ada, and in 1924
was elected post commander. In 1925, he became state com­
icmander of the legion, the youngest in the nation. As 
state commander he spoke throughout Oklahoma, becoming 
better known to the people and increasing the number of his 
important friends.
In 1918, Kerr returned to Ada and entered the pro­
duce business. He lost his produce warehouse by fire and 
other reverses followed. His business losses soon mounted 
to $10,000. He decided to turn to a law career and began 
studying in the law office of J. P. McKeel. After passing 
the State Bar examination in 1922, he practiced lav; in Ada 
as a member of the firm of Kerr, Lambert and Conn.^^
Having suffered through great business losses, Kerr 
then experienced an even greater tragedy. Robert Kerr had 
married Reba Shelton of Ada on December 5, 1919. In 
February, 1924, Reba Kerr died in childbirth.
Otis Sullivant, "Robert S. Kerr; Realist in 
Politics," Public Men In and Out of Office, ed. J. T. Salter 
(Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
1946), p. 425.
^^Daniel Seligman, "Senator Bob Kerr, the Oklahoma 
Gusher," Fortune, LIX, No. 3 (March, 1959), p. 182.
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In the summer of 1925, Kerr met Grace Breene at the 
tennis courts in Ada, \Kerr was a great tennis enthusiast; 
indeed he loved to participate in or observe most sports.
He was always a little disappointed that his father had 
dismissed school athletics as being too frivolous.
After a "whirlwind courtship" Robert Kerr and Grace
Breene were married on December 26, 1925. Over the next
dozen years the Kerrs had four children: Robert S. Jr.,
Breene M., Kay, and William G. The family was a close-knit
and happy group and Kerr was known as a devoted father. The
young Kerrs seemed to be neither awed by their father nor
17inclined to rebellion.
Kerr was a struggling lawyer earning about $1,500 a 
year when he was married. In 1926 while doing some legal 
work for a small contract-drilling firm he became interested 
in the oil business. The firm's chief fieldman was James L. 
Anderson who was married to Kerr's sister Mildred. Soon 
afterwards, Kerr and Anderson borrowed $30,000 and bought 
out the local bankers who had the major interest in the 
firm. Kerr gave up his law practice and the firm of 
Anderson-Kerr set up headquarters in Oklahoma City. Ander­
son had a nose for oil, and an ability to drill cheaper than 
his competitors; and Kerr had a talent for finding investment 
capital, and separating it from its owners.
Their first breakthrough came in the early days of
^̂ Ibid.
18
the depression and launched Kerr on his path to wealth.
Kerr was asked by K, S. Adams of Phillips Petroleum Company 
to persuade the voters of Oklahoma City to approve drilling 
operations in the city. It had been established that there 
were fabulous oil reserves within the limits of Oklahoma 
City but due to some early drilling accidents in the city, 
an ordinance had been passed requiring the voters' approval 
of any extension of the drilling zone farther into Oklahoma 
City. Adams asked Kerr how much trouble he thought it would 
be to win an extension on the Oklahoma City field. Kerr 
said it would be no trouble at all. Adams then asked if 
Kerr would be willing to manage the campaign for extension. 
Kerr said he would be happy to. Adams then inquired what 
the fee would be and Kerr said he wouldn't charge Phillips 
for his services. All he asked was an opportunity for this 
firm to have first chance, on a competititive basis, to bid 
for Phillips drilling contracts in the city. Adams agreed 
to this condition, and Kerr— in his first big -venture into 
politics— ran a whirlwind campaign to convince the voters of 
Oklahoma City that it was in their best interest to permit 
further drilling within the city. He went from house to 
house throughout the city persuading residents that a vote
for expanded drilling would mean a share of the oil profits
"ISfor many Oklahoma City residents. His efforts were
18Interview with Don McBride, Director of Tennessee 
Valley Authority, March 12, 1971.
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rewarded by an overwhelming vote for extension. A year
later he managed a campaign for a further extension of the
drilling area, and won that also.
Anderson-Kerr made a small fortune drilling in
Oklahoma City and Kerr also began his long and profitable
history of collaboration with Phillips Petroleum. One
immediate byproduct of this association was the acquisition
of Phillips' top geologist Dean A. McGee. In 1935, after
Anderson had decided to cash in his chips and retire, the
great Kerr-McGee partnership was formed. The Kerr-McGee Oil
Industries became a famous name in Oklahoma and laid the
basis for Kerr's vast wealth and business fame. By the
early 40's Kerr's personal wealth was estimated at $10
million and at the time of his death it was believed to be
19in excess of $40 million.
The political career of Robert Samuel Kerr began
somewhat slowly and at a relatively late age. He held an
appointment as special justice on the state Supreme Court 
20in 1931. Kerr backed New Dealer Congressman, and oil 
millionaire, Ernest W. Marland in the 1934 gubernatorial 
race, and after his election to that office Marland appointed 
Kerr to his unofficial pardon and parole board.
Kerr was a leading backer of Leon C. (Red) Phillips
19"Kerr Switches Sides to Push Trade Bill," Business
Week, No. 1717 (July 28, 1962), p. 86 
20Arrell Gibson, Oklahoma; A History of Five Cen­
turies (Norman: Harlow Publishing Corp., 1955), p. 386.
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in the 1935 gubernatorial election. Kerr arranged most of 
the financial support for Phillips, and spoke for his 
candidacy throughout Oklahoma. Following his election 
Phillips was largely responsible for Kerr being named Demo­
cratic National Committeeman in 1940, At the Democratic 
National Convention of 1940, the conservative Phillips 
opposed the third term nomination of Franklin D. Roosevelt. 
Kerr not only supported Roosevelt's nomination, but headed 
his election campaign in Oklahoma. His support of Roosevelt 
cost Kerr the support of Phillips, but this was to prove a 
blessing in 1942.
Bob Kerr made his first bid for elective office in 
1942. Running as a Roosevelt Democrat, he narrowly won the 
Democrat nomination for governor over six other contenders. 
Despite the opposition of Phillips, who bolted the party to 
support the Republican William J. Otjen, Kerr was successful 
in the November election— although his margin of only 
16,500 votes was the second smallest majority since state­
hood. His main support came from the party organization, 
the followers of the New Deal, the Baptists, the American 
Legion, the Negroes, and small town merchants. Kerr's own
personality was an important factor in his election, and he
21began to show promise as a campaign orator.
As Governor, Kerr managed to bring the state out of
^^dwin C. McReynolds, Oklahoma: A History of the
Sooner State (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1954),
pp. 380-383.
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debt, push through four amendments designed to improve
public schools in Oklahoma, establish a Pardon and Parole
Board, and promote industrial development in the state.
Kerr's reform in state finances, adopted eighteen months
after he took office, provided for placing accrued surplus
of the state general revenue fund at the end of each month
in the sinking fund to be used solely to pay the state's
bonded indebtedness. The measure gave his administration
the advantage of sound economy in a period of general
employment and good incomes. The debt of the state was
reduced by $40 million and when Kerr left office in 1947,
22Oklahoma was free of debt.
It was in the area of resources development of the 
state, however, that Kerr was most active. In an attempt to 
live up to his campaign pledge to advance soil and water 
conservation in the state, he worked tirelessly to bring 
about needed conservation projects. Having lived through 
the "dust bowl" days of the 1930's and the days of recurring 
floods that periodically destroyed lives and property in 
Oklahoma, Kerr was determined that immediate action by 
government was essential if future disasters were to be 
averted. Perhaps most impressive to him was the devastating 
flood of 1943. In its wildest rage on record, the Arkansas 
River exceeded maximum stages of other historic floods at
?2McReynolds, Oklahoma: A History of the Sooner State,
p. 387 and Gibson, Oklahoma: A History of Five Centuries,
p. 388.
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several gauging stations in Oklahoma. It rolled over more 
than 500 miles of land, cities, homes, factories, highways, 
defense plants, and acres of vitally needed grains and food­
stuffs, Damages approximated $31 million, and twenty-six
lives were lost. As in earlier floods, levees along the
23river failed to provide adequate protection.
Sloshing through the mud and destruction of that 
flood, Kerr resolved to launch a crusade to stop or reduce 
this needless waste and misery. "For me, it marked the 
beginning of a sustained effort to promote balanced con­
servation throughout river basins," he remarked, and marked
a turning point in the history of water and soil conserva-
24tion in Oklahoma. He immediately began to gather around 
him men of ability who would be able to provide the knowledge 
and skills needed to tackle the task ahead.
It soon became evident that no single town or county 
or even a single state should handle the problems of soil 
and water conservation. The establishment of a state 
Planning and Resources Board could help, but eventual solu­
tion of the problem rested with interstate projects and 
federal assistance. Unlike many previous governors who had 
fought against federal dams and federal assistance, Kerr
23U. S. House of Representatives, Arkansas River and 
Tributaries; Arkansas and Oklahoma, House Document 758,
79th Cong., 2nd sess., July 30, 1946 (Washington, 1947), 
pp. 5-6, 37-39.
^^Kerr, Land, Wood, and Water, pp. 345-347.
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was outspoken in favor of full cooperation with the federal 
government in behalf of this program. He began to make 
contacts with federal agencies, legislators and adminis­
trators in an effort to get the federal government more 
deeply involved. He toured various national river develop­
ment sites, including the Tennessee Valley sites, and
actively sought information on resources development and 
25planning. Before his term as governor had expired he had 
become known nationally as a man dedicated to the conserva­
tion of our national resources.
National party councils began to take note of Bob 
Kerr and as the 1944 presidential election approached he 
was named the Democratic Convention's temporary chairman 
and its keynote speaker. Kerr was the first Oklahoman to 
win a keynote spot in a national convention and his selec­
tion greatly increased his strength at home and within the 
party. His speech was a "rafter-ringing" endorsement of 
the New Deal and disparagement of "Hoover!sm" and the 
Republican philosophy in general. Its highly favorable 
reception won Kerr greater influence within the party and 
his timely move to Truman during the vice-presidential 
voting at the convention helped hand the nomination to
Truman and later meant that the VJhite House door would
2 6always be open to him.
25Kerr Papers, "The Kerr Plan," undated mimeographed
sheet.
26Interview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971.
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Before stepping down as Governor, Kerr had received
a letter from an old friend, ex-Senator Owen Townsend.
Townsend urged Kerr to enter the Senate upon the death of
Senator Ed Moore for it "appears to me that the old rascal
27has only about two more years to live." Moore, true to 
Townsend's prediction, was too ill to seek re-election in
1948.
No Oklahoman governor had ever retained enough 
popularity and influence to win election to the United 
States Senate. Kerr was determined to be the first. He 
conducted a vigorous campaign in both the primaries and 
general election and argued that he could do more for the 
state of Oklahoma than any of his opponents. His theme was 
"a stronger America and more prosperous Oklahoma" and his 
slogan and chief area of interest involved "Land, Wood, and 
Water." This slogan signified his great concern for the 
conservation and development of the natural resources of the 
state and indeed of the whole nation. His stated goals were 
a reasonably stable economy, free from the major losses and 
dislocations caused by floods and drought, which Kerr did 
not believe could be achieved without further development of 
the region's resources. He contended that water develop­
ments should be planned as integral parts of basic programs 
and that "planning for,, water resources could not be
27Kerr Papers. Letter from Senator Townsend, 
December 10, 1946.
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disassociated from planning for all resources." Such a 
comprehensive plan extending as it did beyond Oklahoma's 
boundaries could not be accomplished by a single state. An 
interstate system of high dams and of complimentary low 
dams farther up stream was needed to provide flood control, 
irrigation and electricity. The project also demanded a 
system of locks to permit the rivers' navigation. Kerr 
asserted that if he were elected to the U. S. Senate he 
would work to obtain federal projects to implement this
pg
program.
Kerr's Republican opponent Ross Rizley ridiculed 
Kerr's program and in an address to the members of the Tulsa 
Chamber of Commerce referred to it as "Land, Wood, Wind and 
Water," ascribing the "hot" air to Kerr. When Kerr subse­
quently appeared before the Tulsa Chamber he took note of 
the previous perversion of his slogan.
My opponent thinks he is ridiculing Kerr, but actually 
he is making light of your program! It is the very 
program that you conceived, that you have fought for, 
long and hard, to develop your area, and to assume its 
future growth.
I learned this from you . . . .  I learned this at 
the knees of such Tulsa pioneers as Newt Graham, whose 
lifetime ambition is to see the Arkansas opened up to 
the waterways of the w o r l d . 29
On October 22, shortly before the election. Republi­
can Senator William Jenner of Indiana, Chairman of the Senate 
Elections Investigation subcommittee, charged Kerr with
poKerr Papers, "Collinsville Speech," June 11, 1948,
29Kerr, Land, Wood and Water, pp. 169-170.
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spending $61,140 more than he reported in the July pri­
maries. This would be $55,140 more than the law allowed
30since Oklahoma law set a limit of $3,000 for each primary.
Actually the circumvention of this law was an accepted part
of Oklahoma politics. Wives and friends regularly paid for
advertising "unbeknownst" to the candidate. The accusation
probably received such unusual attention because Oklahoma
was one of the states in which the Democrats were attempting
to regain a Senate seat from the Republicans. Despite these
charges, Kerr won the election by a vote of 441,614 to
265,169. After the election the charges were referred to
the 81st Congress. On July 27, 1949, the Senate Rules
Committee unanimously upheld Kerr's election.
The Senate Democratic "class of 1948" was perhaps
the most publicized band of freshmen in Senate history. At
this time, most outside observers considered Paul Douglas
of Illinois, Hubert Humphrey of Minnesota and Estes Kefauver
of Tennessee to be the most promising members of the new
class. However, within the Senate "Establishment," the most
promising members of the class were Bob Kerr, Lyndon Johnson
31of Texas, and Clinton Anderson of New Mexico. The three 
Southwesterners quickly established themselves as members in
30C. P. Trussell, "Senators Accuse Kerr of Oklahoma 
in Campaign Fund," The New York Times, October 23, 1948, 
p. 1.
31Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, Lyndon B« Johnson: 
The Exercise of Power (New York; Signet Books, 1966), 
pp. 37-38.
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good standing of the "inner circle" of the Senate and as
men who knew what power was and how to use it.
As a United States Senator, therefore, Robert S.
Kerr was now a man in a position to do something for his
state and for the nation. His words and deeds in the Senate 
for the next fourteen years would not only reflect his life 
and interests, but would influence United States policy in 
innumerable ways.
CHAPTER II
EVALUATION OF ROBERT KERR'S EFFECTIVENESS 
AS A U. S. SENATOR
"Bob Kerr was no king. For kings are not born in 
log cabins. But, Bob Kerr was a leader." So commented 
William Prouty, R-Vermont, at the death of Robert Kerr. The 
"uncrowned king" of the Senate died at the peak of his
power— when his overall leadership and influence upon that
body was at its zenith. His fourteen years of service in 
the Senate clearly depict his natural proclivity for leader­
ship and his ability to significantly effect the decisions 
of that body. He was, said Senator Glenn Beall, D-Maryland, 
one of a "relatively small band of giants who towered over
their fellow men in ability, in leadership, in patriotism
2and in devotion to duty." It is one of the major aims of 
this paper to evaluate and analyze the leadership qualities 
of this extraordinary man.
A leader can be defined as one who has unusual
influence or power. He is one who has the "capacity to make
\j. S. Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 




others do something that they would not do otherwise and
that the person specifically wants or intends for them to 
3do." In other words, a leader is one who makes things 
happen that would not happen otherwise— one who initiates 
measures that would not have been initiated otherwise, or 
one who vetoes or modifies policies already proposed. When 
such an initiative becomes governmental policy, many events 
occur that would not have occurred. Similarly, modification 
means making changes in political events while the veto 
prevents occurrence of certain events. Initiation, modifi­
cation and vetoing all refer to changing the course of human 
events— in this case changing the course of governmental 
policies.
Robert Dahl puts at the heart of leadership the 
concept of power. He defines power as a relationship between 
people in such a way that "A has power over B to the extent 
that he can get B to do something that B would not otherwise 
do."^ It is defined in terms of what one member does to 
change the behavior of another. Or in the case of a group 
(such as the Senate), how much the final group decision
5correlates with the initial decision of a designated member.
.^Andrew S. McFarland, Power and Leadership in Plur­
alist Systems (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 1969), p. 154.
^Robert A. Dahl, "The Concept of Power," Behavioral 
Science, Vol. 2 (July, 1957), pp. 202-203.
^Bernard M. Bass, Leadership, Psychology and Organi­
zational Behavior (New York: Harper and Brother, 1960),
p. 118.
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As Gouldner puts it, "A leader will, then, here be considered 
as an individual whose behavior stimulates patterning of the 
behavior in some group. By emitting some stimuli, he 
facilitates group action toward a goal or goals, whether the 
stimuli are verbal, written or gestural."^
Having defined leadership in this manner, our next 
concern is to determine how to measure it, how to analyze 
it. We need to devise some techniques of distinguishing 
between the relatively more and relatively less powerful in 
the Senate to determine if Robert Kerr indeed falls into the 
category of relatively more powerful. How can this be done?
Observations by Colleagues 
Several techniques can be suggested. Robert Dahl 
suggests that one method is for the investigator to "observe" 
the participants— in the hope that he might see individual 
A, for example, giving orders to B, and B carrying out the
7orders. Since this is very seldom possible, "observations" 
normally consist of the words of other people— of "reports" 
of the power of actors from those who have observed their 
actions. Since it is not possible to directly check their 
words against reality, the observer can only check one set 
of words against another. Of the observers questioned, are
^Alvin W. Gouldner (ed.). Studies in Leadership (New 
York: Harper and Brothers, 1950), pp. 17-18.
7Robert A. Dahl, "Hierarchy, Democracy and Bargain­
ing in Politics and Economics," Legislative Behavior, ed. 
Heinz Eulau (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free Press, 1956), p. 85,
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they generally in agreement about the power and influence 
of the subject? Do they generally agree about his "power 
ranking" in regard to those he attempts to influence?
An attempt to evaluate Senator Kerr by this method 
results in virtually unanimous agreement by the observers 
questioned that he must be ranked very high in power and 
influence. "Observations" by Senate colleagues, staff 
members, newsmen and others on the scene tell us of his 
outstanding ability to influence the actions of others.
Soon after his arrival in the Senate he showed a desire for 
power and an understanding of hov/ to obtain power and how 
to use it,^ He was quickly accepted into the "inner circle" 
of the Senate and his influence rose steadily during his
9fourteen years in office. When Lyndon Johnson left the
Senate in 1961 a vacuum in effective Senate leadership was
created. "In such vacuums," comments the Time writer,
"power goes to those who seek it. Kerr sought it, and even
though he held no official title, he soon became known as
10the Senator to see to get things done." According to 
Joseph Kraft, "He v/as perhaps the only man in the Congress 
to emerge during the Kennedy Administration as a force in 
his own right. 'V/hat Kerr wants, Kennedy gets,’ they say in
QInterview with Senator Allen Ellender, April 6,
1971.
9Ibid.
in"Death of a Senator," Time, Vol. LXXXI, No. 2 
(January 11, 1963), p. 23.
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the press gallery.
At the time of his death on January 1, 1963, Robert
Kerr ranked 26th in seniority in the Senate. Although not
in the top quarter of the Senate in this vital measure of
power (seniority) Senate colleagues questioned about his
12power, with one exception, unanimously agreed he was in 
the top 10% of overall influence and power at the time of
his death. (See Table 1) He was considered by approximately
TABLE 1
RESULTS OF QUESTIONNAIRE CONCERNING ROBERT KERR—  
RESPONSES BY SIXTEEN SENATE COLLEAGUES
High Medium Low
1. Rank in overall power and influence 
within Senate at time of his death.
(High = top 10%) 15 0 1
2. Degree Kerr was sought out by other
Senators for advice. 10 6 0
3. Kerr's influence on you personally in
area of public works and conservation. 11 3 2
two-thirds of the respondents as ranking high in the area of
^^Joseph Kraft, "'King' of the U. S. Senate,"
Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 235, Number 1 (January 5-12,
1963), p. 26.
12Of the sixteen senators who responded to the ques­
tionnaire concerning Senator Kerr, fifteen were in general 
agreement about the Senator's overwhelming influence within 
the Senate and outstanding leadership qualities. One senator, 
who asked to remain anonymous, ranked Kerr low in virtually 
every category and had only "negative impressions" about the 
Senator. He admitted readily he was often in disagreement 
with Kerr and "did not hold Kerr in high regard."
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being "sought out by his colleagues for advice" on Congres­
sional matters, while in the specific area of concern to us, 
his influence in the area of public works and conservation, 
approximately 70% of those responding felt he had great 
influence upon them personally.
13These obviously incomplete and sketchy findings
merely reaffirm the numerous statements of others that Kerr
was a highly influential senator who exerted considerable
influence upon his colleagues. The Congressional Record is
filled with expressions of respect for and admiration of his
qualities of leadership that were evident throughout his
life. As William Fulbright put it, "He belonged in that
unusually small group of men who seem to be born to lead and
14used his God-given ability well." "He was a man with 
great power, great prestige, and great presence," commented 
Senator Prouty. "Perhaps no man in recent times was more 
able in the Senate to make his presence felt, and to accom­
plish more in the way of legislation in which he believed
15than was Bob Kerr."
13A great number of senators who knew Kerr best have 
either died or have left the Senate and are unavailable for 
comment. Others had the policy of not accepting question­
naires of any sort while several merely failed to return 
questionnaires sent them by the author. Some who served 
with Kerr only a brief time felt they were not qualified to 
answer many of the questions.
14U. s. Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 
1963, CIX, Part 3, p. 3344.
*1 sIbid., p. 3352. Recognizing that the expressions 
of feeling toward the Senator made by his colleagues on the
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Organizational Position Analysis 
A second method of measuring the influence and power 
of an individual in addition to the method just discussed of 
comparing the "reports" of those who are familiar with the 
actions of the individual, is to look at his relative power 
potential on the basis of organizational positions. The 
division of labor (and consequent subject matter suzerainties) 
expressed in the committee system, along with the need for 
coordination, expressed in party leadership positions and 
committees, creates preferred organizational positions and 
confer upon the occupants of such positions a special organ­
izational power base.
For our purposes we may consider as organizational 
power bases those positions from which a senator may either 
have special control over the fate of legislative proposals, 
or exercise a voice in the process of role allocation.
Using a method of analysis developed by Lawrence K. Pettit,
Senate floor shortly after his death would tend to be favor­
able expressions colored by sentiment and emotion, the 
author nevertheless feels that the statements are worthy of 
note and has included several of them throughout the paper. 
Where possible, statements made by the same senators at 
other times (especially during Senate debates or as a result 
of a questionnaire sent to the senators by the author) have 
also been included in the paper. Although comments of some 
of Kerr's known "critics" were unobtainable for a variety of 
reasons, on balance it seems that the "obituary" quotes give 
a reasonably accurate picture of the Senator. The large 
number of senators (54) who eulogized Kerr— some at great 
length— seems to attest to the fact that his passing made a 
significant impact upon a majority of his colleagues and 
left a void in the Senate not easily filled.
^^Lawrence K. Pettit, "Influence Potential in the
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an organizational power base index (OPI) was constructed as
follows: (1) two points for a committee chairmanship;
(2) two points for being a floor leader or assistant floor
leader; (3) one point for each party leadership committee on
17which a senator is a member; (4) one point for each
18prestige committee on which a senator serves; (5) one 
point for a subcommittee chairmanship. Information for the 
index was obtained from the Congressional Directory and the 
relevant issues of the Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report.
Although the possible OPI range is from zero to 
nine, the highest score for the 1962 session, Kerr's last 
session, was seven. Table 2 lists the twenty-eight senators 
who scored four or above on the organizational power base 
index. Robert Kerr had an OPI score of 5 which placed him 
in a tie for 10th among all senators. As might be expected, 
those ranking highest on the OPI index were members of the 
majority party with considerable seniority.
Tied for 26th in the Senate in seniority in 1962 
with fourteen years experience, Kerr was "outranked" on the 
OPI index by only two senators with less experience—  
Majority Leader Mike Mansfield with ten years seniority and
United States Senate," in Pettit and Edward Keynes, eds..
The Legislative Process in the U. S. Senate (Chicago: Rand
McNally, Inc., 1969), p. 230.
17Republicans: Policy Committee, Committee-on-
Committees. Democrats: Policy Committee, Starring Committee.
18Prestige Committees are Appropriations, Finance, 
Foreign Relations, Armed Services.
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Senator Alan Bible of Nevada with nine years seniority. The 
Senator indeed ranked quite high in power potential based on 
organizational positions.
TABLE 2
LIST OF SENATORS WHO SCORED FOUR OR ABOVE 
ON THE OPI INDEX
Name Score Seniority (yrs.)
Carl Hayden, D-Arizona 7 36
Lister Hill, D-Alabama 7 25
John McClellan, D-Arkansas 7 20
Warren Magnuson, D-Washington 7 19
Olin Johnston, D-S. Carolina 7 18
Hubert Humphrey, D-Hinnesota 7 14
Alan Bible, D-Nevada 7 9
Richard Russell, D-Georgia 6 30
Mike Mansfield, D-Montana 6 10
Dennis Chavez, D-New Mexico 5 28
Allen Ellender, D-Louisiana 5 28
James Eastland, D-Mississippi 5 20
Wayne Morse, D-Oregon 5 18
Willis Robertson, D-Virginia 5 17
John Sparkman, D-Alabama 5 17
John Stennis, D-Mississippi 5 16
Russell Long, D-Louisiana 5 14
Robert Kerr, D-Oklahoma 5 14
John Pastore, D-Rhode Island 5 13
Spenssard Holland, D-Florida 4 17
Clinton Anderson, D-New Mexico 4 14
Mike Monroney, D-Oklahoma 4 12
George Smathers, D-Florida 4 12
Henry Jackson, D-Washington 4 10
Stuart Symington, D-Missouri 4 10
Sam Ervin, D-North Carolina 4 9
Joseph Clark, D-Pennsylvania 4 6
Everett Jordan, D-North Carolina 4 5
Roll Call Analysis
A third method of measuring the influence and power
Of an individual is to look at specific examples of
37
decision-making and to determine the actor's role in this
process. Was he successful in persuading those he sought to
influence to follow his lead and to "go along" with him in
specific matters? The more power a person possesses, argues
Max Weber, the more successful he is "in realizing his own
19will" and in "gaining his own ends."
The principal method used by legislators to make and
legitimate decisions is by voting. While all decisions made
by voting are not recorded as roll call votes, roll call
analysis is one commonly used method of systematically
analyzing the voting behavior of individual legislators.
The great advantage of roll call votes is that they are
"hard" data— discrete acts the fact of whose occurrence is
not subject to dispute. As Stuart Rice noted more than
forty years ago, votes are "the most tangible and measurable
20units of political behavior." The assumption is made that 
a legislator does not take the task of voting lightly, but 
rather responds rationally to a variety of cues from sources 
he considers relevant and votes according to the assessment 
of the relative importance of these sources. The final vote 
of a given member represents the ultimate effect of a 
variety of cues from sources he considers relevant and votes
-1 g ......Quoted in Robert Presthus, Men At The Top (New 
York: Oxford University Press, 1964), p. 4.
20Stuart Rice, "The Behavior of Legislative Groups; 
A Method of Measurement," Political Science Quarterly,
Vol. LX(1925), p. 60.
38
according to the assessment of the relative importance of 
these sources. The final vote of a given member represents 
the ultimate effect of a variety of forces and influences 
which the member took into consideration before he cast his 
vote.
In our case we are using roll call analysis in an 
effort to measure the relative influence of Robert Kerr and 
other senators over the actions of the U. S. Senate. The 
basic assumption is made that a senator's influence can be 
measured by the difference between the probability that the 
Senate will pass a bill he opposes and the probability that 
it will pass a bill he supports. The method is based on an 
"index for the measurement of power" developed primarily by
Robert Dahl in his study in 1957 of power in the U. S.
21Senate.
22Dahl, drawing on a paper by Dahl, March and Nasatir, 
uses his method to rank thirty-four senators according to 
their influence on the Senate with respect to two different 
areas, foreign policy and tax and economic policy. The 
thirty-four senators were all those who held office con­
tinuously from 1946 through 1954, a long enough period to 
insure a reasonable large number of roll-call votes. The
^^Dahl, "The Concept of Power," pp. 201-215.
77Robert A. Dahl, James March and D. Nasatir, "Influ­
ence Ranking in the United States Senate." Read at the annual 
meeting of the American Political Science Association, 
Washington, D. C., September, 1956 (mimeo).
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classification of measures to the two areas was taken from 
the Congressional Quarterly Almanac, as were the votes 
themselves. Since no evidence was available concerning 
actual influence processes, the roll-call position of each 
senator was taken to indicate his "support" or "opposition" 
with respect to each bill, and the probability of the bill’s 
passage was estimated by the proportion of bills of each type 
actually passed.
Using Dahl’s formula, we have attempted to rank the
twenty-nine senators in office with Robert Kerr from 1949
through 1962 according to their influence on the Senate in
the area of public works legislation. Some sixty-seven roll
call votes of significance were taken from the Congressional
Quarterly for the fourteen year period and an index score
for each legislator was calculated based on the formula:
M* = p^-pg when
M* = the measure of a senator’s power 
p^ = proportion of times a senator works for a measure 
that the Senate passes 
Pg = proportion of times a senator works against a 
measure that the Senate passes
If the Senate always passes the bills a given 
senator works for and always defeats the bills he works 
against, he receives the maximum score of 1. If the Senate 
always defeats the bills he works for and always passes the 
bills he works against, a minimum score of a -1 is obtained. 
The "power" being assessed, therefore, is that of A over the 
passage or non-passage of mearurrr by the Senate.
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Dahl recognizes certain difficulties that arise from 
the index— due primarily to limitations on the data avail­
able, "limitations that appear to be well-nigh inescapable 
even in the case of the United States Senate, a body whose
operations are relatively visible and well recorded over a
23long period of time."
The most important problem has been to accept the
roll-call position of a Senator as an indication of his
position prior to the roll-call vote. Since no systematic
record is maintained, of course, for the positions or
activities of senators prior to a roll-call vote, and since
it would be exceptionally difficult to reconstruct the
historical record even for one session, not to say over a
fourteen year period, it appears "necessary" to adopt a
rather drastic alternative, namely to take the recorded 
roll-call vote of a Senator as an indication of his 
position and activities prior to the roll-call. While 
this is not unreasonable, it does pose one major diffi­
culty: a vote is necessarily cast either for or against
a measure and hence the roll-call provides no way of 
determining when a Senator does nothing prior to the 
roll-call. But the very essence of the formal concept 
of power outlined earlier hinges on a comparison of the 
difference between what the Senate will do when a 
Senator takes a given position and what it does when he 
takes no position.24
Commenting on this problem James G. March in a letter 
to the author agreed that some relatively major assumptions 
did need to be made.
^^Dahl, "The Concept of Power," p. 212, 
24Ibid., pp. 210-211.
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Since the (Dahl) procedure assumes that one can observe 
the outcome of any possible combination of prior posi­
tions by individual senators but empirical reality 
permits the observation of only a subset of final voting 
positions, some relatively heroic assumptions need to 
be made . . . .  Nevertheless, I think you might find 
the measures useful. The problems cannot be escaped. 
They are endemic to any attempt to measure influence, 
regardless of whether you use roll-calls or interviews 
or whatever.25
A closely related problem, which Dahl calls the 
problem of the "chameleon," involves those senators who take 
no prior position on a bill and successfully guess how the 
Senate majority will vote. If he is a perfect guesser, 
according to the ranking method used, he will be placed in 
the highest rank. "Our common sense tells us," adds Dahl, 
"that in this case it is the Senate that has power over the 
Senator, whereas the Senator has no influence on the votes 
of other Senators," One could treat chameleon activity 
as equivalent to "doing nothing" to influence the passage or 
defeat of a measure.
While it cannot be proved conclusively that Robert 
Kerr was not a "chameleon," it seems evident that from the 
interviews conducted, questionnaires received, and from 
information obtained from other sources that Kerr was indeed 
no chameleon. The record seems to indicate that he was 
frequently on the "unpopular" side of a question and that he 
did not hesitate to support causes that put him at odds with
25Letter to author from James G. March, March 29,
1971.
26Dahl, "The Concept of Power," p. 213.
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27the Senate leadership and a majority of his colleagues.
The evidence seems overwhelming that Kerr took a strong 
position based on his own judgment on virtually all issues, 
and certainly on those involving public water projects.
Recognizing these problems with the use of Dahl's 
power index and recognizing that roll-call analysis, like 
all tools, can be used only for limited purposes, it never­
theless seems evident that the application of this instrument 
to our problem has enabled us to measure Robert Kerr's 
influence in at least one important area of activity— that 
of public works legislation. Table 3 shows us the results 
of the analysis of the sixty-seven most important votes on 
public works legislation taken from 1949 through 1962 and 
the ranking of each senator in accord with the index just 
described.
According to our index Robert Kerr ranked high in 
influence— along with such Senate stalwarts as Dennis Chavez, 
Carl Hayden, John Sparkman, James Eastland and Clinton 
Anderson. The highest ranking Senator, Dennis Chavez, v/as 
the chairman of the Public Works Committee while Carl Hayden 
was the revered and influential president pro tempore of the 
Senate. All of the top influentials possessed considerable 
seniority with only Kerr, Anderson, Kefauver and Humphrey 
out of the top twenty senators serving their first term in
1949.
^"^Interview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971.
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TABLE 3
THIRTY U.S. SENATORS RANKED ACCORDING TO "POWER" OVER 
SENATE DECISIONS ON PUBLIC WORKS, 1949-1962
Rank Senator
Times
a\ o inm cn
Voting With Majority by Year
v H c \ j < * i n i o  r ' C O C ^ o r v i  




1 Chavez 4 6 4 3 5 2 3 7 5 9 2 9 .87
2 Hayden 4 5 4 4 4 2 3 7 3 9 2 10 .86
3^ Sparkman 4 5 4 3 5 2 3 7 5 9 2 5 .83
3^ Anderson 4 5 2 3 5 2 2 7 3 9 2 10 .83
5 Eastland 4 5 4 3 5 2 4 7 3 9 2 4 .82
6 Kerr 4 6 4 3 5 2 3 7 5 9 2 10 .81
7 Magnuson 2 5 4 4 4 2 3 7 5 8 2 9 .80
8 Kefauver 4 5 4 0 5 1 3 7 5 8 2 10 .79
9 Humphrey 4 4 4 3 5 1 3 7 5 9 2 10 .78
10 Long 4 5 4 4 3 2 3 7 5 9 2 10 .78
11 Hill 4 5 4 3 5 1 3 7 5 9 2 3 .76
12 Russell 2 6 3 0 2 0 3 7 6 8 1 10 .75
13 Fulbright 2 6 4 5 2 0 3 4 3 7 2 3 .72
14 John son (S.C.) 2 6 4 3 2 1 3 7 5 9 2 10 .69
15 Morse 4 4 2 1 4 2 3 7 5 9 2 10 .68
16!g Ellender 4 5 4 4 3 2 3 5 5 9 2 8 .66
leh Holland 4 6 4 4 6 2 2 4 5 9 2 7 . 66
18 Stennis 4 6 4 5 3 1 3 7 5 9 2 3 .65
19 McClellan 4 6 2 4 3 2 3 6 3 9 1 5 .62
20 Young(N.D.) 4 5 4 0 6 2 2 7 3 8 2 1 .50
21 Mundt 3 6 3 2 6 1 3 5 3 10 2 1 .39
22 Smith 2 4 1 2 6 1 3 4 4 7 2 1 .16
23 Capehart 0 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 4 7 2 1 .16
24 Douglas 0 0 0 1 3 0 3 4 3 7 2 10 .07
25 Aiken 0 1 1 0 6 2 3 6 3 5 2 3 .03
26 Robertson 4 3 0 2 2 0 1 1 2 9 2 2 .03
27 Hickenlooper 1 3 0 1 6 2 1 2 3 6 1 0 — .06
28 Saltonstall 0 1 0 2 3 2 1 2 3 4 2 1 -.33
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TABLE 3— Continued
Times Voting With Majority by Year Proportion 




(\i Tf m 10^ i n i n i n t n i n m i n i n i n  <oio Ma i or i tv o\mcr» m m  o\ m
0 1 0  1 0  0 
0 1 0 2 2 0
1 1 1 2  1 2  -.55
1 1 3  1 1 0  -.64
Number of roll 
calls 4 6 4 5 6 2 4 7 6  10 2 1:
Total
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REFERENCES FOR ROLL-CALL VOTES ON 
PUBLIC WORKS ISSUES
1949 259-9; 259-10; 260-1; 260-2.
1950 147-7; 723-1; 723-3; 723-6; 723-8; 724-7
1951 178-1; 178-3; 532-4; 532-7.
1952 135-1; 135-3; 135-4; 135-5; 373-6.
1954 183-6; 565-1; 565-2; 565-5; 566-6; 566-7.
1955 122-29 122-30.
1956 166-59 166-60; 180-113; 185-130.
1957 289-15 289-16; 303-59; 308-76; 310-82; 310-83; 310-85
1958 421-19 426-42; 444-108; 462-198; 462-199; 462-200.
1959 402-22 410-59; 425-119; 425-120; 425-121; 433-157;
439-182; 439-186; 444-204; 444-208.
1960 504-136; 512-176.
1962 656-29; 661-53; 661-54; 662-57; 662-58; 662-60;
686-173; 686-174; 692-206; 692-207; 692-208.
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The results are roughly consistent with expectations 
based on general knowledge of the Senate and the period 
studied. Those who tended to favor public works legislation 
generally ranked high in influence while those who opposed 
this sort of legislation ranked low. IVhereas Senators Kerr, 
Chavez, Hayden and others at the top consistently supported 
expanded public works programs, increased funds for projects, 
federal public power projects and the like, those at the 
bottom of the rankings, such as Williams, Byrd, Saltonstall 
and Hickenlooper, were consistently voting against all forms 
of public works. It should also be noted that some of the 
more prestigious senators such as Byrd of Virginia, Capehart 
of Indiana, Aiken of Vermont and Saltonstall of Massachusetts 
ranked very low in influence in this particular legislative 
area while their rankings in other areas (examples: Byrd in
finance or Aiken in foreign relations) we would expect to be 
considerably higher. Likewise, our index does not attempt 
to rank the senators in overall Senate influence or prestige. 
The influence relationship between individuals obviously 
varies according to the subject matter under consideration.
Table 3 also lists the specific roll-call votes used 
in evaluating the senators— giving the page number and issue 
number in the Congressional Quarterly Almanac where the vote 
is found. The researcher was compelled to make a subjective 
selection of what constituted important roll-call votes in 
the area covered, and recognizes that he may have included
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votes that should have been omitted or excluded votes that 
should have been included. It seems inevitable, however, 
that some amount of subjectivity and uncertainty enters into 
virtually all roll-call research in which indexes are used 
to measure the behavior of legislators on a given type of 
issue. Every effort was made to include all votes on 
significant public works issues that came before the Senate 
during this period. Included were votes on issues concerning 
major construction projects, votes on the major appropria­
tion bills and key amendment to these bills, and those votes 
that evoked extensive debate and conflict among the senators.
Leadership in Obtaining Appropriations for the 
Arkansas River Navigation Project
A final measure of Senator Kerr’s influence and 
leadership ability involves his success in obtaining needed 
appropriations for the project of chief concern to this 
paper— the Arkansas River Navigation Project, Authorized in 
1946 the first funds for the project were very slow in coming. 
His success in influencing his colleagues to fund a highly 
controversial and expensive project illustrates the vast 
power that the Senator from Oklahoma possessed. His ability 
to overcome considerable opposition from many sources and to 
persuade the Congress to fund the project (as discussed in 
detail in Chapter 4) is perhaps the best indication of his 
success in changing the course of events and in affecting 
the decision-making process in the Senate in a specific area
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of public policy. If a leader is properly defined as one 
who has the capacity to make things happen that would not 
otherwise happen and v/ho has the ability to modify the con­
duct of others in the manner in which he desires, then Bob 
Kerr was certainly a successful leader.
Robert Kerr early recognized that "the exercise of
the power (of the purse) constitutes the core legislative
28process— underpining all other legislative decisions,"
He quickly perceived that dams were not built and river
banks stabilized by the mere "authorization" of a project
but by the "funding" of that project. As a new senator in
1949, he recognized that his dream of a multi-purpose
navigation, conservation and flood control project on the
Arkansas River and its tributaries depended upon his ability
to obtain funds for the construction of four or five key
reservoirs and to obtain funds for permanent bank stabiliza-
29tion of the Arkansas and Verdigris Rivers, Kerr set it as 
one of his major goals to persuade his colleagues in the 
Congress that the needed funds should be voted. In this 
endeavor he was most successful.
Prior to 1949 the Arkansas River project had received 
less than $1 million from Congress for construction purposes. 
By 1963 the Congress had appropriated nearly $400 million and
28Richard F, Fenno, The Power of the Purse; Appro­
priations Politics in Congress (Boston: Little, Brown and
Company, 1956), p, xiii,
2QInterview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971,
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had committed itself to the balance of a $1.2 billion 
project— the most expensive public works project of its kind 
in our history. Figure 1 shows the amount of money appro­
priated for key Arkansas River projects during the period 
1949-1962. After an initial appropriation of $3.55 million 
in 1949 the funds remained in the 3 to 4 million dollar 
range yearly during the Korean War period, when construction 
at home was greatly curtailed by the requirements of the 
war. After the war was over, funds were obtained in ever 
increasing amounts and rose sharply each year thereafter.
This is in contrast to the overall Rivers and Harbors-Plood 
Control Appropriations for those years as depicted by 
Figure 2. Appropriations for public works projects nation­
wide not only declined dramatically during the Korean War 
period but also showed a slow and uneven recovery after the 
war. Appropriations for 1962 were less than 50% higher than 
they were in the pre-war years— as contrasted to the rapidly 
ascending appropriations for the Arkansas River project.
The big breakthrough came in 1955 and 1956 when 
funds for the most important reservoirs in the Arkansas 
project (Oologah, Eufaula, Keystone and Dardanella) were 
obtained. Kerr's leadership role in spearheading the drive 
to obtain these funds is well documented and discussed in 
detail in a later chapter. His attainment of the chairman­
ship of the Rivers and Harbors Subcommittee of the Senate 
Public Works Committee in 1955 seems to have further enhanced
Fig. 1— Arkansas River Appropriations, 1949-1962
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Fig. 2.— Rivers and Harbors-Flood Control Appropriations, 1949-1963
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his ability to persuade his colleagues to go along with his 
30requests. This chairmanship gave him an ex officio
position on the all important Senate Appropriations Committee,
This position provided him with the same rights and the same
vote as any other member of the committee on measures
involving Rivers and Harbors Appropriations. Likewise, it
permitted him to participate in the all important Conference
Committees where final decisions are ironed out between the
House and the Senate,
Bob Kerr took full advantage of his ex officio
position on the Appropriations Committee, While on the
whole ex officio members are not as influential as regular
Committee members, Bob Kerr seems to have been an exception.
According to one Republican member of the Committee:
They (ex officio members) don't come around very much.
One exception may be Bob Kerr, chairman of the legisla­
tive committee on public works. He's very conscientious 
and sits through a lot of the testimony on appropria­
tions. But most of them don't do much.31
Kerr not only "did much" in the committee hearings
and in the "mark up" sessions, but was "most active" in the
32conference committee sessions. He was at his best in the 
informal, "give and take" atmosphere of the conference. His 
activity in the sessions merely reaffirms the literature's
30Interview with Burl Hays, Kerr's Administrative 
Assistant, July 5, 1970.
31Quoted in Fenno, The Power of the Purse, p. 556.




here the individual senator or congressman exercises 
maximum power . . . .  Participants, secure in the 
knowledge that there is no indisputable means of 
revealing their performance, may be more candid in 
expressing their true position and quicker to desert 
that which they are charged to uphold. They can 
threaten, cajole and bargain more directly than could 
be possible were a written record maintained . . . .  
Tremendous influence works here, and rank is of little 
importance compared to parliamentary skill and persua­
sive capacity.33
Since the conference committee decisions almost always
become the decisions of the C ongr e s s , t h o s e conferees that
dominate the conference are in effect exerting tremendous
power over the entire Congress.
The central question of conference committee decision­
making is, "who wins?"— the House or Senate conferees. It 
must be answered before the other important questions of 
"how" and "why" can be broached. Yet it is impossible to 
know what "winning" means unless the preferences of the two 
sides with regard to the various conflicts at issue are 
known. In the case of the Arkansas River Navigation project 
the preferences of the two houses in regard to the money to 
be appropriated for the key projects during the period when 
Bob Kerr served in the Senate were determined. (See Table 4) 
As a rough empirical measure of "winning," it was established 
for each of the fourteen years whether the dollar outcome
33Jeffrey L. Pressman, House vs. Senate (New Haven: 
Yale University Press, 1956), p. 56.
^^Fenno, The Power of the Purse, p. 512.
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TABLE 4
APPROPRIATIONS FOR KEY ARKANSAS RIVER 
NAVIGATION PROJECTS, 1949-1952 












1949 .70 5.65 3.55 .58
1950 .50 3.02 2.66 .86
1951 3.30 5.83 4.20 .35
1952 2.00 7.15 4.15 .42
1953 2.80 4.56 3.60 .45
1954 3.00 3.00 3.00 -
1955 3.90 6.35 5.55 .67
1956 7.00 11.25 10.35 .79
1957 17.25 18.10 18.10 1.00
1958 29.94 33.94 31.94 .50
1959 44.20 48.20 45.20 .25
1960 50.13 56.90 54.90 .71
1961 82.48 82.48 82.48 -
1962 88.25 88.85 88.55 .50
was doser to the figure in the Senate bill or closer to 
the House bill. If the decision was closer to the Senate 
figure, the Senate v/as said to have "won;" if the decision 
was closer to the House figure, the House was the winner. A 
ratio of Senate victories to House victories was determined.
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A score of 1.0 indicates a "complete victory" by the Senate 
conferees; a .5 score indicates they "split the difference."
A complete House victory would be indicated by a .0 score.
The table indicates that the Senate conferees were 
more often than not "victorious" in their battle with the 
House conferees over appropriations for the key Arkansas 
River projects. In the three important years of 1955-57 when 
the initial funds for the actual construction of the major 
dams were obtained, the Senate prevailed overwhelmingly.
Kerr and his colleagues were more often than not able to 
"out bargain" and "out trade" the House conferees— and to 
obtain the bulk of the funds for the most important projects. 
For example, in 1955 the Senate bill contained $1 million 
to begin construction on the vital Oologah dam while the 
House bill contained no money for the dam. A "splitting of 
the difference" by the conferees would have in reality been 
considered a victory for the Senate since it would have 
permitted a start on the dam— something opposed by many key 
House conferees. Kerr and his colleagues were, however, 
able to obtain in conference the entire $1 million and to 
score a "complete victory" on this one key project.
The figures also show that once the initial break­
through on funds was made, the House figure generally rose 
significantly along with the Senate figure and the range 
between the two figures lessened. Prior to the obtaining of 
the first significant funds for construction in 1955, the
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overall Senate requests were often two to four times as 
large as the House requests. The range narrowed from this 
date forward until in 1961 and 1962 the difference was 
virtually nonexistent. For example, in 1956 the Senate bill 
contained $1.5 million to start construction on Keystone 
dam while the House bill contained no money. With the 
decision by the conference to adopt the $1.5 million Senate 
figure and to start construction, the difference between the 
two houses' figures in subsequent years diminished. By 1960 
the House recommendation had risen to $14.6 million for 
Keystone while the Senate figure was $17.4 million (the con­
ference accepted the Senate figure). For 1961 and 1962 the 
House and Senate figures were identical. So in addition to 
"winning" over the House in the sense of obtaining a higher 
ratio of funds for the key projects, the Senate also tended 
to narrow the range by "pulling" the House figures up to the 
Senate requests so that the differences between the two 
tended to vanish.
While it seems evident that the Senate was more 
often "victorious" than was the House in the battle over 
appropriations, the question remains as to whether the 
Senate figures accurately reflect the funds requested by 
Robert Kerr. Was Kerr able to "win" within the Senate 
Appropriations Committee (and ultimately in the Senate) or 
was he required to accept lesser figures within his own 
house? In other words, do the Senate figures in Table 4
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accurately reflect the amounts desired by Kerr?
The answer seems to be both "yes" and "no." Kerr's
correspondence, weekly newsletters, statements before the
appropriation committees of both houses and other documents
make it clear that Kerr almost always asked for more money
than was later approved by the Senate. Except for the
latter years, Kerr's requests for construction funds, bank
stabilization funds, planning funds and the like were almost
always in excess of what the Senate Appropriations Committee
approved. Yet, as an Oklahoma colleague and former member
of the appropriations committee put it, "this is very common
35and not at all unusual." Expecting that most funds will 
be cut somewhere along the way, it is "generally the case" 
for advocates of specific projects to request more than they 
feel will actually be approved. "Kerr asked for more money 
in committee than he figured he would get," said Senator 
Monroney, so it would be virtually impossible to determine 
what exact sums were desired by Kerr, It does seem clear, 
however, that according to the correspondence and news­
letters put out by his office, especially after 1954, that 
the figures that came out of the Senate Appropriations 
Committee were most acceptable to him and generally reflected 
his realistic desires. He had numerous good friends and 
allies on the Committee— especially Senators Monroney,
35Interview with Senator Mike Monroney, April 6,
1971.
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Ellender and McClellan— and they were generally able to 
work together to get through the Committee "all the funds
nr
needed for the Arkansas project." So it does seem to be
reasonable to say that while Kerr would have obviously
preferred more money than was actually recommended, the 
Senate appropriations did reflect rather accurately his 
realistic desires.
In summary, Kerr's status as an influential and 
successful leader of the Senate during his fourteen years of 
service seems to be rather substantially documented. Those 
questioned— both in and out of the Senate— were virtually 
unanimous in their feeling that the Senator exercised 
extraordinary power and influence within that body. In the
specific area of public works legislation he ranked, as
determined by roll call analysis, near the top of the list 
in success in the adoption of legislation he supported and 
in defeat of legislation he opposed. Likewise, in the all 
important area of securing funds for the furtherance of the 
Arkansas River Navigation project, his influence upon the 
appropriations process seems to have been quite significant. 
He not only originated, but was able to push through with 
considerable success, requests for sizeable funds for pro­
jects that he felt essential. This was accomplished by 
convincing the members of the Senate Appropriations Committee
1971.
Interview with Senator Allen Ellender, April 6,
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that his requests were reasonable and were needed, and then 
by bargaining, in the conference committee, successfully 
with the members of the House Appropriations Committee. 
Victory in the conference was not always his— nor was it his 
alone. But it does seem accurate to assert that it was the 
persistence and persuasiveness of Bob Kerr that was the key 
ingredient in the victory of those who wanted a navigation 
project on the Arkansas River.
CHAPTER III 
SOURCES OP KERR'S EFFECTIVENESS
United States senators, like the denizens of 
Orwell's animal farm, are all equal, but some are more equal 
than others. This unequal distribution of power is one of 
the most pervasive facts of political life; numerous studies 
have confirmed the fact that a few members exercise dispro­
portionate control over their colleagues. In the words of 
the writer in Newsweek:
Senator Robert Kerr of Oklahoma who died last week, 
had achieved the ultimate in equality. Like the other 
99 senators, he cast only one vote when the roll was 
called. Unlike most of them, he influenced the votes 
of a considerable number of his colleagues on a wide 
range of issues . . .  Kerr was correctly rated the most 
powerful member of the Senate . . .Ï
A senator's power over other senators comes from two 
principal sources: his institutional position or positions
and his personal skills and expertise. Institutional power 
comes from holding institutional positions that are assumed 
to have some power attached to them and/or place the holder 
in a strategic position in relation to substantive matters.
4Kenneth Crawford, "The Senate's Ways," Newsweek, 
LXI, No. 2 (January 14, 1963), p. 27.
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Party leaders and committee chairmen, for example, almost 
surely possess some institutional power. Personal power may 
develop because a senator is charming or skillful in his 
personal relations. It may develop because he possesses 
real expertise on specific subject matters. Senators can and 
do develop power of this sort regardless of their position 
or lack of position in the various institutional hierarchies 
of the Senate.
The two types of power complement each other. If a 
senator possesses personal skills that he can use to achieve 
the desired impact on legislative matters, his power is 
further enhanced when he achieves an important institutional 
position. And he is likely to use his personal skills to 
make the most out of his institutional position.
There are two formal systems of power in the insti­
tutional structure of the Senate: the political party and
the standing committees. A senator's overall effectiveness 
is enhanced not so much by the party that he is a member of, 
but whether his party is in the majority or not. Likewise, 
his legislative effectiveness is furthered by his leadership 
role within the party and/or his standing with the party 
leaders.
Formal Sources of Power
Political Party Membership 
Early in his first term as a senator, Kerr
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participated actively as a loyal member of the Democratic
Party, Along with his close friends and fellow freshmen
colleagues Lyndon Johnson of Texas and Clinton Anderson of
New Mexico he quickly settled into the inner circle of the
2Democratic leadership in the Senate. He renewed his 
friendship with his old schoolmate Ernest McFarland, an 
admired leader of the party in the Senate, and cultivated 
the friendship of the leader of the "southern" faction, 
Richard Russell. He was able to obtain during his first 
term appointment to the two committees he most desired— the 
Finance Committee and the Public Works Committee. Since 
the assignment of committees is a party matter Kerr’s record 
of strong party loyalty proved valuable to him at this early 
stage in his Senate career. The fact that he was affiliated 
with the majority party provided additional prestige and 
opportunities for him that did not exist for those members 
sitting across the aisle.
Standing Committee Assignments 
"The committees are where the real work of the Senate 
is done," goes the familiar Capitol Hill refrain. Its con­
stant repetition seems justifiable. It is primarily in 
committee that a senator makes his reputation with his 
associates and leaves his mark on legislation. It is in 
committee that, according to William S. White, real Senate
2Novack and Evans, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise
of Power, p. 40.
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power rests.
The true and ultimate power in the Senate resides in 
the standing committees . . . .  It makes in its field 
in ninety-nine cases out of a hundred the real decisions 
of the Institution itself. What bills it approves are 
approved by the Senate; what bills it rejects are 
rejected, with rare exceptions.^
Kerr was quick to perceive the nature of the 
committee system. Having banking and business interests 
that needed protecting, Kerr was pleased to be assigned to 
the Senate Finance Committee— the traditional protector of 
the oil depletion allowance. He was likewise able to 
obtain a place on the Public Works Committee. While the 
latter assignment did not carry the prestige of the first, 
due to his lifelong interest in conservation he eagerly 
sought the position.
At the height of his power Kerr was second-ranking 
Democrat behind Harry Byrd on the Finance Committee, second 
ranking Democrat on the Public Works Committee, chairman of 
the Senate Space and Aeronautics Committee and a member of 
the Senate Democratic Policy Committee. His chairmanship of 
the Public Works Subcommittee on Flood Control and Rivers 
and Harbors made him an ex-officio member of the Senate 
Appropriations Civil Functions Subcommittee and a frequent 
member of conference committees affecting public works legis­
lation.
Power in the Senate is not always where rules
^William S. White, Citadel (New York: Harper and
Brothers, 1956), p. 180.
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prescribe or appearances indicate it should be, but where 
it is found. In fact, senators quite often do not agree 
about the relative desirability of different institutional 
positions. Committees traditionally low on the desirability 
lists— such as Public Works, Labor and Public Welfare, and 
Government Operations— have at times provided major sources 
of power for specific senators. John Kennedy and Lister 
Hill (Labor and Public Welfare), Patrick McNamara (Public 
Works), John McClellan and Joseph McCarthy (Government 
Operations) are recent examples of this truism.^
Robert Kerr's base of power was not so much his 
major committee assignments but his chairmanship of the 
Rivers and Harbors Subcommittee of the Public Works Com­
mittee, "an obscure post that makes few headlines but much 
political h a y . G i v e n  the right circumstances, the chair­
man of such a subcommittee can be a very powerful force in 
the Senate. As one Congressional staff member put it.
Given an active subcommittee chairman working in a 
specialized field with a staff of his own, the parent 
committee can do no more than change the grammar of a 
subcommittee report.6
Kerr's aggressiveness, combined with the prolonged illness
^Nelson W. Polsby, Congress and the Presidency 
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey; Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1964), 
p. 39.
^Ibid., p. 38.
^George Goodwin, "Subcommittees: The Miniature
Legislatures of Congress," The American Political Science 
Review, LVI (September, 1962), p. 596.
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of the full committee's chairman, Dennis Chavez of New 
Mexico, made his role as subcommittee chairman a particularly 
powerful one. He not only used this position to consolidate 
his position in Oklahoma by festooning the state with public 
works projects, but placed practically all senators under 
obligation to him by promoting their pet home projects.
Every two years his subcommittee produced a bill that, in 
one way or another, put dozens of senators in his debt.
"He orchestrates that bill like Toscanini," a legislative
7expert said. The powers in the Senate— Russell, Ellender,
Johnson, etc.,— were regularly taken care of— as were many
of the "lesser lights." When Kerr needed votes from these
men in return for the favors he dispensed, he never hesitated
8to collect them.
Kerr's appointment in 1953 to the Senate Democratic 
Policy Committee proved valuable to him because it gave him 
a vote on important party matters, such as committee assign­
ments, and because it provided him greater access to the 
communication center of the Senate. If the proposition is 
correct that a person "whose position in a communication 
system is most central' to the system and provides him with 
the easiest access to receiving and sending information is
^Quoted in Joseph Kraft, "'King' of the U. S. 
Senate," Saturday Evening Post, Vol. 236, Number 1 (January 
5-12, 1963), p. 27.
gInterview with Mike Monroney, April 6, 1971.
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most likely to be perceived as a leader of the group,
then the alert senator will place a premium on knowing what
is going on within the body and upon gaining access to those
places in the group where such communication occurs and
where decisions may be taken affecting matters in which he
is interested. Between the standing committees and the
floor of the Senate there is no institutionalized spot
except the Policy Committee where such information is
regularly available. The Committee, of course, does not
monopolize the intelligence function. Important sources of
information are available in the cloakrooms, in the office
of the Secretary of the Senate, in the suites of prominent
senators, and elsewhere. But these are unregularized and
usually segmented, whereas the Policy Committee, through
its regular meetings, through the investigations of its
staff, and through its discussions of the Senate agenda, is
10an institutionalized communication center.
Membership on the Policy Committee thus may be pre­
sumed to have value because it provides access both to an 
important communication center and to the decisions of the 
Floor Leader. Close access to the Floor Leader provides 
"trustworthy" information on bills and legislative politics.
9Research by Kelly and Trow as discussed in Bernard 
Bass, Leadership, Psychology and Organizational Behavior, 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1960), p. 174.
10David Truman, The Congressional Party (New York: 
John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1959), pp. 131-2.
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cues for making voting decisions and access to the setting 
of the Senate schedule. Kerr's personal friendship with 
Ernest McFarland, Senate Majority Leader from 1951 to 1953, 
and his successor Lyndon Johnson was of further value to him 
in gaining prestige and power within the chamber.
His Policy Committee membership was of value to Kerr
in still another way. Appointments to standing committees
were generally referred to the Policy Committee and Kerr
used his position on the Committee to obtain assignments for
favored senators and for new ones he wished to help. After
the assignment of a new senator to a particular committee he
had requested, it was not unusual for him to go up to the
man, put his arm around him and declare, "Well, I got you
11your committee assignment." He was able to build up 
"credits" with new members by using his Policy Committee 
membership to obtain for them desired committee positions.
Kerr's position of power and leadership within the 
Senate as a result of his closeness to Lyndon Johnson was 
due not only to the fact that they were good, personal 
friends but also due to the fact that Kerr was instrumental 
in advancing Johnson’s career within the formal party leader­
ship. After the defeat of Majority Leader Scott Lucas and 
Majority Whip Francis Myers in 1950, Kerr led a drive to have 
Johnson named Whip. He first urged his friend Clinton Ander­
son to take the job, but the ailing New Mexico millionaire
^^Interview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971.
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declined. He next turned to Lyndon Johnson who eagerly 
accepted Kerr's backing for the post. Kerr actively began 
buttonholing votes for the Texan and was instrumental in 
persuading Senator Russell of Georgia, perhaps the most
12respected Democrat in the Senate, to accept Lyndon Johnson.
Russell doubted that the all-Southwest team of McFarland and
Johnson had the proper geographical balance. Nevertheless,
Kerr doggedly argued for Johnson, and Russell eventually 
13yielded. And so, by an uncertain, premeditated course of 
events, Lyndon B. Johnson entered the official Senate Demo­
cratic leadership after only two years in the Senate. Kerr 
was to have a close friend in high places— a friend with the 
ability and drive to be of great value to him in the years 
ahead.
Informal Sources of Power
Decentralized Nature of the Senate
It has long been recognized that Congress is a
highly decentralized political institution in which power is
14widely dispersed. Decision-making is highly decentralized, 
with power widely dispersed among committees, subcommittees.
^^Eric Severeid, Candidates 1960 (New York: Basic
Books, Inc., 1959), p. 297.
13Novack and Evans, Lyndon B. Johnson: The Exercise
of Power, p. 52.
14Lewis Froman, The Congressional Process: Strate­
gies. Rules and Procedures (Boston: Little, Brown and Co.,
1967), p. 16'.
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informal leaders and the party leadership. Standing com­
mittees are almost entirely autonomous— with the tendency 
being for Congressmen to accept the work and expertise of 
the members of the committee. In addition, for many com­
mittees (Appropriations, Public Works, Judiciary, for 
example) subcommittees are relatively autonomous. This 
dispersion of political power means that the actions taken 
by the particular committee or subcommittee are usually the 
actions which are taken by the parent body.
This specialized and decentralized system is well 
adapted to the needs of the relatively independent poli­
tician. The committee system with its many chairmanships, 
subcommittees and subcommittee chairmanships, gives a sub­
stantial number of members an opportunity to gain prestige, 
experience and influence within the Congress at a relatively 
early date. The relatively new member, especially in the 
Senate, is often able to exert influence in a limited area 
as soon as he is appointed chairman or ranking minority 
member of certain subcommittees.
This tendency for decentralized decision-making 
became more important than ever in the Senate during the 
Lyndon Johnson era. Ripley argues that Johnson as Majority 
Leader succeeded in transforming the Senate from a "decen­
tralized" institution where power resided in committee 
chairmen, regional and ideological bloc leaders in addition 
to the central party leaders, to an "individualistic"
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institution where virtually every member was able to maxi­
mize his influence and to become a "leader."
Johnson's . . .  long term impact was to help the Senate 
move from decentralization to individualism . . . .  
Chairmen have power within their committee; but com­
mittees also have powerful subcommittee chairmen who are 
not responsible to the full committee chairman or to the 
party leader . . . .  Subcommittee chairmen are the key 
legislative figures in the Senate regardless of their 
ideological stance or degree of loyalty to the party 
. . . .  (Legislative) success depended on allowing 
virtually every member to maximize his own i n f l u e n c e .
Robert Kerr's elevation in 1955 to the chairmanship
of the Public Works Subcommittee on Flood Control and Rivers
and Harbors enabled him to exercise tremendous power over
legislation that came within his jurisdiction. He freely
used his authority and power to advance legislation favorably
to the rapid development of the Arkansas River Navigation
project.
Member of the "Inner Club" of the Senate 
Kerr's power in the Senate sprang from another major 
source: his membership in the inside informal brotherhood
of the Senate. This "inner club" or "establishment" of that 
house asserts, according to the long time observer William 
S. White, a "controlling influence" upon the "inner life" 
and workings of that body.^^ The members of the "inner club 
make the decisions as to what in general is proper in the
15Randell B. Ripley, Power in the Senate (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 12-15, 31.
^^White, The Citadel, pp. 83-84.
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Institution and what in general its conclusions should be
17on high issues." These decisions almost invariably per­
vade the "outer club" and establish the general direction 
the Senate will take.
There is no list of qualifications for membership, 
either posted or orally mentioned, in this "inner club"—  
though in spirit it is largely dominated by the Southerners 
and those of a more conservative nature. Those who belong 
to it express, consciously or unconsciously, the deepest
instincts and prejudices of what White calls the Senate type
18or what Donald Matthews calls the "Senate man."
What is the "senator" role which emerges from these 
two books? It is one of a prudent man, who serves a long 
apprenticeship before trying to assert himself, and talks 
frequently even then. He is courteous to a fault in his 
relations with his colleagues, not allowing political dis­
agreements to affect his personal feelings. He is always 
ready to help another senator when he can, and he expects to 
be repaid in kind. More than anything else, he is proud of 
the Senate as an institution and ready to defend its tradi­
tions against all outsiders. He is a legislative workhorse 
who specializes in one or two policy areas and who has a 
deep respect for the expertise of his associates. In this
T^Ibid., p. 86.
- I Q
Donald Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World 
(Chapel Hill; University of North Carolina Press, 1960), 
pp. 90-93. '
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composite, the senator "as an ideal type is a man of accomo­
dation who knows that 'you have to go along to get along;' 
he is a conservative, institutional man, slow to change what
he has mastered at the expense of so much time and 
19patience."
The whole thrust of the argument presented by White,
Matthews, and others is that the non-Senate type who does
not make the inner club seldom amounts to much in the Senate.
"Eminence may be reached by a concentration on frenetic and
untypical Senatorial activity but it will never be sustained 
20in that way." The senator who violates the folkways of 
the body is less effective in getting his bills passed or 
his ambitions fulfilled.
Kerr was handicapped in his efforts to enter the 
inner circle of the Senate in at least two ways. (1) He was 
a former governor, and they have a notoriously difficult time 
adjusting to being one member of a vast deliberative body.
(2) He possessed some ambitions for higher office, and this 
often leads to significant violations of the unwritten rules 
of the body.
While these handicaps created some problems for 
Kerr, on balance, however, he generally showed a willingness 
to follow the folkways of the Senate. Matthew refers to six
Ralph K. Huitt, "The Outsider in the Senate— An 
Alternative Role," American Political Science Review, Vol. 
55 (September, 1951), p. 557.
?0White, The Citadel, p. 105.
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basic principles of which the freshman senator must be aware. 
(1) Apprenticeship— Be willing to take on the thankless 
tasks of the Senate, learn from the senior senators and 
don't speak too soon on the floor. (2) Legislative Work—
Be a "work horse not a show horse" and devote a major 
portion of your time and energy to doing your legislative 
homework. (3) Specialization— Become an expert on a few 
matters and do not attempt to become an authority on every­
thing. (4) Courtesy— Do not allow disagreements to influ­
ence personal feelings. (5) Reciprocity— Provide assistance 
to fellow senators when possible and repay in kind.
(6) Institutional Loyalty— Revere the Senate's personnel,
organizations and folkways and champion them to the outside 
21world.
An attempt to rank Kerr on these six principles as 
to his willingness to go along with them resulted in a 
generally high rating for Kerr by those colleagues questioned. 
Figure 3 shows how he was rated on each of the six by the 
sixteen respondents to our questionnaire. When asked to 
comment on his general over-all conformity to the traditions 
and customs of the Senate, they made such comments as "One 
of the best," "100%," "High," "Better than Average," "Very 
High." He ranked only medium/high on Apprenticeship, 
Specialization and Courtesy— with his lowest ranking coming
^Matthews, U. S. Senators and Their World, pp. 93-
102.
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Fig. 3.— Rating of Robert Kerr By Senate Colleagues 












in his willingness to serve a proper apprenticeship. Like 
others who have come to the Senate already accustomed to 
power:
it simply was not in Kerr to sit meekly as a neophyte 
at the knee of Dick Russell, From the beginning, he 
was deep in every aspect of Senate life: pushing
special legislation, opposing presidential nominees, 
advancing friends as candidates for Senate leadershiproles.22
Only one respondent, who wished to remain anonymous, 
consistently rated Kerr "low" in conforming to the traditions 
of the Senate,
Personal Sources of Power 
While it seems beyond dispute that one source of a 
United States Senator's power comes from holding institu­
tional positions that have power attached to them, it seems 
equally true that a man's personal qualities may become a 
significant source of power and influence. Senators can and 
do develop great influence within that body regardless of 
their position or lack of position in the various institu­
tional hierarchies of the Senate, Likewise, the two types 
of power generally complement each other. If a senator 
possesses personal skills and resources that he can use to 
achieve the desired impact on legislation, his power is even 
further enhanced when he achieves an important institutional 
position, A resourceful man will use his personal skills to
22Evans and Novak, Lyndon B, Johnson: The Exercise
of Power, p. 34.
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make the most out of his institutional positions.
The question that must next be raised is what per­
sonal skills or traits must a leader "possess" in order to 
be successful? What is the "essence" of personal leadership 
that distinguishes a leader from his followers?
Both psychological and sociological studies of 
leadership long assumed the existence of specific traits 
possessed by leaders in society and long sought to isolate 
and identify these traits. Attempts were made to draw up a 
list of those qualities that studies showed were common to 
leaders in all situations and by so doing a composite picture 
of a "leader" could be drawn. It was generally assumed that 
those individuals who failed to possess these qualities were 
seriously limited in their chances for leadership.
Recent research, however, has tended to take the
approach that there are no specific "traits" that leaders
can be said to "possess" that invariably distinguish them
from followers. Comments Gouldner: "The hypothesis that
there are some traits common to all leaders is presently
unfashionable . . . .  To consider the first question, is
there any reliable evidence demonstrating the existence of
traits common to all leaders? The answer is plainly no 
„23
The weight of current opinion is summarized in a
23Alvin W. Gouldner, "Approaches to Leadership," 
Introductory Readings in Political Behavior, ed. Sidney Ulmer 
(Chicago: Rand McNally and Co., 1961), p. 456.
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paper in which the author concludes: "No single trait or
group of characteristics has been isolated which sets off 
the leader from the member of his g r o u p . I t  follows then
that as Muzafer Sherif has stated it, "there is no leader-
? Sship quality as such; it is relative to the situation."
As the situation is changed the qualities necessary to 
leadership change, and relationships within a group also 
change. "Traits are not to be ignored or dismissed," argues 
Seligman, "but recent literature has refined our perception 
of the functional interdependence of leadership traits and 
situational factors.
Although the conception of leadership as a functional
relationship rules out the possibility that all leaders have
in common certain traits that set them off from followers,
it does not imply that in particular instances there will be
no differences between leader and led.
At any particular period in time, it follows that the 
qualifications for leadership of various groups and 
institutions will differ sharply. One whose personality 
and skills are appropriate to group leadership at one 
time may be completely inadequate at another, and one 
who is a successful leader in one group may perforce 
become a follower in another. One group situation may 
demand physical strength and courage, another oratorical
24william 0. Jenkins, "A Review of Leadership Studies 
With Particular Reference to Military Problems," Psychologi­
cal Bulletin, Vol. 44, No. 1 (January, 1947), pp. 74-75.
25]yiuzafer Sherif, An Outline of Social Psychology 
(New York: Harper and Brothers, 1948), p. 458.
Z^Lester G. Seligman, "The Study of Political Leader­
ship," Political Behavior, ed. Heinz Eulau (Glencoe, Illinois: 
The Free Press, 1956), p. 181.
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skill, another intellectual acumen, another facility 
at negotiation, and so o n , 27
What type of personality and skills seem to make for 
a successful leader in the United States Senate? What traits 
are more likely to lead to success in a situation where one 
hundred strongwilled men interact daily in the vital process 
of enacting the laws of the land? How did Bob Kerr rank in 
these personal characteristics and which ones help explain 
his success as a legislative leader?
Physical Characteristics
While physical characteristics might not to the 
casual observer seem to be an important resource signifi­
cantly influencing the success of a United States senator, 
it seems to play a part in virtually every interaction 
situation. In the case of Robert Kerr, his appearance and 
physical stamina must be counted as one of his assets in 
his years of service in that body. His huge, 6-foot, 3-inch, 
240 pound frame made his sheer physical presence imposing.
His mere presence and manner is said to have brought fear to 
his lesser colleagues and "when he walked down a corridor,"
so one Capitol observer commented, "he looked like a General
28Sherman tank in search of a target."
Kerr had an abundance of physical stamina and was
27Truman, The Governmental Process, p. 190.
^^Quoted in "The 88th Congress: What Will JFK Get?",
Newsweek, LXI, No. 2 (January 14, 1963), pp. 13-14.
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always on the go. He was a man of extraordinary vigor and
seemed almost tireless as he continued, even up to his death
29at the age of sixty-six, to put in a fourteen-hour day.
Because of his tireless and virtually unlimited energy, Sam 
Rayburn once described him as "the kind of man who would 
charge Hell with a bucket of water and think he could put it 
out."30
Kerr's speaking voice matched his physical size. He 
was a booming speaker who could arouse drowsy spectators in 
the balcony of the Senate Chamber. He did not have to shout 
to accomplish the task. His outstanding speaking ability 
made him much in demand as a speaker at all sorts of occasions. 
One year just prior to assuming his seat in the Senate he 
made over three hundred speeches— most of them requiring long 
drives or train rides. When Congress was not in session, he 
averaged perhaps twenty-five speeches a month— and was often 
booked four to six weeks in advance. From his entrance into 
public service until his death, he continued to be a popular
31speaker filling many more requests than the average senator.
Intellect
Robert Kerr possessed not only a gigantic, physical
29john Lastelic, Kansas City Star, September 15, 
1962, p. 1.
30"Death of a Senator," Time, LXXXI (January 11, 
1953), p. 23.
3^William Baker English, "Robert S. Kerr— A Study in 
Ethos" (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Okla­
homa, 1955), pp. 94-95.
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stature but a mentality to match. Called by one of his
32colleagues "the smartest man I know," Kerr had the capacity 
to grasp the most complex problems, to cut through the mass 
and the maze of irrelevance and get to the heart of a matter. 
"He was gifted with the quickest mind— the most inquisitive 
and retentive mind— that I ever saw in action on the floor
of the Senate, in the committee room or anywhere else,"
33commented Herman Talamdge of Georgia. Even his often 
times opponent and a chief Senate intellectual, Paul Douglas 
of Illinois, "regarded the Senator from Oklahoma as probably 
having the highest I.Q. in the Senate.
Kerr's encyclopedic mind amazed both friend and foe 
alike. He could recall names and faces readily, and appar­
ently never forgot a story or joke. He repeatedly quoted 
statistics and facts that other senators, because of the 
lapse of time, had long since forgotten, and often demon­
strated his expertness by quoting them at length without the 
use of notes. His mastery of detail was remarkable and his 
almost uncanny faculty for digesting and retaining whole 
doses of complex information served him well on numerous 
occasions both on and off the Senate floor. His colleague
3?Statement by Clinton Anderson, "Death of a Senator," 
Time, LXXXI, No. 2 (January 11, 1963), p. 23.
3 3U. S. Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 1st sess., 
1963, CIX, Part 3, p. 3354.
^^Quoted in Joseph Kraft, "'King' of the U. S.
Senate," p. 27.
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Albert Gore of Tennessee remarked, "I believe he v/as the 
quickest witted man I have ever known. He could match his 
wits with the keenest of men in depth of intellect, in
35quickness of perception, in mirth, in sarcasm, in pathos."
He was quick to catch the mistakes of others and 
devastating in his attacks upon the ill prepared or ill 
informed. He was at his best in the committee room in the 
process of cross-examining witnesses. Business Week 
declared, "He is disarming to the witness who has not seen 
him in action before, the witness who makes the mistake of 
believing that he has only a plain politician as an adver­
sary." And woe to the witness who came ill-prepared or 
tried to hoodwink the Senator with "shady logic."
Kerr’s ability to cross-examine is best illustrated 
by reviewing a portion of an actual committee hearing. This 
particular examination of a witness occurred in che Finance 
Committee in 1957 when the fiscal conditions of the United 
States were being examined. The exchange took place between 
Kerr and William McChesney Martin Jr., then chairman of the 
Federal Reserve Board.
Senator Kerr: You said in your report we had achieved a
degree of economic stability in 1952.
Mr. Martin: This is right.
Senator Kerr: Why are you saying now you were moving in
1953 to overcome the inflationary situation of 1952?
Mr. Martin: It got out of hand here. Do you want to
35u. S. Congressional Record, 1963, p. 3346.
^^"Changing The Senate's Finance Watchdog," Business 
Week, No. 1486 (February 22, 1958), p. 25.
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comment on this?
Senator Kerr: You are the one who made the statement.
Mr. Martin: Well, I stand on the statement.
Senator Kerr: You can’t stand on both of them, because
they are in contradiction to each other.
Mr. Martin: Mr. Riefler, I have gotten confused under
the questioning, will you bail me out of this?
Senator Kerr: Who are you?
Mr. Martin: This is Mr. Riefler, assistant to the
chairman of the P.R.B.
Senator Kerr: I'll tell you, if you can bail him out
of that one I want to get acquainted with you.
Mr. Riefler: I thought he wanted to correct himself.
He was not saying in 1951-52 we were having active 
inflation.
Senator Kerr: You can say that is what he wanted?
Mr. Riefler: That is right.
Senator Kerr: I’ll tell you if you can read men’s minds,
I want you out of this room.3'
Without a doubt Robert Kerr’s quick wit, high
intellect and penetrating mind served him well in the U. S.
Senate. Asked to list the main source (or sources) of
Kerr’s effectiveness as a senator his "high intelligence"
v/as listed by respondents to the question as often as any
other single quality. "Brains." commented former Senator
George Smathers, was the key to his success. Many other
senators agreed.
Wealth
A third resource that was to prove a value to Bob 
Kerr was that of his vast wealth. Sam Kerr's admonition to 
his son to establish himself in a business and become finan­
cially independent prior to seeking public office was indeed
37Daniel Seligman, "Senator Bob Kerr, The Oklahoma 
Gusher," Fortune, Vol. LIX, No. 3 (March, 1959), pp. 138 
and p. 179.
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taken to heart by Robert Kerr. It not only permitted him to 
finance his own campaigns with a great deal more selectivity 
and independence, but enabled him to help other candidates 
that won his favor. He entered politics in the 1930’s by 
making his money available to Oklahoma Democrats— and con­
tinued to do so throughout the rest of his life. "I
personally helped him contribute perhaps $100,000 to differ-
38ent candidates for office," commented a close associate, 
and he was frequently bringing friends into business deals 
with him contributing to their favorite "charities," and the 
like.
According to his close friend and colleague Senator
Clinton Anderson, money was a "very important lever of
power" for Robert Kerr:
Not only was he very rich himself but he had access to 
other men who were willing to spend to achieve certain 
political ends. Most of Bob’s money came from petroleum, 
in which he was a shrewd investor, and he had no hesi­
tancy in using his senatorial office to advance the 
interests of the industry. I am sure that Senator Kerr 
honestly believed that in addition to his office duties 
he had a right to look after his own fortune, and if 
people didn’t like his performance, they could vote him 
out of office.
I remember one day I took Joseph Montoya of New 
Mexico to see Bob. Joe was running in a special elec­
tion for a short term in the House of Representatives 
and, as a consequence, had no access to the regular 
party funds in our state. Joe asked Kerr for some help 
and, in my presence. Bob peeled off a number of bills, 
which I think was $1000, and handed it over. Bob Kerr 
certainly got the gratitude of Joe Montoya and me, but 
this was the kind of thing he was willing to do for
38Confidential communication.
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Congressional members when there was need for his 
help.39
While his contributions were normally to those of
his own party and to those who generally agreed with him and
voted with him on important matters, his generosity was not
always so limited. He extended financial help to Republican
Senator Margaret Chase Smith in her reelection battle in
1954 despite serious differences of opinion between the two.
According to Mrs. Smith:
In 1954 when I was first running for re-election, oil 
millionaires sent money into Maine in an attempt to 
defeat me. One reason they did was because of my 
opposition to the 27̂ 2 percent depletion allowance— on 
which Senator Kerr was their champion defender.
In spite of this and even though I am a Republican, 
Senator Kerr came to me and said that though we dis­
agreed on many issues and were of opposing political 
parties, he wanted to see me returned to, and remain in, 
the U. S. Senate because I did not hesitate to speak 
my mind. In doing so, he offered to contrihte to my 
campaign funds. I thanked him but declined to accept 
any contribution from him.
And I continued my opposition to the oil depletion 
allowance for the next six years— and still do.
When I was running for my third term in 1960,
Senator Kerr came to me and said that he did not like 
what members of his own Democratic Party were attempting 
to do to me— that whatever I needed to finance my cam­
paign he would be happy to provide himself. I thanked
him but declined to accept any contribution from him.40
Wealth was indeed one of Robert Kerr’s most valuable 
sources of power— one that enabled him to exert influence, 
both directly and indirectly, upon those who needed his
39Clinton P. Anderson, Outsider in the Senate: Senator 
Clinton Anderson’s Memoirs (New York: The World Publishing
Co., 1970), pp. 274-275.
S. Congressional Record, 1963, p. 3350.
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financial help, Albert Gore called his wealth and "finan­
cial connections" one of the two most important resources 
41he possessed.
Great Capacity for Friendship 
One final quality that proved of value to Bob Kerr 
must be mentioned, and that was his great capacity for 
friendship. Personal relations are an important factor in 
the interrelationship between leaders and followers in any 
group situation and are certainly an important factor in the 
success of any politician. All other things being equal, 
senators with wide acquaintanceships and warm relations with 
numerous colleagues will be sought out for advice more often 
than the others— and will invariably exert a greater amount 
of influence. Friendship is a strong bond in politics, as 
in life, and the affections of friendship carry over into 
the business of lawmaking. Friendship is a means of assuring 
oneself that the other fellow has your interest at heart and 
that his advice and guidance can be relied upon when needed. 
Recent research in the area of legislative leadership seems 
to verify the assumption that those legislators that are 
most influential are those that "interact at a higher rate 
than others" and that have a closer personal relationship 
with their colleagues and with others involved in the polit-




Robert Kerr had a wide range of friends. His close 
relationship with two presidents— Harry Truman and John 
Kennedy— served him well at the beginning and toward the 
end of his Senate career. As already mentioned, his friend­
ship with the Senate Democratic Leaders Ernest McFarland and 
Lyndon Johnson was invaluable to him in furthering his 
career. His closeness to such other Senate influentials as 
Richard Russell, Allen Ellender, John 5tennis, Walter George, 
John McClellan, John Sparkman and others was to prove a real 
source of power to him in his years in the Congress. He had 
a "great capacity for friendship" and was "loved" by the 
great majority of his colleagues in the S e n a t e . H e  made 
friends readily and abundantly. As Richard Russell put it;
Bob Kerr and I became fast friends within a few days 
after his service here commenced, and I have never 
enjoyed a sweeter or more satisfying friendship . . . .
He was big in his affection for his family and for those 
who were fortunate enough to enjoy the priceless boon 
of his friendship. Only those know how big v/as his 
capacity for friendship.^
Wayne L. Francis, "Influence and Interaction in a 
State Legislative Body," American Political Science Review, 
Vol. 55, No. 4 (December, 1962), pp. 953-950. An examination 
of the sixteen questionnaires received from Kerr's colleagues 
reveals that the two senators generally ranking Kerr the 
lowest in effectiveness were the two that had only a 
"greeting acquaintance" with him. Those who "worked with 
him in common activities" and "visited or entertained in each 
others home" consistently ranked him in the high brackets.
^^Remark by Senator Robertson, U. S. Congressional 
Record, 1953, p. 3341.
S. Congressional Record, 1953, p. 3349.
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He was respected and admired by members on "both 
sides of the aisle" and was "sought out for advice and coun­
sel" by a vast number of his colleagues. He was effective
as a senator because of his "fine personality" and "friendly 
45persuasiveness."
These statements should not be taken as indications 
that Kerr did not have "enemies" in the Senate or that he 
was universally liked. "He was feared by many and hated by 
some," commented a staff assistant, "and his occasional 
vindictiveness was a weakness that hurt him some. Yet when 
he 'scolded* those who opposed him, he immediately tried to 
make amends. He was a kindly man— who basically did not 
want to make e n e m i e s . F o u r  of the sixteen respondents to 
the questionnaire sent to Kerr's colleagues listed "fear" 
as one of the ways most senators felt about Robert Kerr and 
two respondents listed "distrusted" and "ruthless" as feelings 
held by many. While these negative feelings toward the 
Senator were obviously present in some, the positive impres­
sion (such as "respected," "admired," "forthright" and the 
like) seem from the questionnaires received and the inter­
views conducted more common feelings among his colleagues 
and close acquaintances.
Of perhaps equal significance to the success of Bob
45senator John Sparkman, Response to questionnaire.
^^Interview with Carter Bradley, former member of 
Senator Kerr's staff, January 14, 1972.
87
Kerr was his warm, personal relationship to his staff mem­
bers. "He was loved by all his staff" commented one of his 
associates, and the feeling was reciprocated.^^ He recog­
nized that "a staff can make or break" a politician and 
attempted to get the best possible. He paid very good 
salaries in order to get and hold good people— using perhaps
$100,000 a year of his own money to supplement his government
48allowance for staff personnel.' He was fortunate in having 
around him many dedicated and talented people.
None was more important to his success in office 
than his assistant Don McBride. Working with him from his 
early days as governor, McBride was so effective on water 
resource and conservation matters and was given such respon­
sibility and authority by Kerr that he became known by
49members of Congress as "the third senator from Oklahoma."
He was the architect of the majority of projects introduced 
by Kerr in the area of natural resources and was especially 
important to the Senator in working out the details of the 
Arkansas River project and in seeing it through to completion. 
After Kerr’s death in 1963 he continued his efforts to "keep 
the Arkansas project funded and on schedule" by working in 
various staff positions in Washington. When asked by
^"^Confidential communication.
^^Interview with Rep. Tom Steed, April 7, 1971.
^^Randall B. Ripley, Power in the Senate (New York: 
St. Martin's Press, 1969), pp. 193-194.
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President Johnson in 1967 to assume the position of Director
of the Tennessee Valley Authority, he declined to do so
until President Johnson promised to do everything in his
power to see that the Arkansas River Project was completed 
50on time.
McBride's ability was not only recognized and used
by Bob Kerr but was generally recognized by Kerr's Senate
colleagues as well. They frequently sought out McBride for
advice and assistance and accepted his opinions and decisions
as accurately reflecting those of the Senator. Senators and
others often asked Kerr for the "use" of Don McBride on
specific water projects that they were interested in— and
51the Senator was quick to "loan" them his top expert. This 
not only enabled Kerr to build up a number of "credits" with 
his colleagues but increased their respect for him as a man 
who had available to him the expertise necessary to make 
sound judgments in this specific area of public policy.
The possession of numerous resources is merely one 
ingredient affecting an individual's ability to influence 
the actions of others. Skill in the use of these resources 
is an equally important element. Many men who possess vast 
resources fail to learn how to effectively use them and are 
often less successful than those endowed with fewer resources 
who use them with greater efficiency. As Lasswell put it,
^^Interview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971. 
51̂̂Tbid.
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"yearning for power is not enough. It is essential to
acquire and exercise appropriate skill with at least a min-
52iraum degree of effectiveness."
Hard Work
Robert Kerr illustrated throughout his life that he
felt there was no substitute for hard work. Whether in
business or in politics he recognized that the successful
person "used his God-given ability well" and that this
meant a willingness to "out work" other men. According to
one of his colleagues,
Few men have, in real life, lived the American success 
story. Bob Kerr was one of them. Born in a log cabin, 
he was a self-made man who, through hard work, ability 
and initiative, became the head of a great industry and 
more important, one of the more able Senators ever to 
serve in this body . . . .  Much of this progress was 
due to his own efforts . . . .  He had courage and 
enthusiasm. He had judgment and perspective. He had 
humor. He had loyalty. And he had tremendous drive 
and ability.53
His colleague Everett Dirksen felt that the key to
his success was his "amazing capacity for hard work."
He realized better than anyone that it took hard work 
to achieve success, and his road to it was never an 
easy one. He was always willing to work, and one could 
always count on him working just a little bit longer and 
harder than his toughest competitor.54
52Harold Lasswell, "Power and Personality," in Heinz 
Eulau, ed. Political Behavior (Glencoe, Illinois: The Free
Press, 1956), p. 96.
53William Fulbright in U. S. Congressional Record, 
1963, p. 3344.
S. Congressional Record, 1963, p. 3350.
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A man possessed of "drive" was indeed an appropriate 
description of Bob Kerr. He drove himself almost unmerci­
fully at everything he did. It permitted him to rise to a 
place of eminence. Yet, this compulsion for hard work may 
also have been a contributing factor in his death. According 
to two of his closest associates, "he drove himself to 
death. He exhausted himself with hard campaigning for 
several Democratic candidates in November, 1962” and com­
bined with his strenuous activity in the Congress prior to
this resulted in the heart attack in December, 1962 that
55eventually claimed his life.
Legislative Craftsmanship 
Kerr’s talents as a legislative craftsman are 
legendary. He spent a great deal of time studying legisla­
tion and was always known as one who had done his "homework." 
His speeches on the floor of the Senate frequently contained 
such statements as, "As I sat in the committee, week after 
week, listening to the testimony in this controversy . . .
"Mr. President, I have studied the Texas Light and Power
57Contract . . .," and "The Senator from Oklahoma probably 
heard more of the evidence on the proposed legislation than
55Confidential communications.
S. Congressional Record, 81st Cong. 2d sess..
1950, XCVI, part 2, p. 2047. 
57U. S. Congre 
1949, part 9, p. 11453
ssional Record, 81st Cong., 1st sess.,
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did any other member of the Committee."58 whenever he
brought a bill to the Senate floor for action
every other Senator knew that the Senator from Oklahoma 
had done his homework. He knew the answers to any 
questions raised in debate on the bills. Bob Kerr 
mastered the intricacies of legislation dealing with 
subjects all the way from taxes to space. He knew his 
business, and all other Senators knew that he knew it.59
As a result of his assiduous concentration on 
legislation, especially those bills which had special mean­
ing for Oklahoma, he was formidable in debate and tended to 
be in control of any discussion in which he participated. 
Senator Norris Cotton described him as "almost invincible" 
in debate while Senator Alan Bible praised him for possess­
ing "the oratorical skill to drive home his points with the 
clarity of a bell and the punch of a jackhammer."^^ 
Republican Senator Thomas Kuchel spoke of Kerr as "fully 
armed in every Senate debate, there was no more powerful
adversary ever to sit in this chamber, skillful, colorful and 
,.61persuasive."
Kerr used his vast skill as a debater to push through 
legislation he favored and to "bring under an avalanche of 
wisecracks, ornately stylish rhetoric and hard facts" those
S. Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 2nd sess., 
1958, CIV, part 15, p. 19124.
59William Fulbright in U. S. Congressional Record, 
1963, p. 3344.
S. Congressional Record, 1963, pp. 3353, 3349.
G1%bid., p. 3351.
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who ventured to oppose him. He was particularly harsh on 
those members of Congress and those representatives of the 
Administration who came to the Senate unprepared to support 
their arguments.
Examples of his ability in this area are numerous.
In a floor debate in 1958 over the Lake Michigan Water
Diversion proposal Kerr quoted a treaty in support of his
argument. He then made the following statement about those
senators speaking against the bill.
Mr. President, there has been considerable debate this 
evening about a treaty between the United States of 
America and the Dominion of Canada. In my opinion, 
the debate has been engaged in by men who are unfamiliar 
with the treaty. The distinguished Senator from Vermont 
(Mr. Aiken) talked about this measure as being a pro­
posal for the diversion of Canadian waters. Nothing 
could be more inaccurate than that statement.
The Senator from Vermont (Mr. Aiken) is here. I 
shall make a statement; and if it is in error, I should 
like to have him interrupt me and correct me. I make 
the statement that, in my judgment, the Senator from 
Vermont has not read the treaty to which he has referred.
I make the statement, without much fear of contra­
diction, that the Senator from Wisconsin (Mr. Wiley), 
who discussed this treaty at great length, has not read 
it.
I make the statement, without much fear of contra­
diction, that the distinguished Senator from Ohio 
(Mr. Lausche) has not read it.62
Should a senator rise to defend himself against such accusa­
tions, Kerr would be ready with specific questions about the 
legislation. Senator Douglas, after being accused of ignor­
ance on the Rivers and Harbors and Flood Control Act of 1957, 
claimed familiarity with the legislation. The following
U. s. Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 2d sess.,
1958, CIV, part 4, p. 19460.
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colloquy took place:
Mr. Kerr: Did the Senator from Illinois attend any of
the hearings on the pending bill?
Mr, Douglas: No, I did not.
Mr. Kerr: Has the Senator examined the reports of the
Bureau of the Budget, of the Corps of Army Engineers 
or of other agencies of the Government with reference 
to individual projects in the bill?
Mr, Douglas: There are some 182 projects, I believe.
The bill was submitted to us on Monday. Since then 
we have been quite busy with the revenue bill. The 
Senator from Illinois has tried very hard to study 
the bill, and he has worked nights on it. He has 
not read all the projects. However, I have studied 
the hearings, and I may say that I hold in my hand
a report from the Bureau of the Budget, in which I
notice that— —
Mr. Kerr: Can the Senator tell me anything about the
recommendations of the Bureau of the Budget without 
referring to its report?
Mr. Douglas: Just a moment.
Mr. Kerr: Can he?
Mr. Douglas: I can answer the Senator's question much
better if I refer to the report.
Mr. Kerr: Can the Senator from Illinois tell the Senator
from Oklahoma anything about any recommendation of 
the Bureau of the Budget contained in the report 
without looking at it now?
Mr. Douglas: Yes. There is the Milwood Reservoir in
Arkansas and Oklahoma involving $53 million. The 
Bureau of the Budget recommends that it should not 
be put into effect.
Mr. Kerr: What do they say as to their reasons, and
what suggestions do they make? Can the Senator tell, 
without referring to the report?
Mr. Douglas: I do not think the Senator from Oklahoma
has the right to demand that I memorize the entire 
wording by heart. Can he quote the 39 articles?
Mr. Kerr: I am not demanding anything. I am requesting
either that the Senator from Illinois manifest some 
knowledge of this matter or stand here branded with 
ignorance of it. That is what I am d o i n g . 53
Kerr was thus a masterful, tireless debater who did
not hesitate to confront any adversary on the floor of
r o
U. s. Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 1st sess.,
1958, CIII, part 4, p. 4606.
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Congress. "He's absolutely fearless," commented his close 
associate Mike Monroney. "He'll take on anyone . . .  and 
give them a rough time until he gets his way."^^ "You think 
twice before crossing Robert Kerr," explained a colleague, 
who took seriously Kerr’s admonition, "I ask no quarter and 
give none,"^^
While his "cajolery, wheedling, invective, threaten­
ing and bludgeoning" caused him to be "feared by many and 
hated by a f e w , i t  seems that on balance his over-all 
effectiveness was increased rather than hindered by his 
legislative tactics and style. His ability to communicate 
effectively and to challenge forcefully those he faced on 
the floor and in committee earned him the respect of friend 
and foe alike. He not only possessed power but showed he 
had the legislative skill to effectively exercise it.
Master Bargainer 
One final quality of Bob Kerr’s must be mentioned: 
his vast ability to bargain, to put together a winning 
coalition by "trading credits." If, as Richard Newstadt 
argues, the essence of power in our present political system 
is based on the power of persuasion, and "the power to
^^Quoted by Seligman, "Senator Bob Kerr, the Okla­
homa Gusher," p. 137-138.
^^Quoted in "Oklahoma’s Kerr— The Man Who Really 
Runs the U. S. Senate," Newsweek, LX (August 6, 1962), p. 15.
Ĝ ibid.
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persuade, is the power to b a r g a i n , "G7 powerful leader must
be a successful bargainer. "All his formal powers, all his 
status, all his well-reasoned arguments, all his charm will 
not secure his influence if he does not know how to bar­
gain. A leader must know how to trade advantages with 
those he deals with and must be able to arrive at solutions 
of a common interest and of mutual advantage to those con­
cerned. Stogdill in a recent study of the leadership 
behavior of U. S. senators concluded that persuasiveness was
the most frequently mentioned characteristic of the success-
69ful Senate leader.
Bob Kerr indeed knew how to bargain. Called by
some "perhaps the greatest vote-trader the Senate has ever 
70seen," Kerr knew how to bargain with key individuals or 
groups in order to win their support or at least their 
acquiescence. He understood the unwritten practice in the 
Senate of "trading credits": that if a senator helps another
senator, he anticipates that when he needs help at some 
future time he will be able to obtain it from the person he 
is presently helping. Kerr's technique in this, said one
67Richard E. Newstadt, Presidential Power: The
Politics of Leadership (New York: Mentor Books, 1954), p. 45,
Ĝ Ibid.
cqRalph M. Stogdill, "The Leader Behavior of United 
States Senators," The Journal of Psychology, Vol. 55 (July, 
1953), pp. 3-8.
70Evans and Novak, Lyndon B. Johnson, p. 40.
96
longtime observer, was that he "always finds some way to
make your interest his interest. People find they need him
more than he needs them. He has a way of getting people
71obligated to him on a due bill for collecting later." One
of his closest friends in the Senate felt that "this ability
to trade on projects he supported was his greatest talent"
72and was the chief ingredient in his success.
Kerr’s fellow senator from Oklahoma, Mike Monroney,
put it this way:
His chief way of getting things accomplished was by 
"horse trading." He always had something for the other 
guy in exchange for his help. He "picked up chits" 
for backscratching . . . and would fight for any who 
wanted water and conservation help from him.?^
Kerr was most effective in bargaining for legislation
that he wanted for the state of Oklahoma. He reportedly
used his influence to push through key legislation for
President Kennedy in the area of trade and tax reforms in
exchange for a solid promise from the President to push up
74the date for completion of the Arkansas River Project. He
helped push through the Senate in 1952 the President’s 
reciprocal trade legislation despite the opposition of the 
oil industry to certain provisons in the bill restricting
Senate," p. 16 
72
71"Oklahoma’s Kerr— The Man Who Really Runs the U. S.
Confidential communication. 
73.Interview with Mike Monroney, April 6, 1971.
^^"Kerr Switches Sides to Push Trade Bill," p. 86 and 
confirmed by Confidential communication.
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that industry. "I told those guys," said Kerr, "that I have
done a lot for the oil industry, I will do a lot more, but
if I went to bat for that thing (the oil amendment) in the
Senate, I’d be beaten bad and then how’d I look going to the
President with an empty hat? , . . If I do a job on this
bill, then don’t you think I’ll have more bargaining power
75with the President for the oil industry?" Several of his
colleagues in the Congress felt he used his position as
chairman of the Senate Aeronautics and Space Committee to
locate the NASA Space Center in Houston in exchange for
help from tv/o or three important members of Congress from
Texas in getting a Federal Aeronautics Center moved to
Oklahoma and in getting added assistance for the Arkansas 
76Project. Commented his long time friend Representative
Tom Steed, "I don’t think Bob would mind me saying that it
was pretty well his position that 'if I have to get in bed
77with the devil to help Oklahoma I will do it.’"
Kerr was especially effective in using his position 
as chairman of the Rivers and Harbors Subcommittee of the 
Public Works Committee in the bargaining process. Every two 
years this subcommittee produces a bill recommending the 
construction of numerous rivers and harbors projects. Kerr's 
approval of a project was virtually essential if it was to
^^"Kerr Switches Sides To Push Trade Bill," p. 86.
nr
Confidential communications.
^^Interview with Tom Steed, April 7, 1971.
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be included in the bill. He put dozens of senators in his
debt by including their pet projects in the bill and using
his influence to push it through the Senate. For example in
the 1962 bill he won the support of such men as Kentucky
Republican Thurston Morton and liberal Idaho Democrat Frank
Church by helping them obtain authorization of their pet
projects— a $151 million reservoir in McCrary County,
Kentucky, and a $186 million dam and reservoir program for
78the Clearwater River in Idaho. It was understood, of 
course, that he could call upon his colleagues to support 
his own ideas and projects as the need arose. His close 
friend Senator Clinton Anderson put it this way;
It v/as often asked . . . how Bob Kerr became such a 
titan. Bob was recognized as the most powerful man in 
the Senate— the "king of the Senate," some called him—  
though he never achieved any position of elected leader­
ship. The answer to the question, I think, lay in Bob’s 
willingness to make any trade that would give him a 
lever on someone elsds vote. After he took effective 
control of the Public Works Committee, for instance, he 
never approved a single dam or road or river dredging 
without trading it off for something he might want in 
return. He dreamed of bringing the Gulf of Mexico all 
the way up to Tulsa, for example, and he almost suc­
ceeded in carrying it off through the Arkansas - Red - 
White River Joint project, which was advertised as a 
conservation measure but which Bob envisioned as a 
means of making Oklahoma into a manufacturing state.
Bob always managed to get his own favorite projects into 
his legislation, he was also scheming at the time about 
the other items he could include in order to get the 
necessary votes. Bob had a long memory on bills he cared 
about and he never forgot who had been with him or against 
him. He kept long lists and, when in doubt, he would 
check against them. I remember that Senator Lee Metcalf 
of Montana once told me he might not be able to vote for
7RJoseph Kraft, "King of the U. S. Senate," p. 27.
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an anti-filibuster bill because, if he did, Bob would 
take a dam away from him. And Lee knew Bob was ruthless 
enough to do just that, so he went along. From the 
time Chavez became ill. Bob applied the screws whenever 
he could and his power continued to grow.?^
Senator Douglas of Illinois, who tried unsuccess­
fully to combat this bargaining and "backscratching" system, 
analyzed the way in which a public works bill was passed:
This bill is built up out of a whole system of mutual 
accommodations in which the favors are widely distributed, 
with the implicit promise that no one will kick over the 
applecart; that if Senators do not object to the bill 
as a whole, they will "get theirs." It is a process, if 
I may use an inelegant expression, of mutual back­
scratching and mutual logrolling.
Any member v/ho tries to buck the system is only 
confronted with an impossible amount of work in trying 
to ascertain the relative merits of a given project; and 
any member who does ascertain them, and v/ho feels con­
vinced that he is correct, is unable to get an individual 
project turned down because the Senators from the state 
in which the project is located, and thus is benefiting, 
naturally will oppose any objection to the project; and 
the other members of the Senate will feel that they must 
support the Senators in question, because if they do not 
do so, similar appropriations for their own states at 
some time likely will be called into question.80
Bob Kerr's effectiveness as a bargainer and persuader
was further enhanced by his reputation for helpfulness and
thoughtfulness. Ripley argues that
mutual helpfulness is the key to accomplishing anything 
and the indispensable quality of a "good senator" . . . .  
Personal qualities help determine whether a senator will 
or will not be effective legislatively. The most effec­
tive are the most admired; admiration leads to influence 
on substantative matters. The personal qualities most 
admired are helpfulness and thoughtfulness. Senators who
79Anderson, Outsider in the Senate, pp. 273-274.
S. Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 2d sess.,
1956, CII, Part 8, p. 9153.
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build credits by being helpful to their colleagues and 
thoughtful of them can expect them to reciprocate.8Ï
Kerr quickly established the reputation for being 
helpful in legislative matters. He generally offered 
assistance to members on both sides of the aisle— to those 
who agreed with him on issues and those v;ho did not. Accord­
ing to Republican Senator Young of North Dakota:
In the years that I had the privilege of serving in the 
Senate with Bob Kerr, notwithstanding the fact that he 
probably had a reputation as being partisan, I can never 
recall a time when he was not anxious to help the 
members oggthis side of the aisle as well as those on 
his side.
And Mrs. Smith:
He was not a man motivated by narrow political partisian* 
ship. As a Democrat, he did not automatically view all 
Republicans as enemies. Nor did he permit his economic 
views to control his attitude toward those of his 
colleagues who held opposite views . . . .  (He) had 
that rare trait of a person being able to disagree and 
yet remain a friend . . . .  No other committee chairman 
ever extended to me the consideration that Senator Kerr
did.83
And to the liberal Senator Ralph Yarborough:
Texas was concerned about many water projects. I 
went to Senator Kerr and asked him to give his help in 
project after project. He placed every single one in 
the bill. There was not the slightest discrimination, 
not the slightest hesitancy, not the slightest bit of 
pettiness in him. He was a broad-gaged man. The fact 
that I disagreed with him on other major proposed legis­
lation made not one whit of difference in the Committee 
on Public W o r k s . 84
81Ripley, Power in the Senate, pp. 150, 164. 
82u, s. Congressional Record, 1963, p. 3345. 
83ibid.« p. 3350.
"̂̂ Ibid., p. 3348.
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Kerr showed a willingness to help other members 
though their problems were far from his own state. He was 
frequently called upon to campaign for colleagues, to 
appear at dedications, to make donations and the like. He 
seldom refused to be of service if it was within his power 
to do so, and as a result gained the admiration and respect 
of the vast majority of his fellow s e n a t o r s . I f ,  as 
Ripley contends, the most effective senators are the most 
helpful and the most admired, then the respect and admira­
tion shown Kerr by his colleagues was an important factor in 
his success as a U. S. Senator.
^^Interview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971.
CHAPTER IV
DEMAND FOR AN ARKANSAS RIVER NAVIGATION PROJECT:
A STUDY OF LEGISLATIVE CONFLICT
The Arkansas River was discovered by the white man 
before the Mississippi River in 1541, by Francisco Vasquez 
de Coronado. Originating as a small mountain stream at an 
elevation of 11,500 feet on the eastern slope of the Con­
tinental Divide, the river flows some 1500 miles through 
four states into the Mississippi. Coronado crossed the 
Arkansas near the present Dodge City, Kansas. He continued 
down the north bank to Great Bend and then went inland 
looking for the golden city of Quivira.
For more centuries than man can count, the Arkansas 
was left to its own devices. Whatever were nature's whims, 
the Arkansas River followed. It has only been in the last 
150 years that man has set himself the task of taming and 
reshaping the river. The early adventurous steamboat and 
keelboat captains who attempted to navigate and conquer the 
river were at least as daring as the hardy pioneers who were 
then beating back the Indians and the wilderness in the 
struggle to establish themselves in the interior of our
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nation. The successful attempt by an Army major, by the 
name of Gibson, to bring a fleet of keelboats and barges 
bearing troops and supplies up the river and into Indian 
territory in 1815 resulted in the establishment at the fork 
of three great rivers— the Arkansas, the Verdigris and the 
Grand— a fort and trading post that was to become the center 
of river activity for nearly a hundred years. For many
■1years Fort Gibson was to be the Army's westward-most outpost.
Early History of Arkansas River Navigation;
Steps Toward Authorization
The first attempt to improve the Arkansas River for 
navigation was in 1832, when Congress appropriated $4,300 
for dredging and snagging to remove perils from the river.
The first work was supervised by Capt. Henry M. Shreve, whose 
famed work with the Red River raft caused his name to be 
memoralized by the town of Shreveport, Louisiana, During 
the years prior to and following the Civil War, river 
traffic was the main source of passenger and cargo movement 
into the Arkansas Basin, but at best, travel on the river 
was an adventure that placed the "passengers in peril of 
their lives."
The Corps of Engineers, in 1881, established an 
office at Little Rock and assigned Captain Thomas H. Handbury 
to be its engineer. Captain Handbury may have made the first
4Colonel Harley W. Ladd, "A History of the Arkansas 
River," unpublished mimeographed material, 1970, p. 4.
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significant contribution to the future economic life of the 
Arkansas River Basin when he asked for a complete survey of 
the river. The first Governor of Oklahoma, Charles N, 
Haskell, in 1907 requested Congress to authorize a study of 
the river and its tributaries to determine the feasibility 
of navigation. Nothing happened. By 1910, for all practi­
cal purposes and for a variety of reasons, the steamboats
were all gone from the Arkansas River. Navigation of the 
2river was dead.
Records dating back to 1833 show the almost annual 
occurrence of major flooding along the Arkansas River. Army 
Engineer records show 63 floods at Little Rock between 1833 
and 1959 and some 50 floods at Tulsa between 1907 and 1961.^ 
As a result of one of the more disastrous floods, in 1927 
Congress authorized studies of the Mississippi River and its 
tributaries. These studies, published as House Report 308 
in 1936, showed that the levees that had been largely 
breeched during the 1927 floods were not adequate to control 
major floods and that upstream holding reservoirs were needed 
throughout the Mississippi Valley to hold these excess flood 
waters until they could be safely discharged downstream.
Later that year the Congress passed the famous Flood Control 
Act of 1936, which became the Magna Carta for the upstream
2Colonel Charles L. Steele, ’’Arkansas-Renaissance of 
a River: Part II," Arkansas Gazette, November 2, 1969, p. 2.
^"Arkansas River Floods Have Left Their Tragic Mark,"
Tulsa World, June 4, 1971, p. 6C.
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tributaries of the Mississippi. This Act was the trigger 
that started the water development of the Arkansas Basin 
along a smoother and more successful course.
In 1938 Congress authorized the Corps of Engineers to 
make a survey to determine the feasibility of a multi-purpose 
plan to develop the Arkansas River, including navigation. 
While the survey was in progress the disastrous flood of 
1943 gave the Arkansas River development plan a badly needed 
but tragic boost. The flood set records as the river over­
flowed its banks all along its course and literally cut the 
states of Arkansas and Oklahoma in half. In its wildest 
rage on record, the Arkansas exceeded maximum stages of other 
historic floods at several gauging stations in Oklahoma and 
Arkansas. It rolled over more than 500 miles of land, 
cities, houses, factories, defense plants, highways and acres 
of vitally needed grains and foodstuffs. Damage approximated 
$31 million, and twenty-six lives were lost. Again, as in 
the 1927 floods, levees along the river failed to provide 
adequate protection.^
Because of the exceptional damage suffered from the 
flood, the House of Representatives Committee on Flood Con­
trol adopted a resolution on July 2, 1943, requesting that 
previous reports on the Arkansas River be reviewed with a
U. S. House of Representatives, Arkansas River and 
Tributaries Arkansas and Oklahoma, House Document 758, 79th 
Cong., 2d sess., July 30, 1946 (Washington, 1947), pp. 5-6, 
37-39.
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view to determining whether any modification should be made 
with respect to flood control. The Tulsa District Engineer 
for the Army Corps of Engineers, Colonel Francis J. Wilson, 
argued that the problem of annual floods had to be considered 
in the light of the interrelated problems of the Basin and 
urged the Congress to provide for "multi-purpose detention 
reservoirs . . .  strategically located throughout the 
B a s i n . H e  believed that taken as a unit and efficiently 
managed these reservoirs could conserve flood waters for 
useful purposes and at the same time protect rural and urban 
property, and save human lives. These developments could 
supply new communities and growing cities with water, gener­
ate power, provide for expanding industries, reopen paths of 
water transportation, water arid areas, and establish means 
for recreation.^
On November 9, 1943, Senator John McClellan intro­
duced a bill "to provide for the construction, maintenance, 
and operation of flood control and navigation improvement, 
including dams, reservoirs, and allied structures, in the 
basins of the Arkansas and White Rivers, and for the disposi­
tion of surplus electric energy generated by the federal 
control and navigation improvements in the basins of such
7rivers."
5u. S. Congressional Record« 78th Cong., 1st sess., 
1943, LXXXIX, Part 3, p. 3936.
6Ibid.. pp. 3936-3937.
?Ibid., Part 7, pp. 9323-9324.
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The McClellan proposal was brief, simple, and 
direct. It stated a definite policy with respect to the 
construction, operation, and maintenance cf all water 
resource improvements on the Arkansas and White River, 
Navigation and flood control activities would be carried on 
by the Chief of Engineers while other activities— such as 
power generation and irrigation— would be under the control 
of existing departments and agencies of the federal govern­
ment, The McClellan Bill did not authorize any particular 
project but merely stated an overall federal policy for the 
Arkansas Basin, It was his opinion that until Congress and 
the Executive agreed upon and executed a definite plan for 
developing the nation's waterways, either by separate 
authorities such as the TVA or by some other method, it was 
advisable and necessary that some sort of general policy be 
pursued in the region of the Arkansas River,
Despite its multiple advantages, the McClellan pro­
posal v/as not completely acceptable to Congress, In fact, 
the Senate Commerce Committee, after considering the bill at 
some length, did not report it out of committee but incor­
porated some facets of the McClellan bill into the pending 
flood control legislation. Thus, the Flood Control Act of 
1944 embodied the major section of that McClellan proposal 
which had as its intent the establishment of an overall
g
policy dealing with integrated river basin development.
^U, S, Statutes at Large, LVIII, p, 887,
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The Flood Control Act of 1944 authorized the Corps 
of Engineers to make needed studies concerning the present 
and future needs of various river basins and to determine 
whether specific projects were economically justifiable.
The Corps reported to Congress in late 1944 that a multi­
purpose plan for the Arkansas River Basin was justified 
economically and that their figures showed a cost to benefit
9ratio of 1 to 1.08, This favorable report by the Corps, 
after several previous studies had failed to find economic 
justification for the project, now meant that the authoriz­
ing and funding of the project was estimated by the Corps 
to cost about $435 million and it soon became evident that 
before Congress v/as going to initiate a continuing project 
of that size a great deal of thought and study would be 
required.
Attempts to convince Congress of the wisdom of pro­
viding for a multi-purpose program for the Arkansas Basin 
were most numerous during the 1945-46 period. Many associa­
tions of local interest groups were formed— the most important 
being the Arkansas Basin Development Association formed in 
February, 1946 in Tulsa. The Association grew out of and 
absorbed members from such groups as the Arkansas Basin Flood 
Control Association formed in 1944 at Russellville, Arkansas. 
Its purpose was to unite various elements within the Basin 
and to work for the development of the soil and water resources
^Ladd, "A History of the Arkansas River," p. 15.
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of the entire Basin for the people living in the region.
Its first President and Executive Officer, Newt Graham, had
been perhaps the most active advocate of development of the
Basin since 1936 and had literally "held things together"
from that period on by keeping the issue before the Congress 
10and the people.
Another significant milestone was the formation in 
1945 of the Arkansas-Oklahoma Interstate Water Resources 
Committee, Established through the combined efforts of 
Governor Ben Laney of Arkansas and Governor Kerr, the 
Committee was responsible for preparing testimony in support 
of the comprehensive multi-purpose plan for the Arkansas 
River Basin and for presenting this testimony to the Congress, 
The Committee agreed with the majority of the Corps' 1944 
proposals for the Valley’s development, but believed they 
had found "additional benefits" which made project planning 
more economically feasible than the Corps' proposals. They 
argued that the unit costs of construction indicated by the 
Engineers were too high and that the public benefits listed 
were too low. The Corps, they stated further, had not even 
mentioned collateral benefits which would accrue to the area 
from a developed river with an adequate navigation channel. 
The Committee, therefore, not only emphasized increased 
potential benefits but also pointed out "possible minor
10ABC TV Special "The Arkansas River Navigation
Project," May 4, 1971,
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changes" in the Corps' plan which if adopted would lower
construction costs, thus increasing the economic profit
ratio of the project well above the figure of 1 to 1.08
11found by the Engineers* survey.
The Waterway Approved: Authorization
Without Appropriations
The efforts of these and other groups to persuade
Congress to authorize a comprehensive, multi-purpose program
for the Arkansas River Basin finally met success with the
passage on July 24, 1946 of the Rivers and Harbors Act of
1946 (Public Law 525, 79th Congress, 2nd Session). The Act
called for the development of the Arkansas River and its
tributaries for navigation, flood control, irrigation,
hydro-electric power and related water uses. It authorized
the construction of 28 reservoirs, 23 navigation locks and
dams, 20 local flood protection works, and a nine foot wide
12channel from the Mississippi River to Tulsa. At long last, 
it appeared that victory was in sight and that the hardy 
pioneers of the Arkansas Valley could anticipate a day when 
they would be free from the fear of floods, have an oppor­
tunity to weather searing droughts and expect a better life
11John Robert Ferrell, "Water Resource Development 
in the Arkansas Valley: A History of Public Policy to 1950,"
(unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. University of Oklahoma, 
1968), pp. 142-143.
12U. S, Congress, House, Committee on Public Works, 
Hearings, Arkansas River and Tributaries, 81st Cong., 1st 
sess., 1949, p. 2,
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from the economic opportunity that the coming of navigation 
portended.
labile the 1946 Act theoretically gave the Corps the
"green light" to proceed with the project, the Congress
failed to appropriate funds for the work. The first money
appropriated came in 1948 and was earmarked for emergency
bank stabilization of the River at Braden’s Bend in Okla- 
13homa. This $1 million appropriation was merely a stopgap 
measure aimed at preventing floods at the most critical spot 
on the river and was not considered a beginning of construc­
tion of the multi-purpose project. The Executive Branch 
failed to include in its yearly budget money for the major 
reservoir projects and those in Congress favoring such 
funding were unable to persuade their colleagues that a 
significant start on the Project should begin.
The election of Bob Kerr to the Senate in 1948 brought 
upon the scene a man who intended to rectify this situation. 
Elected on the platform that he could do and would do more 
for the development of Oklahoma’s natural resources—  
especially water— Kerr brought with him to the Senate a rich 
background of activity in support of the comprehensive 
development of the Arkansas Valley. As Governor of Oklahoma 
he spent much time in Washington working for the authoriza­
tion of the Project— taking at least one trip a year to the
13' U, S. Congressional Record, 88th Cong., 2d sess.,
1964, CX, Part 7, p. 9478.
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Capitol on behalf of Oklahoma resource and conservation 
14projects. He took his case to executive officials and
members of the Congress who were in positions to help the
Project along and gave special attention to cultivating the
friendship of key members of the Corps of Engineers. His
chief assistant for conservation matters, Don McBride,
accepted the position of executive director of the National
Reclamation Association at the end of Kerr's gubernatorial
term and began to develop valuable connections in Washington.
In this position he not only was able to continue to work on
the Arkansas Project but made it a point to become close
15friends with men who could further the Basin Project.
Additional assistance during this period came from 
Kerr's old friend and fellow Oklahoman Newt Graham. He, 
along with McBride, had been a driving force in the entire 
River Development Project from the very beginning. It was 
he who "mastermined" the drive to obtain initial appropria­
tions from Congress for a preliminary examination of the 
Arkansas River by the Army Engineers and through his close 
friendship with General Eugene Reybold, Chief of the Corps, 
was instrumental in getting Corps approval of the Arkansas 
Project. After the Board of Engineers of Rivers and Harbors 
recommended in 1945 that navigation features be deferred for 
a number of years, Reybold reversed the decision and sent
'1‘̂Kerr Papers, "Governor Kerr Says," May 3, 1945. 
T^Interview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971.
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the report to Congress with his recommendation that the 
project be a u t h o r i z e d . G r a h a m  became a mainspring of those 
Oklahoma and Arkansas groups who were working for federal 
action in the water resource field and devised strategy and 
arranged appearances for those spokesmen of the two states 
before Congressional committees.
Attempts to bring about the authorization and funding 
of the Arkansas Project by Governor Kerr and his associates 
was not limited to contacts with key Congressmen and Corps 
Officials, but included appeals to the President himself.
Kerr visited President Truman on numerous occasions when he 
was in Washington and on virtually every visit included a 
request for federal assistance to Oklahoma resource develop­
ment. In regard to the original Corps of Engineers report 
on the feasibility of the Project, Kerr was urged by Don 
McBride to
contact President Truman and have him tell General 
Reybold by telephone or letter, or both, of his personal 
interest and hope that the comprehensive development of 
the Arkansas will be included in a post-war public works 
program as is the Missouri . . . .  (If the President 
does this) it will be done. If anyone less than the 
President expresses this hope, we believe the Chief will 
hesitate to ask the Board of Engineers to expedite their 
study, although they have now had the Arkansas River 
study longer than that of the Missouri before decision.
Soon thereafter Kerr wrote the President and
^^"Newt Graham Led Fight For Arkansas Navigation," 
Tulsa World, June 4, 1971, p. 13C.
^^Kerr Papers, Letter from McBride to Kerr, August 10,
1945.
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requested his help in the matter as suggested by McBride, 
Through his military aid General Harry Vaughan, the President
urged the Chief of Engineers to complete and forward as soon
"1Ras practicable the Arkansas River study. This was quickly 
done.
After authorization was achieved, Kerr continued to 
contact the President in regard to funds to start construc­
tion. He followed Newt Graham's admonition to "go to the 
White House (and) say to President Truman that you hope he
will do for the Arkansas what another Democratic president
19did for the Missouri," In 1949 Truman proposed, and the
Budget of the Bureau included, a request for $3 million to
start construction of a key reservoir, Eufaula. Although
funds for the reservoir were approved by the House that
?0year, they were eliminated in the Senate.'
IVhile Bob Kerr's early attempts as a senator to 
obtain needed funds for the Arkansas Project were generally 
unsuccessful, he was able to accomplish two things of 
significance to further the Project in his first two years 
in office. He introduced on April 13, 1949 a bill to
18Kerr Papers, Letter from General Vaughan to
19"Newt Graham Led Fight For Arkansas Navigation,"
Governor Kerr, September 25, 1945. 
p. 13C.
20Kerr Papers, "Statement of Senators John L. McClellan 
of Arkansas and Robert S. Kerr of Oklahoma Before the Sub­
committee on Army Civil Functions of the House Appropriations 
Committee," May 9, 1951, p. 3.
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establish the United States Study Commission on the Arkansas- 
VJhite and Red River Basins. It called for a comprehensive 
survey of the Arkansas-White and Red River Basins by a 
federal inter-agency committee in cooperation with the eight 
states in the basins, Kerr felt that proper resource 
planning and development of the River Valleys required the 
assembling of all available information on the area and co­
operative planning on the part of all agencies and states 
involved. This he hoped to accomplish through the intro­
duction of Senate Bill 1576.
Kerr’s purpose in proposing an inter-agency study
commission seems to have centered around the idea that by
getting the various states and federal agencies involved in
drawing up an overall plan of resource development for the
affected area there was a greater chance that the Arkansas
21River Navigation Project would finally be accomplished. 
Conflicts between various federal agencies, especially the 
Corps of Engineers, the Bureau of Reclamation and the Soil 
Conservation Service, over their respective authority and 
responsibility in the area of conservation and natural 
resources development seemed to Kerr to present a major 
obstacle in the fulfillment of his "dream" of a comprehensive, 
multi-purpose plan for the Arkansas Basin. In addition, 
interstate disputes, federal-state disputes, and disputes 
between the advocates of "big dams" vs "little dams" further
P 1Interview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971.
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complicated the picture. Kerr felt that by getting all the 
"combatants" involved and working together on a comprehen­
sive survey that his chances of getting the needed Arkansas 
Projects authorized and funded would be greater.
Kerr believed the study commission would provide 
information which, combined with program goals and prefer­
ences, could aid in reaching policy decisions based on the 
resources of the area as a single integrated unit for 
planning purposes rather than by the project-by-project 
approach. The major significance of this would be that 
future authorizations and appropriations could then be based 
on the unitized regional plan rather than on a particular 
project, such as a specified flood control structure in the 
lower part of one of the basins. Explained Kerr
Oklahoma will be in line for more projects if they 
are investigated and appraised on a basin-wide basis 
. . . .  The balancing of all economic benefits against 
all costs assures a favorable margin. This makes it 
possible to justify federal funds for desirable needed 
projects which could not stand alone on their own economic 
feet. For example, many irrigation and municipal water 
supply projects in western Oklahoma could be justified 
because of the excess economic benefits in the larger 
multi-purpose projects in the eastern portion of the
state.22
Under the terms of the proposed legislation, the 
commission was to exist only until its planning work was 
complete. It would not supplant any existing agency nor 
interfere with projects already proposed or authorized. The
22xerr Papers, Press Release "Oklahoma Launched Into 
Big New Development," May 25, 1950,
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bill contained no authority for any actual construction or 
development. Despite the support of most of the federal 
agencies involved and the support of seven of the eight 
states in three basins, opposition to the "Kerr Plan" 
developed as hearings began on the proposal. Chief opposi­
tion came from the Corps of Engineers and other downstream 
interest groups. The Corps argued that the federal agencies 
had sufficient authority, that "comprehensive studies" had 
already been prepared, and that adequate machinery existed 
already for coordinating the resources planning activities 
of the federal agencies. Therefore, the Corps official
concluded, a special inter-agency and state effort was 
23unnecessary.
After several minor modifications of the "Kerr Plan" 
in the Senate Public Works Committee, the bill was passed by 
the Senate, Due to opposition by key Public Works Committee 
members in the House the plan failed to pass the House. In 
conference, the bill was amended by deleting the key section 
and substituting in lieu thereof a provision providing for 
the Chief of Engineers, in cooperation with other Federal 
agencies, to make a comprehensive survey of the land and 
water resources of the Arkansas-White and Red River Basins 
in Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Texas, New Mexico, Colorado,
23U, S, Senate, Flood Control— Rivers and Harbors: 
Hearings before a Subcommittee of the Committee on Public 
Works on H.R, 5422, Part I, 81st Cong,, 2d sess,, 1950, 
pp. 638-644.
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Kansas and Missouri. Thus, the bill as finally passed made 
the Corps the dominant agent in the survey and substantially 
altered the original intention of the Kerr proposal.
Despite the fact that Kerr's plan had, according to
Don McBride, "practically been vetoed by the Corps," and
could at best be considered only a "partial victory" for 
25Kerr, the loss of a battle did not mean the loss of the 
war. President Truman had from the beginning supported 
Kerr's proposal of a comprehensive survey carried out in 
such a way as to take fully into account the interests and 
responsibilities of all Federal agencies in the area. He, 
like Kerr, originally preferred an independent inter­
departmental commission assisted by an eight-state advisory 
committee responsible for gathering the needed information 
and making needed recommendations. So the President was 
most receptive to the suggestion made by Kerr that he use 
his executive perogative to "set up an Inter-Agency Committee, 
consistent with H. R. 5472 as passed by the Congress," to 
accomplish the original purpose of the Kerr Plan and to give 
the other agencies equal consideration in the planning and 
execution of projects. "Although I believe," wrote Kerr,
"that the Study Commission, as approved by you and as pro­
vided in the bill as it passed the Senate, would have been
^^Kerr Papers, Letter from Robert Kerr to President 
Harry Truman, May 5, 1950.
^^Interview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971.
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more desirable, I am convinced that a Committee such as 
herein recommended can accomplish more of the results 
sought.
In an executive order to the Secretaries of Agri­
culture, the Array, Commerce, and the Interior, the Federal 
Power Commission, and the Federal Security Administrator, 
the President instructed them to "organize an inter-agency 
committee, formulate procedure, and map out a joint plan of 
investigation, indicating specifically the precise respon­
sibilities of each and the prospective allocation of agency 
resources to the joint effort. Because of the language con­
tained in H.R. 5472," he continued, "it seems desirable that
the Department of the Army be designated as the chairman
„27agency."
As a result of this order to the Executive Depart­
ments by the President, Bob Kerr was able to set in motion 
an inter-agency study that was to eventually issue a single 
comprehensive report that was to prove of value to the 
Arkansas River Navigation Project, Comments McBride, "Kerr’s 
entry into the White House helped him overcome legislative 
opposition and overcome opposition of the Corps . . . .  
Truman’s order to the Executive Departments provided Kerr 
with the real victory."28
25Kerr to President Truman, May 5, 1950.
2?Kerr Papers, Copy of letter sent to Secretaries and 
Agency Heads, May 18, 1950.
28Interview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971.
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While the Inter-Agencies Report, published in 18 
volumes in 1955, was to be of value to Bob Kerr in .obtaining 
funds for major construction beginning in that year, a second 
accomplishment on his part in his first years in the Senate 
must also be considered. The Flood Control Act of 1948 
authorized the construction of three small dams in northeast 
Oklahoma designed primarily for flood control purposes.
Kerr was persuaded by his two chief water resource advisers, 
Don McBride and Newt Graham, that the multi-purpose Arkansas 
Project would be furthered by the substitution of one large 
dam in the area. Keystone Dam, for the three smaller ones.
The "little dam" vs. "big dam" controversy v;as of long 
standing in the Arkansas Basin and included many elements of 
disagreement about the most desirable water development and 
water conservation methods. The practice of constructing 
many "little dams" throughout the basin was supported by 
such groups as the Soil Conservation Service which felt this 
v;as the best way to prevent flooding and to provide water 
for irrigation purposes. The private utility companies 
favored the smaller dams because they eliminated the danger 
of cheap public power that could be generated by the larger 
dams. Likewise, the railroads favored them because there 
would be less dislocation of their tracks and because there 
would be no threat of water navigation to compete with the 
services of the railroad.
The Corps of Engineers generally supported the "big
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dam" concept and urged, along with Senator Kerr, the Congress 
to replace the smaller Mannford, Taft and Blackburn Reser­
voirs with Keystone Reservoir, Based on facts supplied him 
by the Corps, Kerr argued before the Senate Committee on 
Public Works that the smaller dams should be replaced because 
Keystone would (1) cost less, (2) increase benefits in the 
way of flood control, (3) increase hydroelectric power pro­
duction, (4) save valuable agricultural land from inundation, 
and (5) provide badly needed municipal and industrial water.^9 
It was felt that whereas the smaller dams could not include 
hydroelectric power production and city and industrial water 
storage as factors in determining the cost-benefit ratio, 
the larger dam would do so. Newt Graham argued before the 
Committee that Keystone's flood control value alone would
produce a public benefit ratio of 1,31 to 1 while the
30smaller dams ratios were barely 1 to 1,
Based on testimony by Kerr, Graham, Corps representa­
tives and several Oklahoma residents the Congress eventually 
concluded that the substitution of Keystone for the three 
smaller dams was desirable and the provision was included in 
the 1950 River and Harbor and Flood Control Act, This ability 
to achieve authorization for a controversial "big dam" was
29U, S, Senate, Hearings Held Before Subcommittee 
For Flood Control and Improvement of i^ivers and Harbors of 




early evidence of Kerr’s impact upon the water resource
policy of the Congress and was considered one of his first
31major accomplishments in the Senate.
The outbreak of the Korean War in 1950 was a serious 
blow to advocates of the Arkansas River Project as work and 
planning on the various projects was virtually suspended 
until the cessation of hostilities. Money appropriated for 
such dams as Dardanelle in Arkansas and Oologah in Oklahoma—  
for planning purposes, for acquisition of the dam sites, for 
construction of access roads, etc.— was often not spent as 
the Corps of Engineers shifted its activities to military 
construction. The stipulation by the Congress that "no 
planning shall be started on any new project, or unauthor­
ized project, or continued on any old project unless certified 
by the President as necessary to the defense effort" resulted 
in a nearly four year delay for most projects in the Arkansas 
Basin.
The Battle for Appropriations: The
Conflict Continues
The end of the Korean conflict did not, of course, 
automatically result in immediate resumption of the Arkansas 
Project by the federal government. Obstacles still stood in 
the way of full scale construction of the needed reservoirs 
and related facilities— with opposition coming from many
31 "Newt Graham Led Fight For Arkansas Navigation,"
Tulsa World, p. 13 C.
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sources» A new administration had come into power in Wash­
ington— headed by a President of the opposition party. Many 
key members of Congress had yet to be convinced of the 
wisdom of spending the vast sums of money that would be 
required to bring to completion this enormous project. 
Opposition continued on the home front with various Oklahomans 
attacking the plan for a wide variety of reasons. Pressure 
groups representing oil interests, the railroads, private 
power companies, Indian interests, individuals who were to 
lose their homes and farms, and a horde of other concerned 
citizens fought the Project in Oklahoma and in Washington,
In a real sense the battle to develop the Arkansas Valley 
was most fiercely fought in the period of the mid and late 
1950’s, with the outcome even up to the end often in doubt. 
Those opposing the Arkansas Project gave a wide 
variety of reasons why it should not be completed. Chief of 
these reasons was the argument that it was a "gigantic pork- 
barrel boondoggle" that could not be economically justified. 
The tremendous expense anticipated should the entire project 
be fully funded would make it the most expensive civil works 
project in history— a $1,2 billion dollar "ditch," as com­
pared to the $380 million Panama Canal or the $431 million 
St, Lawrence Seaway, Arguments were advanced by opponents 
that it would be cheaper to "pave the river" rather than to 
turn it into a navigable canal for large vassals or that for 
$1,2 billion a railroad could be built paralleling the river
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and goods shipped free on the railroad for a hundred years
32or more. Opponents criticized the supposedly objective 
benefit-to-cost standard used by the Corps of Engineers for 
deciding whether a project is worthy of approval, and felt 
that if the costs and benefits of the Project were fairly 
computed the resulting ratio would be less than the required 
1 to 1 (one dollar of benefit for each dollar spent). The 
flexibility in the process used by the Corps to determine 
the benefit-cost ratio meant, said one man who worked with 
the Corps on Capitol Hill, "that controversial projects are 
recomputed until they come out right . . . . "There is 
enough room in the benefit-cost ratio for the Corps to be 
responsive to strong members of Congress who really want a 
project."^^
Kerr and other proponents of the Project were quick 
to answer their critics, especially as to the economic value 
of the completed project. They argued that public spending 
on public works projects was not money wasted but money 
invested. A project such as the Arkansas Navigation System, 
he commented,
32Interview with Senator Mike Monroney, April 5, 
1971. Former Senator Monroney admitted thab he was one who 
originally felt it would be "cheaper to pave it" and that he 
used this argument in his successful campaign for the Senate 
in 1950 against Senator Thomas.
^^Quoted by Elizabeth B. Drew, "Dam Outrage: The
Story of the Army Engineers," Atlantic. Vol. 225, No. 4 
(April, 1970), p. 56.
125
does not cost the taxpayers one penny. In fact, it is 
an instrumentality whereby the taxpayers save money, 
whereby revenue is created for the Treasury of the 
United States . . . .  The total benefits (of the 
Arkansas Project) over the useful life of the project 
will be 12 times the initial investment. So, what has 
been described by some as "boon-doggle" and "pork 
barrel" is paying off about as well as A T & T stock 
. . . .  So, I disclaim the tag of "spender." I am an 
investor in the human and natural resources of this 
great country, and I know the investment will pay great 
dividends to all of us, including the o b j e c t o r s . 34
Kerr pointed out in this letter, written just before
his death, that total annual benefits of the Navigation
Project were already estimated at $64.5 million. This
included annual flood benefits of $7.5 million, annual power
revenues of $9 million, annual savings to transportation of
$40.5 million, and miscellaneous annual benefits of $6
million. This was based on the "old criteria" used by the
Corps to estimate benefits and was considered by Kerr as a
very conservative estimate. "There is no reason to believe
that the Arkansas River Project will not follow the same
pattern as other inland waterway projects," he argued,
"which have far exceeded the benefits estimated to accrue
from them."^^
He was quick to assemble specific facts concerning
specific savings to prove his point. For example, after the
heavy rains and floods in certain parts of Oklahoma in April
1957, he got the Corps of Engineers to estimate, from past
^^Kerr Papers, Letter from Kerr to Hr. Victor E. 
Van Duzer, November 16, 1962.
35Ibid.
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floods, the amount of flood damage prevented by the already 
constructed Pensacola, Ft. Gibson, Tenkiller and Wister dams
O C
— four smaller dams located in the flood area- In refer­
ence to devastating floods that hit part of four states in 
the summer of 1951 he took exception with those who have 
"sneered as they claimed the comprehensive development of 
the Arkansas-Red River waterbeds would cost more than a 
half billion dollars. The present flood in eastern Kansas 
will do more than a billion dollars of actual damage in 
western Missouri, eastern Kansas, northeast Oklahoma and
Arkansas. This would pay all the costs for the completion
37development of the Arkansas Watershed." On the 25th 
anniversary of the federal governments participation in 
nation-wide flood control he pointed out that of the approx­
imately $4 billion spent nationwide by the Corps of Engineers 
on flood control projects since 1936 that approximately $10 
billion in property had been saved in that 25 year period.
In addition its frequency of floods claiming 100 or more 
lives had been cut from 1 every 3 years between 1900 and 1940 
to about 1 every 10 years since 1940, when the initial 
effects of flood control began to be felt.38
U. S. Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee on 
Appropriations for Public Works, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957, 
p. 369. The Corps estimated savings of $995,000 to bottom 
lands, towns, highways, utility lines, and the like.
37Kerr Papers, "Senator Kerr Says," July 19, 1951
^^Kerr Papers, "Department of Defense News Release," 
June 21, 1961.
127
In addition to flood control benefits derived from 
public works projects such as the Arkansas Project, economic 
benefits from lower transportation costs would be enormous. 
It was felt that once the Arkansas Basin was opened up to 
water transportation, charges to users in the area would 
rapidly demonstrate the economic wisdom of the Project. As 
Representative Tom Steed put it:
A major hang-up in Oklahoma in so far as attracting 
business is concerned has been the discriminatory 
freight rates. Freight charges are made by "ton mile­
age." Oklahoma has lots of miles but not many tons.
As a result rates have been high. Thus the state has 
been hurt economically as new businesses have by­
passed Oklahoma . . . .  If we had even one barge a 
year we could declare lower freight rates. As an 
example, because we had barge traffic into Oklahoma in 
1970 wheat farmers obtained a 6 cents per bushel cheaper 
rate than if the Arkansas River had not been open.39
Bob Kerr put it this way:
I ’ll tell you what navigation will do for freight 
rates. For instance, take fertilizer to the farmer. 
Instead of paying $10 per ton average as he is nov/ pay­
ing for freight on commercial fertilizer, he will get it 
for $2,50 . . , . The Federal Government owns enough 
coal adjacent to the Arkansas to receive an increased 
royalty thru low-cost water rates in the next 50 years 
to paty for this entire navigation project.40
Barges plying the Arkansas would give Oklahoma producers
direct water access to virtually all parts of the nation.
According to Arrell Gibson:
The U. S. Geological Survey estimates that the Arkansas 
barge canal will tap the nation’s greatest source of 
energy fuels— Oklahoma’s oil, gas and coal. Besides 
providing the Sooner State with a cheap transportation
39interview with Representative Tom Steed, April 7,
1971.
40Kerr, Land, Wood and Water, pp. 302-3.
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route to the sea, it will connect Oklahoma with 
northern and eastern cities via a vast 30,000 mile 
inland waterway lying along the Mississippi, Missouri 
and Ohio, At present transport rates, savings for Okla­
homa are expected to run something like this: steel
will move from Pittsburgh at a savings of two dollars 
per ton; and newsprint at a reduction of 4 dollars per 
ton. Shippers will save more than 13 cents per bushel 
on wheat from Oklahoma to New Orleans, well over one 
dollar per ton on coal, and oil transport prices will 
be substantially lower, too.41
These last savings, on petroleum products, were 
shown in the Army Report for the Arkansas to be the most 
important tonnage savings. As Newt Graham pointed out in 
his testimony before the House Committee on Public Works in 
1949:
Today 74 percent of the refined oil products manufactured 
in this area must find markets away from the area and to 
find such markets our refiners must absorb an increasing 
amount of the freight costs , . , , Let us present an 
example. The Chicago market is our largest present 
outlet , , . , Our transport cost to Chicago is nov; 
4,1148 cents per gallon; and if the increase demanded is 
granted, it will be 4,6728 cents per gallon.
Mississippi River refiners are moving gasoline by 
water to Memphis at three-quarters of a cent per gallon, 
to St, Louis at 1 cent, and to Chicago at lh cents per 
gallon, and to meet rhis competition our refiners are 
absorbing rail freight costs of 2 to 3 cents per 
gallon . . .  .4?-
As Graham went on to point out, as competitors 
obtained access to water transportation not available to 
Oklahoma producers business was seriously hurt. He pointed 
out that this transportation handicap cost Oklahoma over 50
4ÏArrell Gibson, Oklahoma; A History of Five Cen­
turies (Norman: Harlow Publishing Corp., 1965), pp. 463-4.
4?U, S, House, Hearings on the Arkansas River and 
Tributaries, Arkansas and Oklahoma, 81st Cong., 1st sess., 
1949, p. 73.
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percent of its gasoline refinery capacity since 1927,
Between 1927 to 1946 the region dropped from about 14 percent 
of the total number of refineries in the United States to 
about 6.5 percent. Fifty-eight refineries were dismantled 
and abandoned during this period as a result of this 
restriction of marketing processes.
Senator Kerr was convinced that while industrial 
growth and development along rivers such as the Tennessee, 
the lower Mississippi, The Illinois Waterway, and the Ohio 
had been phenomenal, that growth along the Arkansas would 
actually or proportionally be greater. Quoting the Chief of 
Engineers Major General E, C, Itschner who felt that the 
great development of such areas as the Ohio Basin had been 
based on three things— abundant coal, cheap water transpor­
tation and abundant water supply— "here in the Arkansas 
Basin," he said, "the same elements are present with oil and 
bauxite in addition. Once waterway transportation is avail­
able for the hauling of bauxite and pig metal and fuels, 
once hydro-power is available near at hand to backstop the 
low-cost power advantage inherent in the coal resource and 
the easily available natural gas, once water-supply possi­
bilities are developed to the fullest possible extent, the 
Arkansas Basin will possess the physical attributes needed 
for truly great e x p a n s i o n , J u s t  as in the decade of the 
50*s, a billion dollar investment annually along the Ohio
^^Kerr, Land, Wood and Water, p, 184,
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had enabled that area to surpass the Rhine, Europe's
"chemical valley," and to outproduce the fabulous coal-rich
Ruhr, Kerr felt that the unique combination of natural
wealth along the Arkansas would enable it, once unlocked by
the magic of low-cost transportation and ample water, to 
44outdo them all.
Not only did Kerr and other proponents of the Arkan­
sas Project attempt to justify this vast project on economic 
grounds, but every effort was made to prove it was in the 
nation's best interest from a security standpoint as well. 
Kerr was convinced that in order for the United States "to 
maintain our security and reinforce our world position— the 
basic elements of our economic strength (land, wood and 
water) must be diligently conserved and wisely used.
President Kennedy has said," he continued, "we must negotiate 
with the Russians from a position of strength, and this 
report (on resources) verifies the fact that the basic
foundation of our enduring strength consists of our natural
,,45resources."
Kerr v;as very concerned that a "pagan and Godless" 
nation such as Russia should use her resources more 
efficiently than the "most advanced and enlightened nation 
in the world." He took seriously Krushchev's boast: "We
44ibid., p. 172.
45U. S. Congressional Record, 87th Cong., 1st sess.,
1961, CVII, part" 2, p. 1412.
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declare war on the United States in peaceful production . . , 
We will win over the U, S.," and felt that military defeat 
might very well follow economic failure. "Krushchev says 
they can and will win. Our survival requires that they 
can’t and won’t."^^
In his 1961 book Kerr commented at length concerning 
this problem:
While the Communists no doubt cheer the Americans 
who apply the ’pork barrel’ epithet to U. S. water 
resources development, I am sure that no Russian would 
ever apply the term to any part of the huge Soviet river 
basin construction program . . . .  Russia's widely- 
touted ’peaceful economic war of production' is sparked 
by a gigantic program for electrical power . . . .  The 
Communists invariably quote their founder, Lenin, who 
stated emphatically that the strength of Russia rests 
on the Communist party and ’the electrification of all 
the country.’
I VMS astonished to hear the extent and progress of 
the Soviet electric program as depicted both by Senator 
Ellendcr (after his recent visit to Russia) and General 
Itschner, at a Senate Committee hearing in 1958. To 
keep posted on this powerful mobilization, a Senate sub­
committee was dispatched to Russia for a most thorough 
inspection . . . .  They (Moss, Gruening and Muskie) 
criss-crossed Russia for 13,000 miles; climbing dams on 
a dozen mighty rivers, closely inspecting various instal­
lations and appraising Soviet technical skill.
By January 1960, they had delivered to the Senate a 
200 page eye-witness report unveiling a crash program 
of electric power . . . .  The Senate observers summed 
up the outlook this way: "Although the U. S. is still
far ahead, with 142 million installed kilowatts at the 
beginning of 1959, compared with 53 million in the 
U.S.S.R., the Russians could overtake us in 1974— in 15 
years— unless we sneed up or they slow down . . . ." 
According to General Itschner their inland water way 
projects rival ours and their planned development 
probably surpass ours. They have larger irrigation 
projects than ours, and they are probably irrigating new 
acres at least as fast as we are . . . .  Russian 
strides in water development are due mainly to an
^^Kerr, Land, Wood and Water, p.
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all-out effort . . . . We must gear our resources for 
maximum growth and strength. Russia and Red China, 
dedicated to the brutal task of overcoming and dominating 
our civilization, are pressing dangerously onward. We 
can and will meet this challenge, by making full use of 
our abundant soil and water r e s o u r c e s . 4?
The Senator obviously felt that the national interest required
that we not fall behind in our natural resource development
program.
A final argument used by Robert Kerr to convince 
opponents of the Arkansas Project that it was a badly needed 
program was that of the desperate need to conserve our 
natural resources. Nothing was more abhorrent to him than 
the wasting of our "God-given" resources. His deep, almost 
religious, feeling about conservation led him to argue it 
was man's duty "before God" to use prudently and wisely the 
good things of life God had entrusted to him. "God created 
this earth," he observed, "and then he directed men to hus­
band the earth, to dress it and use it, to be a steward of 
its unlimited resources.
He compared the overall policy of irrigation in 
America and in the Arkansas Valley to the Old Testament 
instructions to Joseph to store up grain in times of abundance 
for the seven lean years. "We store water in reservoirs and
49ponds to be used in the dry months and years," he explained.
^^Ibid., pp. 323-339.
43Kerr Papers, Mimeographed copy of speech delivered 
in Muskogee, Oklahoma, March 12, 1960.
49Kerr, Land, Wood and Water, p. 132.
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When Jesus said to his disciples, "the works I do ye can do,"
Kerr felt this a command to man to use his reason and energy
to control nature and to turn it into an instrument for the
betterment of mankind. He viewed his over-all soil and
water program as consistent with man's good and with God's
will. He commented early in his career:
We are going to make a new girl out of Old Mother Earth. 
Time has weighed heavily on her surface. She has been 
wrinkled and seamed by erosion. She cannot keep pace 
with the demands of today. But the magic of modern 
engineering will give her new life. Her contour will be 
put back in shape. She will become more productive.
Yes, Old Mother Earth will be just like a new girl. And 
boy oh boy, the opportunities she is going to h a v e . 50
Kerr saw the millions of acre-feet of water and the
valuable inches of top-soil washed wastefully downstream and
into the oceans each year. He saw floods followed by
droughts as little v/as done to regulate the flow and to
conserve the water for productive use. Valuable minerals
were wasted, needed crops destroyed, and man's most essential
resource, water, was allowed to go unharnessed. If man
would only take the time to plan the orderly development of
these God-given treasures:
topsoil, washed away by the million of tons, could be 
sowed and put to permanent use. With ample moisture 
from ground-water for irrigation, the fields would 
flower. Our clogged and sluggish streams could be 
opened to the waterways of the world, . . .  our thirsty 
cities could be served, and still have plenty of water 
to build industry. The unused power of the rivers could 
turn the turbines of hydroelectric plants in a grid of 
low-cost power to cover the a r e a . 5'!
SOKerr Papers, "Senator Kerr Says," May 3, 1951. 
S ^ - K e r r ,  Land, Wood and Water, p .  344.
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He argued for a comprehensive resource policy for 
the Arkansas Basin, therefore, not only because it was a good 
economic investment and because it was essential to our 
national interests, but also because the conservation of our 
natural resources was man's "God given" responsibility and 
was necessary for the good life here on earth.
CHAPTER V
THE SUCCESSFUL COMPLETION OF THE ARKANSAS RIVER 
NAVIGATION PROJECT: AN EXERCISE IN
LEGISLATIVE LEADERSHIP
Compared with the decades the Arkansas River Naviga­
tion Project was in the talking and planning stage, the 
actual construction phase took only 14 years. Studies begun 
in the late 1920’s did not culminate in the authorization of 
the $1,2 billion project by Congress until 1945. Almost 
another decade was required before substantial construction 
funds were voted. Moreover, except for the Oologah Dam—  
which stood on its own feet as a badly needed control 
project— and emergency bank stabilization work, actual 
construction on the key reservoirs did not start until 1957. 
Although construction proceeded rather rapidly once begun, 
this should not be construed to mean that once funds were 
obtained and the actual work begun that successful completion 
of the Project was a foregone conclusion. Obstacles of 
almost every conceivable type were encountered— requiring at 
times herculean efforts to overcome. For years the waterways 
stood at the head of every list of "pork barrel" river pro­
jects picked out by critics for condemnation. That it was
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able to move ahead so rapidly once started is an eloquent 
testimonial to the power of the political forces mobilized 
behind it.
The Breakthrough Year— 1955
Perhaps no single year was more important to the 
eventual success of the Arkansas River Project than the year
1955. Following the elections of 1954 the reorganization of 
the Senate found Bob Kerr as the chairman of the newly 
created Rivers and Harbors Subcommittee of the Senate Public 
Works Committee. Kerr's membership on the Public Works 
Committee prior to this time had proved of some value to him 
in his efforts to push through the Arkansas Project, but his 
lack of seniority and his lack of a subcommittee chairmanship 
had significantly curtailed his effectiveness. His influence 
was greatly increased when in January, 1955 he acquired all 
the power and prestige that the subcommittee position brought 
him.
Not only did the position bring with it a virtual 
veto over proposed rivers and harbors projects, but it also 
brought with it ex-officio membership on the Senate Appropri­
ations Committee and a right to membership on the Appropria­
tions Committee's conference committee. Kerr had learned 
early the value of membership on that committee. In 1951 he 
had defeated Oklahoma's junior senator, Mike Monroney, in a 
floor fight over money for construction of Oologah only to 
see the item, which originated in the Senate, eliminated by
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a conference committee. The chairman of the conference, 
Representative Clarence Cannon of Missouri, permitted no 
item originating in the Senate to stay in the bill unless it 
was in the state or district of one of the conferees. When 
Kerr learned what had happened, he knew he had to get on that 
committee. This he was able to do in 1955.
Kerr's assumption of the Subcommittee Chairmanship
was also of value in his relationship to the Army Corps of
Engineers. The Corps prior to 1955 had often shown little
enthusiasm for the Arkansas River Project. Three times they
had been persuaded to make studies of the Arkansas. Twice
they had come back with the conclusion that the project was
not economically justified. The third study, begun in 1953,
was on "dead center" in early 1955 with the outlook for
2"re-authorization" appearing rather dim. As late as 
February 10, 1955 the District Engineer for the Arkansas 
Basin Area, General Itschner, felt that since "the feasi­
bility of the entire multi-purpose plan rests largely on its 
navigation aspects" and since these "navigation benefits 
have not yet been sufficiently established under present 
criteria to determine the economic justification for pro­
ceeding now with the over-all plan of improvement," then
^"Political Power Helped Bulldoze Channel," Tulsa 
World, June 4, 1971, p. 25C.
2Kerr Papers, Letter from Newt Graham to Don McBride, 
March 21, 1955.
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the Corps could not whole-heartedly endorse the Project.3
Robert Kerr recognized that action was necessary on 
his part if the study was to receive the support of the 
Corps and eventually of the Congress. In cooperation with 
Senator John McClellan, informal talks were held with high 
Corps of Engineer officials about the need to put the com­
prehensive plan back on the approved list.^ Kerr's Rivers 
and Harbors Subcommittee took testimony from and put ques­
tions to various Corps officials including Major General 
Sturgis, Chief of the Engineers. Consequently, on March 31, 
1955, General Sturgis in a letter to Public Works Committee 
Chairman Dennis Chavez "concluded that the Arkansas River 
Project with the modifications described previously, which I 
propose to make, should remain authorized as an approved 
long-range plan for water resources development in the 
Arkansas River Basin. It should no longer be considered as 
'deferred for restudy.
Kerr felt that this decision by the Army Engineers 
to actively support the great bulk of the Arkansas Project 
came partly as a result of the comprehensive study of the 
Arkansas-Red-White River Basins undertaken by the Inter-Agency
3Kerr Papers, Quoted in letter from C. F. Byrns to 
Newt Graham, March 21, 1955.
^Interview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971.
^Quoted in U. S. Senate, Hearings Held Before the 
Public Works Appropriations Committee, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 
March 18, 1959, p. 329.
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Committee during the period just prior to 1955.^ while it 
does seem to be the case that the Inter-Agency Committee 
study provided data that was used to justify the Arkansas 
Project, it seems more likely that the "pressure" put on the 
Corps by Senator Kerr was more significant. Nev;t Graham 
felt that it was the Senator's "heart to heart talk" with top 
Corps officials that finally "got the study off dead center." 
In a letter of appreciation to the Senator in April of that 
year he wrote:
I thank God that Oklahoma once more has a Senator 
in a position to and with the ability to exercise great 
power for good. I have no illusions about higher author­
ity in the Corps of Engineers. They know their masters 
(sic) voice and heed it. Two years ago when Oklahoma 
had two freshmen Senators, someone high in the adminis­
tration told the Corps to reduce their backlog of 
projects by at least a billion dollars. They looked for 
what they thought to be the easiest place to do this and 
chose the Arkansas.
Fortunately the A.V/.R. Study was far along . . . .  
After it (the re-study) had been made, it became lost in 
the forest of "higher authority" and was only brought 
out because the Chairman of the Sub-Committee on Rivers 
and Harbors asked for it. Now I know we will start once 
more to build the Arkansas River program.?
Armed with official technical support for the project 
and with the statement by the Chief of Engineers that naviga­
tion on the Arkansas was economically sound, Kerr set out to 
get appropriations to start Oologah, Keystone, Eufaula dams, 
and other projects in the Arkansas system, including bank 
stabilization. On May 16 he carried his case to the Senate
1955.
^Kerr, Land, Wood and Water, pp. 350-351.
nKerr Papers, Letter to Kerr from Graham, April 20,
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Appropriations Committee where he forcefully argued for full
funding of needed projects. He stressed in his testimony
the statements of the Corps that tended to support the
Project and quoted the Chief of Engineers as affirming that:
the entire comprehensive plan for the development of the 
Arkansas River has been placed in an active status and 
(we) have found that $40 million annual savings costs 
can be accomplished by the improvement of the river and 
that the new benefits-cost ratio is 1.15 to 1.8
On June 13 the House Appropriations Committee, headed 
by Representative Clarence Cannon, reported its public works 
appropriation bill to the floor of the House. The bill did 
not recommend funds for construction purposes for any of the 
key Arkansas dams. So many cuts had been made by the Appro­
priations Committee in river projects desired by House 
members from all parts of the country that a revolt was 
brewing when the bill reached the floor.
Oklahoma House members sensed the opportunity and 
united with other dissident members in proposing several 
amendments to the bill— including one "restoring" to the 
bill $450,000 for construction purposes for Eufaula Reservoir 
and $450,000 for Dandanellc Dam. Sponsored by Ed Edmondson 
of Muskogee the amendment, after heated debate, was approved
by the House in a major victory for the members of the
9Oklahoma-Arkansas delegations.
^Quoted in U, S. Senate, Hearings Held Before the 
Senate Appropriations Committee, 84th Cong., 1st sess.. 
May 16, 1055, p. 415.
9"Legislative Origins of Arkansas River and
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On July 1 the Senate Appropriations Committee 
reported its public works appropriation bill to the full 
Senate. Due to the extensive testimony before the Committee 
by a large and distinguished delegation of federal and state 
officials and private citizens from Oklahoma and Arkansas 
the Committee Report not only supported the House-approved 
allocation of $450,000 for both Eufaula and Dardanelle but 
added $450,000 for construction of Keystone Reservoir and 
$1,000,000 for Oologah“Reservoir. As Bob Kerr put it
It was a dramatic night session in Washington that 
opened up this new opportunity for Oklahoma. Competing 
against time and many other projects, we persuaded the 
Senate Appropriations Public Works subcommittee to con­
cur with the House on Eufaula dam and to a ^  to the 
House list, Markham Ferry, Keystone and Oologah dams.
Final Senate approval of the half-million dollar 
item to start Eufaula will be a clincher, because of the 
successful effort of the Oklahoma delegation, led by 
Representatives Edmondson and Albert, on the House floor 
over the opposition of the powerful House Appropriations 
Committee. We are most hopeful that v;e can get the 
House conferees to agree on the other three Oklahoma 
dams added by the Senate.
The Senate did indeed pass the Appropriations Com­
mittee Report as written and on July 5 the bill was sent to 
conference. With Kerr on the conference committee funds for 
Eufaula, Dardanelle and Oologah were accepted by the conferees 
as contained in the Senate bill. Kerr accepted a reduction 
of funds for Keystone from $450,000 to $150,000 with the
Tributaries Multiple-Purpose Project,” unpublished report 
prepared by the Library of Congress for Senator Fred Harris, 
March 9, 1970.
10Kerr Papers, "Senator Kerr Says,” July 7, 1955.
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funds to be used for planning purposes only. Thus starting 
money was provided for the construction of three dams which 
would ultimately cost more than $250 million and represent 
nearly a fourth of the total navigation project, while 
planning money was voted for the fourth key reservoir. It 
was indeed a major breakthrough for the Arkansas Basin Pro­
ject and represented the "finest year of progress in the long
1 "1struggle to develop Oklahoma's soil and water resources,"
The "Gold Star" Year— 1956 
The passage of the Conference Report on H.R, 6756 by 
both houses on July 13, 1955 and the signing of that bill by 
President Eisenhower two days later did not end the struggle 
over the Arkansas Navigation System, as some seemed to 
assume at the time, but merely paved the way for continuing 
conflict over the controversial Project. For although the 
President signed the bill he did so "with great reluctance," 
The final bill contained appropriations for some 107 projects 
which had been opposed by the Budget Bureau, The President 
was determined to put the squeeze on the civil works program 
and in a letter to cabinet members he stated that budget 
ceilings were to include "no appropriations to start con­
struction on new civil works projects or on new features of 
going projects, or to resume construction on projects in a
1955,
11Kerr Papers, "Senator Kerr Says," November 17,
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suspended s t a t u s . I n  direct defiance of the just passed
Public Works Appropriations Bill the President instructed
the Budget Bureau not to release the funds appropriated for
construction of the Eufaula and Keystone reservoirs and the
Army Engineers were instructed to postpone indefinitely the
opening of the first bids for the construction of Oologah.
The President felt that spending the appropriated funds
would commit the government to three-quarters of a billion
dollars in "unauthorized expenditures" and therefore refused
13to permit the money to be spent for construction purposes.
He reasoned that it was within the Executive's prerogative 
to "impound" funds voted by the Congress when prudent admin­
istration called for such "impounding."
With the failure of the President to spend the funds 
appropriated in 1955 or to request additional funds in his 
January, 1956 budget message, it was "an entirely new ball- 
game." Kerr attacked Mr. Eisenhower's stand as one that was 
not only "playing partisan politics" in an election year, 
but which was in "direct defiance of the expressed will of 
Congress." He vowed to use every weapon at his command to
see that justice was done and that Oklahoma received "every-
14thing that it was entitled to."
12Kerr Papers, Press Release by Senator Kerr, 
September 6 , 1955.
^3"Political Power Helped Bulldoze Channel," Tulsa 
World, June 4, 1971, p. 25 C.
14Kerr Papers, "Senator Kerr Says," January 26, 1955.
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In his budget message of January 16, the President 
asked the Congress for construction funds to start 17 new 
public works projects in the Northeastern part of the 
country. In the late summer of 1955 devastating floods hit 
several northeastern states resulting in nearly $2 billion 
in property damage. Concern for the affected area was 
immediate throughout the nation and resulted in expressions 
of concern for the inadequate safeguards against such 
catastrophies. The New York Times declared editorially,
"The whole problem of flood control in the New England and 
Middle Atlantic States must now undergo searching examina­
tion. Obviously, the whole existing system of dams and
similar measures was grossly inadequate last week, and we
15paid heavily for that inadequacy." President Eisenhower 
expressed his concern and declared that the federal govern­
ment was going to "go into the business of seeing whether 
we can prevent these floods in the future on a long-range 
basis . .
Accordingly, in a special message to the Congress 
on January 12, 1955 the President asked Congress for supple­
mental money to start five nev; projects and to complete the 
planning for 17 more projects in the Northeast. This was 
just four days before he asked for, in his regular budget, 
funds to start construction of the 17.
15The New York Times, September 3, 1955, p. 14, 
T̂ Ibid.
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Kerr seized this opportunity to deliver a scathing 
attack upon the Administration. He vowed that:
Unless we can simultaneously secure funds for our 
projects, I am going to fight every inch of the way the 
latest maneuver aimed at early construction of ^  new 
projects in the Northeast with an ultimate cost of 
nearly $500 million, while only $5 million is approved 
for Oklahoma to continue Oologah dam and the Oklahoma 
city floodway.
The Administration strategy involves an immediate 
supplemental appropriation outside the regular budget. 
This would put the Northeast in the unprecedented 
position of being fully taken care of before anything 
was provided for anyone else, and regardless of whether 
other sections got a dime or not.
Of course, we are willing to do equity for other 
regions, but we don't aim to be pushed aside to help 
political favorites in 1956, after they had been opposed 
to any water program anywhere, until the recent floods 
in the Northeast put them on the hook there. Let me 
remind them that drouth disaster is just as deadly as 
flood disaster, and while the Southwest has suffered 
from both, we have never received any such "emergency" 
treatment.i7
Kerr was urged by Newt Graham to use his position as 
Subcommittee Chairman to "close down on all new authoriza­
tions until more Now authorized projects (were) nearer 
completion" and to find out where in the Administration the
real obstacles lay so that pressure could be applied to force
i8the Administration into an about-face. Kerr not only 
followed Graham's advice to threaten to use his Subcommittee 
position to hold up other public works projects, but he also 
used his friendship and close relationship with Senator 
Ellender to delve into the decision-making process within
17Kerr Papers, "Senator Kerr Says," January 26, 1956. 
T^Kerr Papers, Letter from Graham to Kerr, January 20,
1956.
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the Administrative apparatus. In a letter to Senator 
Ellender he observed that it appeared obvious that the 
Bureau of the Budget "was being somewhat more generous in 
its recommendations for appropriations" for certain areas 
as New England and the upper Colorado area than for the 
Arkansas projects. Quoting Kerr;
I am wondering if the Clerk of your Committee might 
not ascertain from the Bureau of the Budget and the 
Secretary of the Army the criteria used in making 
requests for funds for the upper Colorado and the New 
England projects, and whether or not the same criteria 
might be applied for requests for the Arkansas River, 
notwithstanding the President's comments regarding the 
magnitude of the project.
I would call your attention to the planning funds 
for Nev; England projects in the emergency supplemental 
bill . . .  And to the requests for construction in the 
regular budget. It is difficult for me to understand 
how planning can be initiated at so late a date and be 
completed in order to justify appropriations in the 
budget . . . .  I would be very grateful if, as the 
hearings before your committee proceed, you would ask 
representatives of the various administrative depart­
ments who are responsible for the program before you, 
why there is a difference in the treatment by the Bureau 
of the Budget of the Arkansas River, long since author­
ized, and such a great number of substantial projects 
in so many other areas of the United States, which have 
just been or are just being authorized.Ï9
In the hearings held by Senator Ellender's Sub­
committee on Public Works of the Appropriations Committee 
shortly afterwards, both Ellender and Kerr attempted to 
pinpoint responsibility for the "unfair" treatment of the 
Arkansas Project. In an exchange with the Chief of 
Engineers, General Itschner, Kerr inquired into the process
1955.
19Kerr Papers, Letter from Kerr to Ellender, March 26,
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used to determine what funds would be requested in the 
budget for civil works projects.
Kerr: Now, the Corps each fall sends up suggestions as
to what should or could be appropriately used by the 
Corps, for instance, in continuing construction on 
projects authorized for construction; does it not?
Itschner: Yes, sir.
Kerr: I am particularly concerned, Mr. Chairman, with
Keystone Dam, Oklahoma, for which adequate funds 
were provided last year to complete the planning.
Is there anything on one of these sheets to show 
what the Corps suggested in the way of additional 
funds to start construction there, in view of the 
completion of the planning? There is nothing in the 
information before the committee to show that, is 
there?
Itschner: No, sir.
Kerr: Now, the Corps does advise the Budget as a routine
matter with reference to not only the Keystone but 
other projects in similar status, as to what would 
appropriately be considered necessary to start the 
construction, in view of the fact that planning had 
been completed. General?
Itschner: Normally, we do, sir. In the case of Key­
stone, there was an exception to the general rule.
We did not request the budget directly for funds 
with which to start the construction at Keystone, 
even though we did have in the fiscal year 1956 
appropriation act funds to advance the planning of 
that project to the state where it would be ready 
to start construction in fiscal year 1957,
Kerr: You say you did not advise them directly. Did
you advise them indirectly?
Itschner: Yes, sir. It v/as an unusual case.
Kerr: What made it unusual. General?
Itschner: Well, we did not make a specific request for
funds for the initiation of construction for Keystone 
Dam in the fiscal year 1957, for this reason. The 
cost of the Keystone project is quite great, and 
there was a limitation of $275 million . . .  by the 
Budget as being the total cost, when completed, of 
all the nev; starts that they would permit us to 
incorporate within our fiscal year 195 7 budget.
Kerr: And your suggestions to them, of the amounts for
appropriation in 1957, also had to give considera­
tion to the amount that it would cost to complete 
the new starts that you would send up.
Itschner: Yes, sir. And consequently, in our letter of 
transmittal to the budget, we told them that if it 
were not for that limitation which we were acting
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under, we would have included the Keystone project.
But because of the large cost of the Keystone pro­
ject, and the fact that the total amount, in view 
of the many other projects included as new starts, 
approached the $275 million limitation, we were not 
able to include the Keystone project in our request 
for funds with which to initiate construction on 
projects during fiscal year 1957 , , , , On the 
Keystone project at least we v;ould have asked for 
$1,500,000 if it had not been for that limitation. 
Kerr: But due to the fact that the budget put a limit
on you, and you had to leave something out in a 
given category of projects, the Corps found it 
necessary to exclude Keystone . . .
Itschner: Yes, sir.20
As Kerr was in the process of discovering and exposing 
the individuals or agencies responsible for blocking progress 
on the Arkansas Navigation Project, a drama was unfolding 
between members of the Eisenhower Administration and a mem­
ber of the Oklahoma Congressional delegation. Representative 
Page Belcher. In early 1956, Representative Belcher received 
a call from President Eisenhower's chief assistant, Sherman 
Adams, inviting the Tulsa Republican to a luncheon meeting
of Republican Representatives from selected states who faced
21strong opposition in the upcoming election. At the meeting 
Adams individually inquired of the Representatives what the 
Administration could do to help each one in their home dis­
trict. When Belcher was asked what problem he faced, he 
listed four or five important ones, including the lack of
20U. S. Senate, Hearings Held Before the Public Works 
Appropriations Committee, 84th Cong., 2d sess., April 16, 
1956, pp. 1044-46.
21The entire discussion is taken from an interview 
with Representative Belcher by the author on April 7, 1971.
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funds for the Arkansas Project. "If Ike doesn't help me," 
commented Belcher, "he's putting a knife in my back. Con­
gress has requested some $585,000 in funds for the Project, 
and the Bureau of the Budget is holding the funds up. I 
face the loss of my seat to a Democrat over this river 
thing."
After listening to the various problems of the men 
there, Adams appointed different aids to take care of the 
specific needs of the Representatives. He appointed Presi­
dential Assistant Fred Seaton, a close advisor on water and 
conservation matters and later Secretary of Interior, "to 
take care of the Arkansas River problem," "We haven't been 
treating Page very well," Adams commented. "Fred you take 
care of Page on this Arkansas thing for me."
Belcher asked Seaton to have the Budget Bureau 
"look at it again," and see if they couldn't give it their 
approval. In late February a meeting was called at the 
White House by Seaton for members of the Oklahoma delegation 
to present their case anew to the Bureau of the Budget 
officials. Led by Bob Kerr, the entire Oklahoma Congressional 
delegation explained the Arkansas River program and its 
justification in detail to the President's representatives.
The meeting concluded with the Bureau officials promising 
to take a new look at the elements of justification for the 
Project. The Oklahoma delegation, joined by most of the 
Arkansas delegation and numerous citizens and officials from
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home, then proceeded to take their case to the Congress and 
made massive appeals at hearings before the Senate and House 
Appropriations Committees,
Some six weeks after the White House conference 
Belcher received a phone call from Fred Seaton. "I have 
bad news for you, Page," he commented, "I talked to the Old 
Man and he feels that if he reverses the Bureau of the Bud­
get's earlier decision against the Arkansas he will be 
criticized for doing it strictly for political reasons. 
People know the Oklahoma delegation has just been up pres­
suring the White House and the Congress, However, Ike 
said," he continued, "'if the Congress appropriates the 
money again, I will not stand in its way, I will yield to 
the wishes of Congress,'"
Belcher reports he immediately called Senator Kerr 
and told him of the exchange with Seaton, After hearing the 
story Kerr cried out over the telephone: "My God, boy,
we're in business." "I heard him pound his table over the 
telephone," commented Belcher, and then continue: "Wonder­
ful! This is the greatest day in Oklahoma history!" After 
a short pause he inquired: "Will Ike keep his word?" 
Belcher's reply was an emphatic "yes," "Once he has given 
his word he will not back out,"
Shortly thereafter Belcher contacted Don McBride and 
told him to tell the Corps of Engineers to ask the Budget 
Bureau for funds needed for construction of the needed pro­
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jects. The Corps informed McBride that they did not want to 
go to the Bureau "with hat in hand" and to be turned down 
again. At McBride’s request Belcher checked with the 
assistant head of the Budget Bureau to see if the Corps 
could get the money. "He answered that they had not applied 
for any. I asked him," commented Belcher, "Do you remember 
our agreement— if Congress appropriates money that it will 
not be turned down by the Budget Bureau?" "Yes, we will 
approve anything the Corps requests," came the reply, "Will 
you put that in writing?" asked the Representative. "Yes, 
what do you want me to say," responded the Bureau official. 
Belcher then asked that he be allowed to dictate a paragraph 
over the phone to a Budget Bureau secretary that would be the 
essence of the agreement. The paragraph said in effect that 
despite the reluctance of the President to approve such 
projects that "it has become apparent that Congress wants the 
money appropriated for the Arkansas River project. Therefore 
the Administration will go along with the wishes of the 
Congress and will release the money as requested." The 
letter was signed by the Budget Director, Rowland B. Hughes. 
It gave assurance to the Engineers that their requests for 
funds would not be turned down by the Budget officials as in 
the past.
This "victory" over Administration opposition did 
not, of course, insure victory over Congressional opponents. 
Opposition by several influential members of Congress,
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especially the elderly but still powerful chairman of the 
House Appropriations Committee Clarence Cannon, had to be 
overcome. Under the general overall leadership and strategy 
of Robert Kerr a massive assault was made on the Appropria­
tions Committees of both houses with extensive testimony given 
by a flood of witnesses. While the united bi-partisan forces 
of Oklahoma and Arkansas, reinforced by representatives of 
the Mississippi Valley Association and of Southeastern 
Kansas, presented a powerful case at the Committee hearings,
Kerr worked behind the scenes dealing and bargaining with
22individual Congressmen.
An important addition to the forces favoring the 
Project during this period v/as the junior Senator from Okla­
homa, Mike Monroney. For a period Monroney was the only 
major "hold-out" in the Ok 1 ahom a-Ark an s a s delegation v/ho did 
not support the Arkansas program. As time came for the 
Senator to run for reelection (1956), pressure began to build 
on him to change his stand and to support the Project. Some 
of his supporters who had, along with Monroney, opposed the 
Oologah Reservoir in the Tulsa area in the 1950 election, 
began to change their attitudes toward the project. Private 
power interests dropped their opposition to the reservoir 
when Newt Graham was able to convince the Corps to drop the 
provisions for the inclusion of power generating facilities
22Interview with Ed Edmondson, April 5, 1971.
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on the d a m . 23 Several oil companies dropped their opposition 
to the project when the government agreed to build the dam 
in two stages so as to postpone flooding the oil field until 
the principal operators had a chance to get most of their 
oil. Most of the oil companies began to feel that in 
addition to government compensation for property taken, the 
future benefits from navigation on the Arkansas would more 
than offset any temporary losses of oil revenue.
Monroney credits Bob Kerr with finally convincing
him that not only Oologah but the entire Arkansas Project
was in the best interest of Oklahoma. We just "kinda got
together on the Arkansas Project," commented Monroney. "Bob
25just won me over to his point of view." Kerr pointed out 
to Monroney that considerable opposition to his reelection 
was building up— especially in the Tulsa area. Most Tulsa 
based oil companies had already changed their minds on the 
project and the provision for Oologah to become a future 
source of municipal water for Tulsa caused others to support 
the project. According to one source, the clincher came 
with an "indirect threat by the oil men not to support Mike 
in his bid for reelection if he did not change his view 
toward the Arkansas Project."
23"Mev/t Graham Led Fight For Arkansas Navigation," 
Tulsa World, June 4, 1971, p. 13 C.
^^Interview with Mike Monroney, April 6, 1971.
^^Ibid. ^^Confidential communication.
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Monroney thought it over, decided to support the
Arkansas Project, and the stalemate came to an end. He was
returned to the Senate after an easy victory and became a
vigorous supporter of the program from that date forward.
"This change by Monroney was a key factor in the passage of
27appropriations" by the Congress. His membership on the 
Senate Appropriations Committee was to prove "vital" to the 
Project in.the years ahead.
On May 21, 1956 the House Committee on Appropriations 
reported to the House floor a bill that included funds for 
the start of construction of both Eufaula and Dardanelle 
Reservoirs plus $3 million to continue construction on 
Oologah. In debate on the bill the next day Representative 
Edmondson praised the "great House Committee on Appropria­
tions for initiating appropriations for the three major 
projects in the Arkansas Plan." He continued.
Although the funds provided for each of these pro­
jects are modest and below requests of the Army 
engineers, they serve the significant purpose of con­
tinuing construction— and they provide an unmistakable 
green light by this body to the army engineers, to go 
ahead with great plans for the Arkansas Valley which has 
been authorized since 1946.28
And according to the influential Carl Albert:
You perhaps recall that Congress voted $450,000 last 
year to complete engineering plans and to make a start 
on construction of Eufaula. Thus far this administration 
has seen fit to impound these funds so that there has
^̂ ibid.
28U. s. Congressional Record, 84th Cong., 2d sess.,
1956, CVII, Part 7, p. 8752.
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been no construction at all. It is my opinion that in 
this case the executive branch exceeded the^authority it 
has under the Constitution. We have reason to believe 
if Congress again acts in this matter, the executive will 
allow the Corps of Engineers to proceed with construc­
tion.
I regret that the Committee did not see fit to 
provide more than $500,000 for Eufaula in the next fiscal 
year . . . .  However, I am going to accept the Com­
mittee's figure because I am so anxious to get this 
program started that I don't want to quibble over the
amount.29
The House approved the bill as reported by the 
Committee on May 22, 1956.
The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported to 
the full Senate on June 8 , and due to the influence of 
Ellender, McClellan, Kerr and others the bill increased 
substantially funds for the three previously mentioned reser­
voirs plus recommended $1.5 million to start Keystone 
Reservoir— the other major reservoir in the system. Although 
the Keystone funds represented a "new start" that few, 
except Kerr, felt had a chance to stay in the final bill, 
the Senate approved the Committee recommendations and the 
bill was sent to conference.
For the second time in as many years Bob Kerr had a 
chance to use his bargaining powers for the Arkansas Project 
in the Conference Committee. He was in a position to trade 
favors— and he did just that. He was able to obtain 
virtually everything contained in the Senate Bill, including 
the very important $1.5 million construction money for
29Ibid., p. 8716.
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Keystone. In two letters written by Don McBride to Francis
J. Wilson, Executive Vice President of the Arkansas Basin
Development Association during this period the magnitude of
the victory was made plain;
We are, of course, waiting the mark up of the Senate 
Appropriations Bill and are certainly hopeful that the 
Senator can get something in for Keystone and for the 
study of the long range program for Central Oklahoma, 
in addition to raising the amounts set in the House 
Bill. We know we are expecting the world with a fence 
around it but we think the miracle man can get the job
done.30
The next day, June 7, he wrote:
Babe, I expect that within the next day or two you 
will read in the paper about what happened in the markup 
of the Appropriations Bill for Civil Functions. We did 
almost get the world with a fence around it, I think 
you'll agree. I will tell you the story some time when 
we have an opportunity to visit but it isn't the kind 
of thing I can discuss in a letter . . . .
Babe, I have never experienced as great a thrill as 
this session of Congress. From the standpoint of our 
water program, it seems to me that we accomplished 
almost everything that we could expect. It is not often 
that you bat 1000%.31
Senator Kerr put it this way shortly afterwards in his
monthly newsletter:
When I came out of the final Senate-House conference 
near midnight, having helped save and "deliver" the 
Senate increases, including the threesome of Eufaula- 
Keystone-Oologah, I rushed to telephone Don, who had 
been as tense and jittery as an expectant father. His 
reaction reminded me of the fellow who when told his 
wife had given birth to triplets, fainted dead away and 
later explained jubilantly, "I just wasn't prepared for 
it . . . ."
30Kerr Papers, Letter from McBride to Wilson, June 6,
1956.
^^err Papers, Letter from McBride to Wilson, June 7,
1956.
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Navigation is no longer a dream. It is going to be 
a reality, now that Eufaula, Keystone and Oologah dams 
are assured, . . . Without a doubt, this has been 
Oklahoma's finest year in Congress. We could call it 
the Gold Star year, as we prepare to celebrate Oklahoma's 
50th anniversary of statehood in 1957.32
The "Gold Star" year had seen an agreement by the Adminis­
tration to release "impounded" funds for the major Oklahoma 
reservoirs and to permit the further construction of the 
reservoirs should Congress vote the needed money. It saw 
Congress appropriate significant funds for the four major 
reservoirs, with Robert Kerr using his positions on the 
Public Works Committee and the Appropriations Committee to 
guide the appropriations through the legislative maze and to 
"deliver" in conference the figures he felt were essential 
to the future of the Arkansas Project. By early August of 
that year the climate toward the entire Project seemed to 
have substantially changed. As Francis Wilson put it: "It
is most interesting to me how we now talk freely of naviga­
tion and yet six months ago we were almost afraid to open
our mouths on the subject. The sentiment is really changing 
.,33
Hastening and Expanding the Project 
December 15, 1956 was Robert S. Kerr day in Oklahoma 
as the Senator was honored at ceremonies at the Keystone Dam
32Kerr Papers, "A Report from Senator Kerr in Wash­
ington," August, 1956,
33Kerr Papers, Letter from Wilson to McBride,
August 7, 1955.
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site. Speaking to a large crowd gathered at the site to 
celebrate the awarding of the first contract for construction 
of the daiTi, Kerr predicted that many battles remained ahead 
before the Arkansas Navigation System became a reality. The 
theme of his address centered around the feeling that while 
"the fight to start the dams had been won, the fight to finish 
the dams has just started." He recognized that the magnitude 
of the Project would generate controversy and criticism from 
many sources for many years to come.
The struggle for the next several years was primarily 
centered around three objectives. First was the determina­
tion of the Senator to obtain from Congress on a yearly 
basis the appropriations needed to keep the Project moving 
and construction progressing as rapidly as possible. This, 
of course, involved the continuing problem of maintaining 
satisfactory relations with the Executive and especially the 
Bureau of the Budget. Second, the Senator made it one of 
his major goals to bring about the expansion of the Arkansas 
Project by obtaining authorization for a Central Oklahoma 
Project bringing navigation to the vicinity of Oklahoma City 
and by obtaining authorization for other "worthy" projects 
that would enhance the overall economic justification of the 
Arkansas Basis System. Third, it gradually became a major 
objective of Kerr and the other supporters of the Project to 
speed up construction so that the anticipated economic 
benefits to the area could be achieved at as early a date as
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possible. The anticipated period of construction— 15 to 20 
years— gradually became unacceptable to Kerr, and major 
efforts were undertaken to shorten this construction period.
The Continuing Fight For Funds
In the period after the initial appropriations for 
major reservoir construction were voted by the Congress, 
very little serious opposition developed within the Congress 
to the yearly requests for funds for the projects. Differ­
ences arose over the amount of money that should be allocated 
for the Arkansas Project, but the commitment by the Congress 
to eventually complete the Project seems not to have been an 
issue with a significant number of Congressmen from 1956 on. 
The members of the House Appropriations Committee, while 
normally requesting smaller appropriations for the Project 
than was true of their counterparts in the Senate, neverthe­
less recommended substantial funds for the authorized 
projects.
This general willingness on the part of both Houses 
to appropriate ever increasing amounts resulted, at least in 
part, from the never ceasing efforts of the Oklahoma Con­
gressional delegation. Quarterbacked by Bob Kerr, the 
"team" kept the pressure upon the key committees and key 
party leaders in both h o u s e s . C a r l  Albert, from his 
majority whip post in the House, was able to keep the party
1971.
^^Interview with Representative Tom Steed, April 7,
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leadership sympathetic to the cause. Page Belcher was 
valuable in working the other side of the aisle. Both 
Edmondson and Steed held committee posts of value to the 
Project. As mentioned, Mike Monroney*s Senate Appropriations 
Committee seat was of great value. However, the key to the 
operation remained Robert Kerr. Says his old friend Tom 
Steed:
Bob held the entire delegation together and kept 
them working together. We stuck so closely together 
that it became a saying in the cloakroom that "if you 
scratch one Okie you scratch them all . . . ." Kerr 
was the leader that set the pattern and "made it jell." 
When he was gone, the delegation was not as effective 
as before.35
Kerr’s friendship with and influence upon many 
members of both Houses from other states had already been 
mentioned as a valuable asset. His closeness to the two top 
Democrats in the Congress, Lyndon Johnson and Sam Rayburn, 
was invaluable when bills dealing with the Arkansas River 
came up. His close relationship to members of the "inner 
circle" proved valuable when time came to "ask favors" and 
"call in promises." For example, his success as a conferee 
on Public Works Appropriations matters might well be partially 
explained by the fact that the majority of Senate conferees 
were "inner circle" members or otherwise on good relations 
with Bob Kerr. Of the 13 Senate members of the conference 
committee in 1959, for example, at least nine (Ellender, 
Hayden, Russell, McClellan, Robertson, Hill, Magnuson, Kerr
35Ibid.
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and Mundt) might be considered members of the "establishment" 
and generally sympathetic to the Arkansas Project, Two 
others (Smith and Young) expressed generally favorable 
attitudes toward Kerr as a man and as a Senator. On the 
House side, Kerr was constantly courting the two most impor­
tant conferees, Clarence Cannon and his successor Mike 
Kirwan.^^ While the aged Cannon often presented problems 
for the Arkansas Project, Kerr and other members of the 
Oklahoma delegation, were often able to work through Repre­
sentative Kirwan to get agreement to hold certain funds in 
the final report. Kerr was able to "persuade" Kirwan on 
several occasions to "go along with" Senate requests in 
exchange for Kerr's assistance to him in Public Works matters
that came before the Senate that were favored by the 
37Representative.
Perhaps the last significant obstacle from within 
the Congress was overcome in 1959 as an effort by Representa­
tive Cannon to further hold up the project met with defeat.
At a meeting of the House Appropriations Subcommittee for 
Public Works in March of that year Chairman Cannon directed 
the Army Engineers to "hold everything" on Arkansas naviga­
tion pending a new report on the benefit-cost ratio of the 
38Project. The chairman felt construction of at least
^^Interview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971.
37Confidential communication.
S. House, Hearings before Subcommittee of the
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Eufaula and Dardanelle ought to be deferred until a new 
general study could be made of the impact of navigation on 
the benefit-cost ratio.
When the Army Engineers got to the corresponding 
hearing on the Senate side, Kerr was "utterly amazed" to 
find out that "like a bolt out of the blue" the Corps had 
been instructed to hold up on the project. Kerr and Chairman 
Ellender quickly moved to the attack:
Ellender: When do you hope to enter into the Dardanelle
contract?
General Whipple: Previously we had hoped to enter into
a contract in the middle of April, 1959. However, 
we have now a suspension of award directed by the 
Appropriations Committee of the House, and I must 
say, therefore, that the date of the award is 
indefinite.
Ellender: When was that done?
VJhipple: Yesterday, sir.
Ellender: Did you get your instructions from them or
how did they do that?
Whipple: The chairman of the committee directed that we
suspend the award of any further contracts on this 
project, sir.
Ellender: V/hat if this committee told you to go ahead?
Whipple: I am unable to say.
. Ellender: The House Appropriations Committee cannot
legally stop you. The Congress has acted on these 
appropriations before.
Whipple: I believe that is correct, sir.
Ellender: So, suppose we just instruct you to go ahead.
We have as much right to do that as the Chairman of 
the Appropriations Committee of the House of Repre­
sentatives.
Whipple: I believe that if this committee should direct
us to go ahead after the other committee has told us 
to suspend operations, I would have to get our legal 
people to advise us what to do.
Ellender: Well, you get your legal opinion. We instruct
you to go ahead.
Committee on Appropriations, Civil Functions of the Depart­
ment of the Army, Part 1, 86th Cong., 1st sess., 1959, 
pp. 307-309.
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I know I speak for the whole committee . . . .
If you were to listen to verbal instructions of the 
chairman of the House Appropriations Committee,
Mr. Cannon, why, according to that he could close 
up every project of the Corps, if you followed that 
line of reasoning. You know you would not follow 
such a command from him . . . .  I think this action 
comes in bad grace on the part of Mr. Cannon or 
anyone else who is connected with this,
Kerr; The executive has indicated their desire to pro­
ceed, have they not, by including the funds for the 
continuance in their own budget request?
Whipple: Yes, sir,39
The affair seemed to be settled v/hen shortly after­
wards the Appropriations Conference committee, and eventually 
the Congress, reaffirmed its authorization of the project by 
appropriating funds for all the major reservoirs. Major 
conflicts within the Congress were virtually nonexistent 
after this episode.
The same cannot be said, however, for legislative- 
executive relationships. While the initial agreement in 
1955 by the Eisenhower Administration not to "impound" funds 
voted by the Congress was a significant breakthrough, it did 
not mean that the Administration was wholeheartedly endorsing 
the program or that support for the program in the form of 
substantial budget requests would be automatically forth­
coming. Conflict between the Executive and those favoring 
the Arkansas River Project continued almost without inter­
ruption until the end of the Eisenhower Administration in 
1961.
39U. S. Senate, Hearings before the Subcommittee for 
Public Works, Appropriations Committee, Part 1, 86th Cong., 
1st sess., 1959, pp. 325-330.
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Despite the Budget Bureau’s agreement not to hold up 
construction funds voted by Congress, in December 1957 the 
Bureau delayed the advertising of bids on the Oologah pro­
ject pending review by the agency of all new rivers and 
harbors contracts. Although the delay lasted only a few
days, Kerr made the comment that
It is a tribute to the strong bi-partisan backing which
Arkansas Basin projects enjoy that the Oologah contract
was cleared without a much longer delay. We cannot, 
however, overlook the significance of the fact that 
there was a "re-appraisal" by the Executive Department 
of all water projects coming up under appropriations 
voted by the Congress and, more particularly, that some 
of the publicity which accompanied the disclosure of the 
review referred to rivers and harbors work as "pork 
barrel" projects. Once again we are reminded that there 
are segments of the Eastern press and Budget Bureau 
employees who have yet to learn the vital importance of 
developing all of the resources of the nation if America 
is to be as strong as she must be.40
A prime factor in the Administration’s "re-appraisal" 
and "delay" of civil works construction projects during this 
period was its concern about the economic situation of the 
country and the gradually rising cost of living. Kerr 
attacked the Administration for "poor economics" and for 
"blocking the construction program which Congress has pro­
vided for the current fiscal year" in a misguided effort to 
cure the ills of the economy. Commented Kerr:
Budget Director Brundage, in the role of non-elected 
dictator or Ike appointed czar, is holding in "budget 
reserve" current funds provided for upstream flood 
control. Keystone, Eufaula, Oologah, Foss and Cobb 
reservoirs, bank stabilization on the Arkansas and others, 
All these projects are therefore behind schedule.
40Kerr Papers, Kerr Newsletter, December 26, 1957.
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The shocking explanation to this move is that the 
Administration is still clinging to its previously 
announced position that the only cure for inflation is
recession.
As the economy began to slow down early in 1958,
Kerr began to press the Budget Bureau to release construction
funds. A mild recession set in and the Administration became
concerned about rising unemployment and economic instability.
Kerr publicly called upon the Chief Executive to release
funds for the construction of rivers and harbors projects to
help alleviate the rapidly approaching recession. He
criticized the President for "overriding the will of Congress
by holding in budget reserve" some $10,839,000 appropriated
42for upstream projects. He argues that if the President 
was really serious about helping the 5 million people out of 
work he could easily supplement his budget message and ask 
for additional funds for "ready to go" projects in soil con­
servation, flood control, reclamation and river development.
In March of that year he reported to the people of 
Oklahoma that "as chairman of the Public Works Sub-committee 
for flood control and rivers and harbors and ex-officio 
member of the Appropriations Committee, I have been trying 
to dislodge current appropriations from the stranglehold of 
the budget bureau (sic) and to greatly accelerate construc­
tion of projects, above the budget requests for the new fiscal
^ ^ e r r  Papers, "Senator Kerr Says," February 27, 1958.
^^Conqress and the Nation, 1945-1964 (Washington,
D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Service), 1965, pp. 856-857.
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year. We are most hopeful of considerable success for 
Oklahoma.
By late March "a complete change in the climate of 
official Washington" had taken place. In his news release 
of March 20 he noted:
While the Administration was still trying to get the 
country out of the recession with nothing but talk, I 
outlined specific programs on which I had been and was 
working . . .  Now, as the economic facts of life became 
so obvious to everyone, the President and Republican 
leaders have really changed their tune . . . .
First has been the immediate release of appropria­
tions voted by Congress for this fiscal year. Since I 
reported to you on March 6 that a half-billion dollars 
for the soil-and-water program was being held in "budget 
reserve," it is now officially estimated that all but 
$52.8 million will be available for expenditure by 
July 1.
In this effort, I have had a running battle with the 
U. S. Budget Director. Before publicly opening fire, I 
made a special trip to Washington last December just 
before Christmas for an unannounced conference with him 
in the vain hope that a reasonable settlement could be 
reached. The Budget Director just wouldn't budge then, 
but he has now budged himself all the way out of
office.44
As a result, therefore, of the economic slow down 
the Eisenhower Administration reluctantly began to release 
construction funds— a course called for by Kerr and other 
Democratic leaders in the Senate. The replacement of the 
Budget Director with a new appointee, Maurice Stans, was also 
considered a "victory" over the executive branch by Bob Kerr, 
lifhile the new director was considered "just as rugged and
43Kerr Papers, Copy of "Radio Speech" delivered 
March 15, 1958.
44Kerr Papers, "Senator Kerr Says," March 20, 1958.
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tough as the previous one," Kerr felt he was a man who 
"tried harder to harmonize the differences between the Con­
gress and the Executive B r a n c h . A n d  what was more 
important to Oklahoma was that he was willing to look at the 
Arkansas River Project with an open-mind, something Kerr 
felt other Bureau Directors had been unwilling to do. He 
was flown to Oklahoma by the Senator and briefed about the 
plans and purposes of the entire navigation program. Comments 
the Senator:
This was the first time a U. S. Budget Director has 
been on the scene for a thorough first-hand study of the 
opportunities and needs of Oklahoma. The entire develop­
ment was indeed fortunate for Oklahoma, and I am sure it 
was enlightening to the visitor from Washington.
Partly as a result of the Director's "look-see" trip, 
the Budget Bureau now accepts and supports the Arkansas 
Navigation program, and has an open mind about the 
pending Central Oklahoma project. All we have asked is 
for Oklahoma programs to be considered on their relative 
merits with others in the nation.
After a six year battle with the Eisenhower Adminis­
tration, and especially the Bureau of the Budget, over 
appropriations for the Arkansas River System and over the 
"impounding" of funds and the "delaying" of construction of 
contracts, the controversy was virtually settled in early 
1959 due to circumstances of history, pressures ypon the 
Administration, and the hard work of Bob Kerr.
45Interview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971.
46Kerr Papers, "Senator Kerr Says," February 5, 1959. 
This view was confirmed by Don McBride in a letter to C. F. 
Byrns, January 29, 1959.
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Expanding the Project
Once the battle was won to bring a comprehensive 
waterway system to northeastern Oklahoma, Kerr began to 
think in terms of modifying the system to include other 
parts of the state as well. As early as 1955 Kerr was able 
to get the Corps of Engineers to agree to a study of an 
extension of the Arkansas Project into central and south­
eastern Oklahoma. The plan was to extend the system from 
Eufaula Reservoir up the Little River to an area just south 
of Oklahoma City. The possibility of a connecting large- 
water canal into southeastern Oklahoma through a series of 
projected reservoirs was also to be studied. Kerr's aim was 
to bring economic prosperity to other parts of the state, 
especially the Oklahoma City area. He felt that "the 
Arkansas navigation channel, plus the proposed Central Okla­
homa extension, would produce the most dynamic, industrial 
growth and economic expansion of any inland waterway in the 
history of this country. It will trigger an economic explo­
sion unparalled by any other similar project in our history.
He wanted Oklahoma City and as many other areas of Oklahoma 
as possible to be in on this coming prosperity.
In a series of hearings before the Senate Subcommittee 
on Public Works Appropriations in April, 1957, Kerr pressed 
the Corps on the matter in an effort to get the study started.
^^Kerr Papers, Copy of Speech Delivered in Muskogee, 
March 12, 1960.
169
He felt it was "inexcusable that no move had been made by 
the Corps on the preliminary examination which was author­
ized in 19L’5" and that the Corps had failed to request money 
for it in the 1958 budget. "If you never start it (the 
study)," he commented, "I want to tell you right now, con­
fidentially, my public service will be terminated-— I hate to 
say so— probably before the Public Works Committee ever 
considers it."'^^
Kerr and Ellender instructed the Chief of Engineers 
to examine the situation and let the committee know how much 
it would cost to make a start. A request for $20,000 for 
fiscal 1958 and $30,000 for fiscal 1959 to complete a pre­
liminary survey was eventually made by the Corps and the money 
promptly voted by the Congress. Kerr set his goa) of com­
pleting the preliminary survey by 1960, then the over-all 
project survey by 1952, with authorization of the project by 
Congress to follow shortly afterwards. He began to proceed 
on the expectation that the Arkansas plan would be modified 
to include the Central Oklahoma project. He commented in 
early 1960;
As I talk to you about our waterborne future, I do 
so with the concept of the addition of the Central 
Oklahoma Project to the Arkansas River Development Plan 
now under construction . . . .  It is my hope and purpose 
to expedite completion of the preliminary investigation 
now underway for this extension, looking to the initia­
tion of the project survey at an early date. That would
48U. S. Senate, Hearings before Subcommittee of the 
Committee on Appropriations. Public Works Appropriations, 
1958, Part 1, 85th Cong., 1st sess., 1957, p. 365.
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take about two years to complete, if sufficient funds 
can be won, and it would be our hope to secure authori­
zation of the project by 1964, about the time of the 
closure of the Keystone and Eufaula Dams, That would 
still give us ten years to build the extension, which I 
am sure the Army Engineers could take in stride.49
In characteristic fashion Bob Kerr used his many 
resources to "expedite completion" of the survey and to 
obtain support for the Project both in and out of Congress. 
After a devastating flood in 1957 hit much of eastern Okla­
homa, he obtained massive support from senators of both 
parties to a resolution urging the immediate expansion of 
the Arkansas Project so as to prevent future loss of life 
and property in areas where flooding took place and where 
flood control projects were not presently authorized. This 
included four proposed dams in southeast Oklahoma that would 
not only be of value in flood control but were being con­
sidered as an integral part of the southeastern branch of 
the Central Oklahoma Project. It was pointed out that 
speedy construction of needed projects in the areas of cen­
tral and eastern Oklahoma that were alternately plagued by 
flood and drouth was not only economically sensible but 
necessary to the conservation and development of the natural 
resources of that area.^^
Kerr, and especially his chief assistant Don McBride,
49Kerr Papers, Copy of Speech Delivered in Muskogee, 
March 12, 1960.
S. Congressional Record, 85th Cong., 1st sess.,
1957, CIII, Part 5, p. 7233.
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were active in gathering information on the feasibility of 
the job as well as the wisdom of the Project, Kerr made a 
special trip to the Tennessee Valley waterway to see first 
hand the workings of the "highest navigation lock in the 
world" at Wilson dam at Muscle Shoals on the Tennessee 
River. He was impressed by its size and its ability to 
replace three smaller locks.
To me, the greatest significance of this mammoth new 
lock is in connection with the proposed extension of 
navigation into Central Oklahoma, Much has been said 
about the great number of locks to be required in the 
canal as the water is lifted a total of 650 feet between 
Atoka and Oklahoma City,
Such amazing modern improvements as illustrated by 
the new TVA lock, demonstrate how really simple the 
engineering job on the Central Oklahoma extension will 
be. From the experience of others, we cannot only 
build more economically, but modern construction will 
avoid the early obsolence which has beset others,51
The Senator investigated the proposed $11 billion
California state water plan and found out that it was
"technically tougher and much more costly" than the Oklahoma
extension. He pointed out to opponents of the Oklahoma plan
that the state of California would have to pump water uphill
more than one-half mile (2850 feet) from the source to the
farthest point of distribution while the "fine pure water
from southeast Oklahoma to Oklahoma City would have to be
52raised only one-fourth that high, or about 650 feet," In
S, Congressional Record, 86th Cong,, 1st sess., 
1959, CV, Part 10, p, 12642,
52Quoted in "The Arkansas Basin Development Associa­
tion Newsletter," Tulsa, Oklahoma, September 30, 1959,
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addition, the cost to buyers of California water would be 
about 15c per 170OO gallons, compared to less than Sc for 
the same amount sold to cities along the route of the 
Oklahoma project.
Kerr was busy back in Oklahoma rounding-up support
for the project from business interests, economic and
engineering experts and the public in general. Members of
Kerr's staff were instrumental in bringing together some
200 representatives from the affected areas to a two-day
short course at the University of Oklahoma in July, 1958 in
a preliminary study and discussion of the proposed project.
Kerr personally briefed the participants on how they might
best convince the Army Engineers and the general public of
the need for the project when hearings were held by the Corps
throughout the area in the coming months. A series of
articles by George W. Reid, Director of the Bureau of Water
and Environmental Resources Department at the University of
Oklahoma, endorsing the Central Oklahoma project as "the
most economical system" of obtaining the required amount of
water for the area extending from Atoka to Oklahoma City,
53were given wide circulation by the Kerr forces.
Kerr also took a direct part in seeing that economic 
justification for the project was complete and that the 
support of local business interests was obtained. An example 
of his active interest in even the minute details of local
Ŝ ibid.
173
support for the project is illustrated by a series of 
letters written in early 1959. In a letter from the Senator 
to Mr. Murrell Matthews, Executive Vice-President of the 
Ideal Cement Company of Denver, Kerr expressed interest in 
the company's increased cooperation:
The other day while I was in Oklahoma City and 
discussing the proposed Central Oklahoma Project with 
the Engineers, I was advised that the Ideal Cement 
Company had not returned the questionnaires sent out 
relating to shipments from your good company which 
might use waterways, when provided.
I know that you have all you can do, without taking 
on any additional responsibilities, but it would indeed 
be very helpful to the justification of the project, 
which is now being studied by the Corps of Engineers, 
if it could be determined what water-freight movements 
might be generated by your good c o m p a n y . 54
Murrell, I know of no single program or project 
which, in ray opinion, will be of more benefit to your 
great company than the Central Oklahoma Project. There­
fore, I hope you will feel inclined to send your check 
for $1,000 to the Water Development Foundation of 
Oklahoma, I n c . 55
Approximately one week later Mr. William M. Cain, 
President of the Water Development Foundation of Oklahoma, 
received a letter from Matthews which stated that "at the 
request of Senator Kerr, Ideal Cement Company has increased 
its subscription to your organization by $500, and our check 
for $1,000 is enclosed.
^^Kerr Papers, Letter from Kerr to Murrell Matthews, 
February 6, 1959.
55Kerr Papers, Letter from Kerr to Matthews, Jan­
uary 25, 1959.
^^Kerr Papers, Letter from Matthews to Cain,
February 4, 1959.
174
Kerr recognized that while local support of the 
project was important, the real battles would be fought in 
Washington, The Engineers, once their studies were com­
pleted, would not be able to sell the project to the Budget 
Bureau or the Congress unless the benefit-cost ratio made 
the project economically feasible. Kerr recognized that the 
Central Oklahoma Canal, and other extensions of the Arkansas 
System— several of which were under consideration by Kerr 
and his staff, including especially an extension of naviga­
tion from Eufaula Reservoir along the Poteau River to the 
vicinity of Poteau— would be most difficult to justify under 
the method used by the Corps at that time to compute the 
benefit-cost ratio. The Corps was limited by law in the 
factors it could take into consideration in determining the 
economic value of a project and it became evident to many 
supporters of the Central Oklahoma Project and other exten­
sions that certain changes in the economic formula were 
necessary if the extensions were to be justified. Beginning 
in 1957 Kerr took steps to set in motion the machinery of 
Congress that would bring about the needed changes in the 
law.
The first change in the benefit-cost formula sought 
by the Senator was to permit the Corps to figure into the 
formula the value provided by public works projects in the 
storage of water for municipal and industrial use. He added 
a provision to the Omnibus Rivers and Harbors Act of 1958
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which "authorized the Corps to include in all projects, 
already built or to be built," this storage space for 
municipal and industrial water. Although the bill was twice 
vetoed by President Eisenhower— for a variety of reasons, 
one of which was his opposition to the municipal water sec­
tion of the bill— Kerr and Republican Senator Case were 
finally able to work out a compromise that the President 
would accept. It contained, virtually unchanged, the water 
storage provision and was a step, according to the Senator, 
in the direction of a more realistic formula for determining 
the true value of a reservoir. He optimistically commented 
after final passage of the bill that "the new municipal 
water section will be the difference in finally enabling us 
to get that project authorized, if the people along the
57route and throughout Central Oklahoma work together for it."
Concurrent with his attempt to include water storage 
in the economic formula was an attempt to include recreation 
benefits derived from the construction of public works pro­
jects. Under legislation in effect at the time recreation 
was given no economic value in the development of a project. 
After Congress approved and the Administration accepted the 
water-storage provision, Kerr launched a drive to write into 
law the provision that recreation must also be included in 
determining economic benefits. After a long hard battle with
57Kerr Papers, Letter from Kerr to Clyde W. Chesnutt,
September 6, 1961.
176
both Congressional and Administration forces he was finally 
able to obtain acceptance of the provision. The bill as 
finally passed in 1961 permitted the Corps to tabulate the 
economic value of recreation in the cost-benefit ratio on the 
basis of not less than 50 cents per visitor day forecast for 
the project. The total recreation figure was not to exceed 
10 percent of the entire cost of the project. As in the 
case of the water storage provision, this change in the law 
gave proposed projects additional value and made it easier 
to secure their authorization.^^
A third major change in the economic formula also was 
brought about in 1961 with the extension of the economic life 
of public works projects. Prior to 1961 the life of a pro­
ject was estimated at 50 years in computing benefits. Kerr 
was able to convince the Congress that many projects had a 
useful life span of at least twice that long and that it was 
unrealistic to figure benefits based on 50 years. He was 
therefore able to obtain authorization for the Corps to
calculate benefits on the basis of "the useful life of the
59project" up to as much as 100 years. This, of course, 
considerably brightened prospects for the Central Oklahoma 
Canal as it did for other projects throughout the state.
58Congress and the Nation, 1945-1964 (Washington,
D. C.: Congressional Quarterly Service)"," 1965, p. 865.
59Kerr Papers, Letter from Kerr to Clyde W. Chesnutt,
September 6, 1951.
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Because of these and other changes in the economic 
formula, Kerr was most optimistic in late 1962, just prior 
to his death, that the Central Oklahoma Extension would be 
found economically feasible and would soon be authorized by 
the Congress. He felt that if appropriations were made 
immediately thereafter that the Extension could be completed 
by the Engineers by the time the original canal reached the 
port of Catoosa near T u l s a . K e r r  estimated that the cost 
of the canal would be approximately one-half billion 
dollars.
Hastening the Project 
As the battle over extending the Arkansas Project 
was going on both within and outside Washington, plans were 
being formulated to speed up construction of the key reser­
voirs and locks in the system. "Always pushing, never 
satisfied with just letting things drift a l o n g , K e r r  
began to strive for an early completion date for the Naviga­
tion System. Originally scheduled for completion in 1973, 
Kerr and other supporters of the Project recognized that the 
sooner construction was completed and navigation of the 
Arkansas began, the sooner the anticipated economic benefits
Kerr Papers, "Pact Sheet on the Arkansas River 
Navigation Project and the Proposed Central Oklahoma Project," 
June 7, 1962,
^\err Papers, "News Release," September 17, 1962.
^^Interview with Tom Steed, April 7, 1971.
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would begin to accrue to Oklahoma. He could see no reason 
why once a desirable and potentially valuable venture was 
begun it should not be speeded to completion.
The original suggestion as to the feasibility of a 
speed-up was made by Brigadier General Robert J. Fleming, 
division engineer of the Southwestern Division, Corps of 
Engineers, in a speech in Tulsa on January 23, 1951. The 
General suggested that given increased appropriations by 
the Congress the Corps could move the completion date up 
three to six years.
After contacting General William F. Cassidy, Director 
of Civil Works, Army Engineers and requesting that specific 
figures be given as to what amounts would be needed to speed 
up the Project, Senator Kerr arranged a meeting between the 
entire Oklahoma delegation and the top Army Engineers.
General Cassidy informed the group that an average annual 
appropriation of about $141 million would be needed to com­
plete the Project by 1970, and that it could be completed by 
1967 with an average annual appropriations of about $187 
million.G3
The participants at the meeting decided that the 
former completion schedule was more realistic for getting 
Congressional approval of funds, so the decision was made to 
ask for funds that would call for the completion of the 
entire project by 1970— cutting three years off the original
C  3
Kerr Papers, Press Release, February 26, 1961.
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expected completion date. It was determined that to meet 
the new deadline it would be necessary to add, if possible, 
some $4,150,000 for planning and bank stabilization to the 
1962 fiscal year budget estimates submitted by former 
President Eisenhower.
Kerr spoke to the newly inaugurated John F. Kennedy 
about the speed up and was able to get his and the Budget 
Bureau's approval for the increase. The new President 
readily accepted the target date of 1970 and pledged his 
administration's support of the entire Arkansas River Pro­
ject. Kerr praised the "dynamic leadership" and "new 
spirit" of the new President and expressed hope that after 
eight years of "slow downs" and "no new starts" the "new 
climate in the executive branch would bring about greater 
progress in conservation and development of our water resources 
in the next few years than ever before.
Bob Kerr was destined to play a major role in the 
activities and ambitions of the Kennedy Administration and 
the relationship between the two men was important not only 
to the future of the Arkansas River Project but to many 
other programs as well. Soon after his election, John 
Kennedy asked Lyndon Johnson to bring Robert Kerr to Florida 
to discuss with him the President's legislative program for
64Kerr Papers, "Planning For the Nation's Water 
Needs, 1980 to 2000," An address by Senator Kerr Before the 
American Water Works Association, Detroit, Michigan, June 5, 
1961.
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the upcoming C o n g r e s s . 65 Johnson had convinced the newly 
elected President that Bob Kerr would be the key man in the 
Senate and that his assistance and counsel was essential if 
the President was to get through Congress the numerous pro­
posals he hoped to have enacted into law. Lyndon Johnson's 
exit from the Senate to become Vice President left a power 
vacuum that neither majority leader Mike Mansfield or majority 
whip Hubert Humphrey seemed willing or able to fill, and it 
was Bob Kerr who stepped in and took charge. Commented 
Newsweek about this transition:
On Capitol Hill . . . there was near unanimous accord on 
one question last week: \^o really runs the United
States Senate? . . .  that man is neither Majority Leader 
Mike Mansfield, nor Assistant Majority Leader Everett 
Dirksen, nor any of the senior Southerners who control 
the important committees. The most powerful man in what 
has been called the world's greatest legislative body is 
the freewheeling, outspoken cattle, oil and uranium baron, 
Robert Samuel Kerr, 65, Democrat, of Oklahoma.
Within the Senate, Bob Kerr has maneuvered his way to 
a position of extraordinary influence: His sponsorship
of a measure is practically a guarantee of passage: his
opposition, the kiss of death. Under any circumstances, 
a man of Kerr's ability, seniority (elected 1948), and 
sheer force of character would command authority. But 
the diffusion of leadership that has occurred since 
Lyndon B. Johnson resigned as majority leader has enor­
mously increased Kerr's power. Like nature, Robert Kerr 
abhors a vacuum.66
Kennedy turned to Kerr for help and Kerr gave it.
He admired the new President and felt the bulk of the Admin­
istration' s measures were in the best interest of the nation.
^^Interview with Burl Hays, July 15, 1970.
^^"Oklahoma's Kerr— The Man Who Really Runs the U. S. 
Senate," Newsweek. Vol. LX, No. 6 (August 6, 1962), p. 15.
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"I love him (Kennedy),” commented the Senator. "Never saw a 
fellow I thought was working any harder to do the right 
thing. In the main, I think he is."
Kerr agreed to guide the President's major legisla­
tion through the Senate and did so with remarkable success.
He got five of the six key Kennedy measures through the 
Senate with very few c h a n g e s , a n d  on the sixth measure 
(medicare) he opposed the President (and Vice President 
Johnson) and defeated them. He had used his influence and 
friendship with key Democratic members of the Senate, 
especially the Southerners, to support substantially the 
program of the Democratic President and was most successful 
in doing so.^^ Though Kennedy had a "ragged record" with the 
87th Congress, observed one Washington politician, "without
70Bob Kerr the President wouldn't have had any record at all."
According to Senator Clinton Anderson, Kerr was by this time
the "titan" of the Senate. Explains Anderson:
I joined Kerr in a meeting with President Kennedy in the 
White House one day and, in Kerr's presence, I warned 
Kennedy that Kerr v/as in the process of making him a 
"legislative captive," Kerr and Kennedy both laughed—  
but they knew it was true.?^
67ibid.. p. 15.
GBinterview with Burl Hays, July 15, 1970.
G^Theodore C. Sorenson, Kennedy (New York: Harper
and Row, 1965), p. 348.
70"Oklahoma*s Kerr— The Man Who Really Runs the U. S. 
Senate," Newsweek, p. 17.
7%Clinton P. Anderson, Outsider in the Senate:
Senator Clinton Anderson's Memoirs (New York: The World
Publishing Co.', l970), p. 274.
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In exchange for his assistance in guiding many of 
the President's bills through the Senate, Bob Kerr expected 
political concessions in return. He let it be known that he 
would oppose any attempt to revise downward the 21h. percent 
oil depletion and that if the administration expected his 
help in the fight to revise the income tax the President 
would have to delete this aspect of his bill, Kennedy sent 
Treasury Secretary C, Douglas Dillon to see the Senator at 
his Poteau, Oklahoma, ranch to argue for including the pro­
vision in his bill. When Kerr predictably blew up, Dillon
is reported to have told him the Administration "didn't
72expect to get the cut anyway,"
In addition, he informed the President soon after he 
came into office that he expected his help in regard to the 
Arkansas River Project, In October, 1961 the President flew 
to Oklahoma to dedicate the opening of a scenic highway 
across the Kiamichi Mountains in the southwestern part of 
the state. While staying overnight with Kerr at his luxurious 
ranch at Poteau the two men discussed the Navigation Project 
and Kerr's plans for the comprehensive development of the 
Arkansas Basin, The story goes that the President had been 
previously advised to oppose the Project but that in the 
course of their conversation he changed his mind. When he 
asked Kerr to help him with his proposed tax reform bill.
72Kenneth Crawford, "The Senate's Ways," Newsweek, 
Vol, LXI, No, 2 (January 14, 1963), p, 27,
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Kerr curtly responded, "I hope you understand how difficult 
I will find it to move the tax bill with the people of Okla­
homa needing this river transportation." "You know, Bob,"
the President is said to have replied, "I think I understand
73the Arkansas Project for the first time." Another source 
quotes the President as saying that he felt the trip to Okla­
homa was essential since he felt the Senator "could make or 
break" him on so many measures before the Congress. When 
asked why he was going all the way to Oklahoma for a rela­
tively insignificant dedication, the President is reported 
to have answered: "I'll tell you why I'm doing it. I'm
going down to dedicate that bridge (sic) and kiss Bob Kerr's
ass."74
Whatever the conversation and agreement at Poteau 
may have been. Bob Kerr worked diligently for the bulk of 
the President's program during the two years of their asso­
ciation and John Kennedy supported wholeheartedly the 
Arkansas River Navigation Project. He included in his budget 
100% of the funds requested by the Senator for the Project
and supported fully his request for funds to study the pro-
75posed Central Oklahoma Extension. His acceptance of a
T^Elizabeth B. Drew, "Dam Outrage: The Story of the
Army Engineers," Atlantic, Vol. 225, No. 4 (April, 1970), 
p. 54.
^^Hugo Young, Bryan Silcock and Peter Dunn, "Why We 
Went to the Moon," The Washington Monthly, Vol. 2, No. 2 
(April, 1970), p. 44.
75u. s. House of Representatives, Appropriations
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timetable that would accelerate construction throughout the 
valley so as to enable navigation to reach Tulsa by 1970 was 
further evidence of the influence and power exercised by 
Robert Kerr even on the President of the United States. 
Despite Kerr's death on January 1, 1963 his "dream" of 
ocean-going vessels plowing their way up the Arkansas River 
to the port of Catoosa by 1970 was to become a reality.
Committee Report, House Document 1125, 87th Cong,, 1st sess.,
1961, pp. 1, 9.
CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
It was the stated purpose of this paper to examine 
the role of the late Senator from Oklahoma, Robert S, Kerr, 
in bringing about the massive and controversial Arkansas 
River Navigation Project and by so doing to provide some 
insight into the nature of political leadership in at least 
one area of the American political system of today. An 
attempt has been made to discover and record the specific 
actions and characteristics of Robert Kerr as they relate to 
his public career, his leadership role in the Senate and his 
efforts on behalf of the Arkansas River Project. The study 
has attempted to analyze Kerr's effectiveness in the Senate, 
to determine his sources of power, and to examine his use of 
power. The conflict generated over the Arkansas Navigation 
System before and after its authorization by the Flood Con­
trol Act of 1946 has provided an ideal case study illustrating 
the effective use of political power by this powerful Senator.
If a leader can be defined as one who makes things 
happen that would not happen otherwise, as one who has the 
capacity to make others do things they would not do except
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for the influence of the leader— then Bob Kerr was a most 
effective leader. Of the variety of techniques available to 
assess successful leadership, four have been employed in 
this study. One was to obtain "reports" from those observers 
who were familiar with the actions of the Senator, In 
attempting to evaluate Kerr by this method statements from 
the Senator’s colleagues, from Congressional staff members, 
from Washington reporters, and from other observers both in 
and out of government generally affirmed his effectiveness 
as a leader. Interviews with two senators who worked most 
closely with Kerr— Senator Allen Ellender of Louisiana and 
former Senator Mike Monroney of Oklahoma— , questionnaires 
completed by sixteen senators who served with Kerr an average 
of ten years each, and interviews with Oklahoma Congressional 
representatives and former members of Kerr’s personal staff 
supplied specific examples of his leadership qualities. Not 
only those who generally found themselves in agreement with 
the Senator on most issues but those who were many times in 
disagreement with him on important matters— such as Senators 
William Proxmire (D-Wisconsin), Margaret Chase Smith (R- 
Maine), and Jacob Javits (R-New York)— generally responded 
favorably about the considerable influence of Robert Kerr 
upon them personally and upon the Senate in general. Thus 
our attempt to evaluate Kerr by the "reports" of those who 
were familiar with his actions resulted in virtually unanimous 
agreement that he must be ranked very high in power and
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influence.
A r_:. d rue ;hod used to measure Kerr* s influence and 
power was tt l, !: jc his relative power potential on the 
basis of formal organizational positions held within the 
Senate. Using a method of analysis developed by Lawrence K. 
Pettit, an organizational power base index (OPI) was con­
structed for each senator serving in the 1962 session of 
Congress. The OPI was computed based on specific Senate 
"power bases" held (committee chairman, subcommittee chair­
man, member of a prestige committee) and specific party 
positions held (floor leader, assistant floor leader, member 
of a party leadership committee). The supposition of this 
method of analysis is that preferred organizational positions 
confer upon the occupants of these positions a certain amount 
of power and influence in relation to their colleagues.
Using Pettit's index the scores of all 100 senators 
ranged from 0 to 7. Bob Kerr had an OPI score of 5 which 
placed him in a tie for tenth among all senators. The index 
confirms the fact that as far as power potential based on 
organizational positions is concerned, Kerr had a solid base 
from which to operate. His control over the fate of legis­
lative proposals— his ability to have enacted those measures 
h; 'dvored and to defeat those measures he opposed— was 
significantly enhanced by the formal Senate and party posi­
tions he held. His ability to obtain in less than 14 years 
of service several highly important committee and party
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positions must be considered a significant source of Kerr's 
power and influence.
The third method used to analyze Kerr's relative 
influence within the Senate was by measuring his effective­
ness in the passage of bills through the Senate, Using 
roll-call analysis based on Robert Dahl's "index for the 
measurement of power," a rank order of senators serving 
continuously from 1949 through 1962 in the area of public 
works legislation was obtained. Voting records on sixty- 
seven roll call votes dealing with public works measures 
during the fourteen year period provided the data for the 
analysis, A "power index" for each senator was obtained—  
calculated on the assumption that a senator's influence can 
be measured by the difference between the probability that 
the Senate will pass a bill he opposes and the probability 
that it will pass a bill he supports, Kerr had a "power 
index of ,81— which ranked him sixth in power over Senate 
decisions out of the thirty senators evaluated. As in the 
case of the other techniques employed, it is recognized that 
the method of roll-call analysis, like all tools, can be 
used only for limited purposes. It can be employed to 
analyze discrete acts of voting on specific issues but is 
not constructed as a tool for evaluating non-roll call votes, 
for determing the amount of influence one legislator has 
upon another, or for determining which legislators take no 
prior position on bills but merely "guess" how the majority
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will vote. Likewise, roll-call analysis is not designed to 
evaluate influence exerted by individuals at other stages of 
the legislative process, but merely measures the final judg­
ment of a given member after a variety of forces and 
influences have been taken into consideration,
A final measure used to evaluate Kerr's influence 
and leadership ability involved his success in obtaining 
needed appropriations for the project of chief concern to 
this paper— the Arkansas River Navigation Project, Kerr's 
ability to persuade his colleagues to fund the expensive and 
highly controversial project illustrates the vast power that 
the Senator from Oklahoma possessed. His ability to overcome 
considerable opposition from many sources and to increase 
appropriations for the Arkansas Project significantly from 
year to year, while appropriations for other public works 
projects increased less consistently and less dramatically,, 
seems to illustrate that he was able to influence certain 
specific decisions of the Senate— in at least this one area 
of public policy. In addition, Kerr was able to "guide" 
victories obtained in the Senate through the conference 
committee, and was able to "out bargain" House Conferees on 
the majority of vital Arkansas projects. In the three most 
important years, 1955-1957, when the initial funds for the 
major dams were obtained, the Senate conferees prevailed 
overwhelmingly, Kerr's colleagues readily give him major 
credit for the Senate "victories" in these crucial conference
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sessions.
Kerr's power and influence over other senators came 
from two principal sources: his institutional positions and
his personal skills and expertise. Within the institutional 
structure of the Senate his effectiveness was enhanced by 
his membership in the Democratic Party, the majority party 
in the Senate, and his closeness to the Party leadership.
His close identity to the Party and its leadership proved of 
value to him when it came to committee assignments and to 
opportunities for leadership on the floor and in party 
circles. His appointment in 1953 to the Democratic Policy 
Committee provided him greater access to the communication 
center of the Senate and to the inner workings of party 
planning within that body. In addition, his standing 
committee assignments provided him with a base of power that 
was to enhance his influence with his fellow senators. 
Membership on the highly regarded Finance Committee and on 
the less prestigious but potentially valuable Public Works 
Committee placed him in a position to exercise his leadership 
qualities to the maximum. These committee positions placed 
him in a strategic position in relation to substantive 
matters of deep interest to him. Membership on the Public 
Works Committee proved especially valuable when time came to 
push for rapid completion of the Arkansas River Project.
Kerr's rapid acceptance into the "inner club" of the 
Senate combined with the highly decentralized nature of
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decision-making within the Senate meant that political power 
came to the Senator very early in his career. As he was able 
to be accepted as an "insider" and to make his wishes known 
to the members of the "inner club," he was able to obtain 
support on the various issues of importance to him. Like­
wise, as he acquired sufficient seniority to be elevated to 
the chairmanship of the Rivers and Harbors Subcommittee of 
the Public Works Committee, he found himself in a position 
that enhanced his bargaining power with those desiring his 
help in regard to public works legislation. He quickly 
perceived that an institution with numerous and disparate 
centers of power inevitably thrived on political relations 
based on persuasion, bargaining and "logrolling"— and he 
used this fact to "trade off" his support for projects he 
favored, including the controversial Arkansas River Naviga­
tion System.
While it seems beyond dispute that one source of a 
United States senator's power comes from holding institutional 
positions that have power attached to them, it seems equally 
true that a man's personal qualities may become a significant 
source of power and influence. Nowhere is this personal 
factor more evident or more important than in the political 
activity of the U. S. Senate. Personal qualities help 
determine whether a senator will or will not be effective 
legislatively.
By nature, by experience, and by training, Bob Kerr
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seemed to possess an abundance of these qualities. His 
imposing physical appearance, his deep resonant voice, his 
quick mind and retentive memory all served him well in his 
personal dealings with his colleagues. He possessed a great 
capacity for friendship and readily earned the affection and 
respect of the majority of those around him. Despite his 
ferocity and tenaciousness in his dealings with "opponents'* 
on the floor of the Senate or in committee hearings, he was 
generally able to remain on friendly terms with members on 
both sides of the aisle. His friendship extended to a 
willingness to be of service to virtually all v/ho called 
upon him— including the use of his vast wealth for those in 
need of such help and the freely given use of his staff 
assistants, especially the effective Don McBride.
Two individuals with access to approximately the 
same resources or possessing approximately the same personal 
qualities may not exercise the same degree of power or 
influence over the decisions of others. Skill in the use 
of these resources is an equally important element. Bob 
Kerr demonstrated throughout his public career that he was 
most proficient in the effective use of his various resources. 
His amazing capacity for hard work enabled him to achieve 
success when a less "driven" man would have failed. He was 
a masterful, tireless debater who was willing to take the 
time to do his "homework" so that he would be fully armed in 
every encounter with an opponent. He excelled in legislative
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craftmanship and developed the technical skills necessary 
for effective leadership. He was a master bargainer who 
possessed the ability to trade advantages with those he 
dealt with and the ability to put together a winning coali­
tion on key issues. His effectiveness as a bargainer and 
persuader was further enhanced by his reputation for help­
fulness and thoughtfulness. He seldom refused to be of 
service to those who called upon him, and as a result gained 
the admiration and respect of the vast majority of his 
fellow senators. If, as Ripley contends, the most effective 
senators are the most helpful and the most admired ones, 
then the admiration and respect shown Kerr by his colleagues 
was an important factor in his success as a U. S. Senator.
Bob Kerr's success as a legislative leader can be 
analyzed by examining the roll he played in bringing to 
fruition the Arkansas River Navigation Project. A study of 
his activities in this one area of policy making illustrates 
his ability to use both institutional and personal resources 
to their fullest.
Of continuing value to Kerr throughout his political 
life was the fact that he was a Democrat— and a loyal one. 
This fact gave him greater access to the White House during 
ti.e Truman years and was of value in enabling him to con­
vince the President in 1949 of the need for funds to start 
construction of a key reservoir, Eufaula. Likewise, he 
found President Truman a valuable ally in setting into
1S4
motion by executive order in 1950 an inter-agency committee 
to study the comprehensive development of the Arkansas Basin. 
When the results of the Inter-Agency Report was published in 
1955, the findings supplied Kerr with much of the ammunition 
needed to convince the Corps of Engineers and eventually the 
Congress that the Project was economically justified.
In addition, his strong party loyalty gave him 
virtually immediate access to John F. Kennedy after his 
election in 1960. During a period when his power was at its 
zenith. Bob Kerr was instrumental in helping the new presi­
dent launch many of his "New Frontier" proposals. In return 
for his assistance in 1961 and 1962 in pushing the President's 
legislative proposals through Congress, Kerr was "rewarded" 
with political concessions in many areas. One of these was 
a presidential budget that included 100% of the funds 
requested by the Senator for the Arkansas Project and the 
President* s acceptance of a timetable that would accelerate 
construction so as to complete the Project by 1970. Member­
ship in the Republican Party, or less loyalty to the Democratic 
President and his program, would most assuredly have limited 
Kerr in his relationship with the Executive and in his 
effectiveness in the Democratically controlled Senate.
The importance of membership in the party in power 
is illustrated by the problems encountered by the Senator 
during the Eisenhower years. A lack of ready access to the 
Executive created countless problems during this period and
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resulted in numerous conflicts and delays in regard to the 
Arkansas Project. The importance of proper party membership 
is seen by the role played by the lone Republican in the 
Ok1ahoma-Arkansas delegation, Representative Page Belcher. 
Belcher was able to provide the needed breakthrough with the 
Eisenhower Administration in the area of releasing funds 
already appropriated for construction purposes because he 
was a Republican and because the Eisenhower Administration 
wished to help him win reelection in 1956. Similar concern 
for Congressional Democrats was obviously not present. Thus, 
party membership proved both an asset and a liability to 
Kerr in his struggle to launch the Arkansas River Project.
Of equal importance to Kerr’s success was the 
prestige and respect that went with his standing committee 
assignments. His appointment as a freshman senator to the 
prestigious Finance Committee was one key to his success, as 
was his Public Works Committee assignment. The former 
assignment placed him in a position of general respect and 
influence in regard to financial matters coming before the 
Senate while his Public Works position gave him specific 
power over certain public works projects that might be 
desired by individual members. He freely used his position 
on both of these committees as levers to exert pressure on 
his colleagues to support measures he favored. "He always 
had something for the other guy," commented his fellow 
Oklahoman Mike Monroney, and, of course "expected their help
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in exchange for his."^ He let it be known to those coming 
before his Public Works Committee for favorable action on 
rivers and harbors proposals that authorization of their 
projects required that they take their place in a line 
headed by his Arkansas River Project. The roles of these 
backers swelled Congressional support for virtually all 
water projects that he favored.
This success would not have been as extensive as it 
was if it had not been for the generally decentralized 
nature of decision-making in the Senate. Vast power over 
final decisions of the Senate resided not only with chairmen 
of the respective standing committees but in many instances 
with chairmen of key subcommittees as well. Such a sub­
committee was the Rivers and Harbors Subcommittee over which 
Robert Kerr ruled. In practice he had the final say over 
which projects would be authorized and over which would be 
rejected— and he used this power freely to benefit friends 
and to put pressure upon foes. On several occations, such 
as in 1956 when the Eisenhower Administration attempted to 
push thirty-three new projects in the Northeast ahead of 
other authorized projects in other parts of the country, 
including Oklahoma, Kerr threatened to use his subcommittee 
position to "close down" new authorizations altogether. Com­
bined with his ex officio membership on the Appropriations 
Committee that resulted from his subcommittee chairmanship.
1Interview with Senator Mike Monroney, April 6, 1971.
197
Kerr was in a position to have a significant voice in the 
blocking of projects that did not meet with his approval.
In practice he and Senator Ellender were often the only 
members of the Appropriations Committee who took a consis­
tently active part in hearings on rivers and harbors projects
and were therefore the key members in drawing up final
2recommendations for funds for specific projects. Here 
again he had a significant voice not only in regard to 
projects he felt deserved a lower priority than his own 
projects, but was also able to push through in the mark-up 
sessions of the committee the large sums he felt were needed 
for the Arkansas Navigation System.
Perhaps the most important by-product of his sub­
committee chairmanship was the opportunity it gave him to 
participate in conference committees where the appropriations 
figures for the various Arkansas projects were finalized. 
Beginning in 1955 he was able to retain in the final bills 
the bulk of appropriations voted by the Senate and frequently 
opposed in the House. The leader of the House Conferees, 
Clarence Cannon, was more amenable to requests for Arkansas 
River funds after Kerr's membership on the Senate conference 
committee gave him an institutional position where he could 
exercise his personal powers of persuasion and bargaining.
2This conclusion was drawn from the reading of 
numerous committee hearings of the Public Work Subcommittee 
of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and from a verifying 
statement by Senator Ellender in his interview with the 
author.
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Kis effectiveness in this regard seems clearly evident from 
the results obtained.
As his institutional positions served him well in 
pushing through the Congress the Arkansas River System, so 
were his personal qualities and resources of great value, A 
resourceful man will use his personal skills to make the 
most of his institutional positions— and Robert Kerr was 
indeed a resourceful man.
Perhaps of greatest value to him in this regard was 
his intellect. He early determined the course of action 
that would be most effective in obtaining the needed support 
for his Project and devoted his vast mental energy to organ­
izing and pursuing that course. He systematically assembled 
a multitude of arguments in support of the Project, obtained 
and memorized numerous concrete examples to substantiate his 
arguments, and declared himself intellectually capable of 
defending the Project against all its critics. He illustrated 
this on the Senate floor, in committee hearings, in speeches 
before constituents, and wherever the opportunity arose. He 
was most effective in his penetrating cross examination of 
those that appeared before him in committee hearings, such 
as various Corps officials in the 1950 debate concerning the 
need for a comprehensive survey by an inter-agency committee. 
By the sheer force of his logic and reason he was able to 
convince the Corps that no comprehensive survey for the 
Arkansas Basin had ever been undertaken. Likewise, in a
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series of hearings before his Rivers and Harbors Subcommittee 
in 1955 his knowledge of the subject and his penetrating 
questioning of the Corps officials seems to have been a 
major factor in reversing the Engineer’s earlier decision to 
"defer for restudy" the Arkansas Project,
Kerr recognized that success would come only as 
those in the Congress who opposed his plans were shown that 
the large expenditures involved in his proposals were econom­
ically justified and in the best interest of the nation. He 
was quick to exploit the floods that almost annually hit 
some parts of the nation to gain support for his own Project 
as well as flood control projects throughout the nation.
After the disastrous floods of 1957 that devastated not only 
much of Oklahoma but neighboring states as well, he spoke 
eloquently upon the Senate floor about the need for nation­
wide action to prevent such catastrophies. He reasoned with 
his economy-minded colleagues that water projects were not 
just "budgetary fat" but the "bone and mighty muscles of our
3great nation" and a wise economic investment. Likewise, he 
used periods of economic recession that came spasmodically 
during the 1950's to justify the spending of vast funds on 
public works projects as an aid to the economy and as a 
weapon against unemployment in the land. His intellectual 
ability to search out all possible arguments supporting the
3U. S, Congressional Record, 85th Cong,, 1st sess.,
1957, CHI, Part 6, p, 7233.
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Arkansas Project, to get to the heart of an opponent’s 
argument and to succeed in refuting it with facts, and to 
bring forcefully before the Congress the natural catastro­
phies and economic events that tended to strengthen his 
position seems to have played a major role in influencing 
many who had doubts about the desirability of the Arkansas 
River program.
A second personal resource that served him well in 
these endeavors was his vast reservoir of friends— and his 
great capacity for friendship. The contacts he made in 
early life, in the business world, in his church life, and 
as Governor of Oklahoma were to prove a valuable asset not 
only financially at election time but on occasions when 
funds and workers were needed to form local organizations to 
persuade the Corps, the local citizens, and the Congress of 
the desirability of specific projects. He called upon busi­
ness acquaintances in the oil industry to assist him in 1956 
in convincing Senator Monroney that he should change his 
stand in regard to the Arkansas Project. During his term as 
Governor he became acquainted with Governors and officials 
of other states, as well as with numerous federal officials, 
and these contacts were to serve him well during his days in 
the Senate. For example, when in 1949-50 he was seeking 
support for the Arkansas-Red-White Inter-Agency Study Com­
mission he personally wrote each governor in the eight state 
area asking for their support and assistance in urging
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acceptance of the Study by the Congress. He won the backing 
of virtually all of the governors^ and further strengthened 
his position by incorporating various suggestions made by 
these men into the plan.
Kerr cultivated the friendship of men who were able 
to give him the technical assistance and expertise needed to 
carry out such a major undertaking. He was fond of quoting 
John D. Rockefeller who attributed his success to his 
ability to gather around him men who had far greater ability 
than he had and to learn from these men. Kerr was ably 
assisted by his friend and long time staff member, Don 
McBride. McBride provided the engineering expertise so 
essential to the Project. Another close friend, Newt Graham, 
had the necessary connections with the Corps of Engineers to 
obtain their support at critical moments in the history of the 
Arkansas Project. Graham was instrumental in getting the 
Chief of Engineers, General Reybold, to reverse an earlier 
decision and recommend authorization of the Project in 1945. 
Graham, along with Tulsa businessman Glade Kirkpatrick, 
former Corps District Engineer Francis J. Wilson, Tulsa 
merchants and civic leaders John Dunkin and John Mayo and 
others were instrumental in organizing the Arkansas Basin
4Opposition to Kerr's proposed Study Commission was 
expressed only by Governor Earl K. Long of Louisiana. Long's 
opposition v/as based on a fear that work on already author­
ized river projects in Louisiana would be stopped until the 
comprehensive study was complete. Letter from Earl Long to 
Kerr, February 21, 1949 in Kerr Papers.
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Development Association— the single most powerful association 
dedicated to the construction of the Arkansas System. A 
wide variety of business and civic leaders from both Arkansas 
and Oklahoma were available to appear at Congressional 
hearings on behalf of the Project— and Kerr was considered 
the man most responsible for bringing into the group a wide 
variety of talented and dedicated citizens.^
But perhaps the most important result of Kerr’s 
ability to achieve a satisfactory relationship and a feeling 
of mutual trust and respect with those he came in contact 
with was his ability to unite the Oklahoma delegation into 
a cohesive team behind the Arkansas Project. A few days 
after he entered the Senate for his first term he gave a 
luncheon for the members of the delegation and presented a 
series of maps and detailed plans about his goal of bringing 
navigation, and other benefits, to Oklahoma. He laid out 
his plans for pushing it through to completion and beseeched 
the delegation to unite with him in the major undertaking.
At the conclusion of the meeting Representative Steed, some­
what overwhelmed by the proposal, commented to his colleague 
Carl Arbert that they had just been in the presence of a 
"genius or a mad man."^ But, according to Steed, it soon 
became apparent that he was indeed no "mad man" and within a
^"Newt Graham Led Fight For Arkansas Navigation," 
Tulsa World, June 4, 1971, p. 13C.
^Interview with Tom Steed, April 7, 1971.
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very short time "he had the entire delegation working 
together as never before." It soon became evident that he 
had the natural ability to draw men together behind a common 
cause. He gained the respect and friendship of each of the
members of the delegation and was able to call upon each for
assistance in the struggle to bring navigation to Oklahoma. 
Each man knew that Bob Kerr could be called upon at any time 
for help with their specific problems and each man was
7willing to return this helpfulness when called upon.
Of course, the possession of these and other personal
qualities would not have automatically led Kerr to the suc­
cesses he eventually achieved without his ability to use 
these resources to the fullest extent. Indeed, it is a common 
observation that individuals possessing approximately the 
same resources may differ greatly in power. One may use his 
resources to increase his power; the other may not. Bob 
Kerr effectively used his resources in at least three ways: 
he was a tireless worker who was willing to "out work" his 
colleagues; he developed a knowledge of the skills needed to 
guide legislation through the legislative "jungle"; he 
possessed the ability to put together a winning coalition by 
bargaining and "trading credits."
From his first bill introduced in the Senate to the 
end of his career Robert Kerr worked hard for the Arkansas 
River Project. He learned at a very early age the need to
^Ibid.
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"plan where you are going" and came to the Senate already 
prepared to reach his goals. He drove himself to be thor­
oughly prepared in every situation— and expected those who 
worked for him to work the needed hours to be prepared also. 
He was faithful in attending virtually all committee hearings 
and floor debates involving the Arkansas Project and related 
issues, and became actively involved in the small details as 
well as the broad outline of the Project. He determined 
early in the struggle the amount of money needed for an 
early completion of the Project and worked hard to obtain 
these funds. Once obtained, he pushed for more funds and an 
earlier completion— which was also obtained. He was always 
pushing— always fighting for an expansion of the Project in 
one area and then in another. He seemed determined that if 
hard work on his part would bring to Oklahoma the benefits 
of the Arkansas Project any sooner— then he would not slacken 
his pace.
Kerr supplemented his capacity for hard work with an 
understanding of the intricacies of the legislative process. 
He recognized very early the role played by the Corps of 
Engineers in determining which civil works projects would be 
given priority and which would be "deferred" or "restudied." 
When in 1950 he was unable to entirely replace the Corps 
domination of the public works projects in the Arkansas Basin 
by an Inter-Agency Commission, he shifted tactics and decided 
to use the Corps instead. He sought to cultivate its favor
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through increased personal contacts with key Corps officials, 
by inviting Corps officials to speak at various gatherings 
of concerned citizens, by holding dinners and other social 
affairs in their honor, and by repeated public praise of 
the accomplishments of the Engineers. He sought, success­
fully, to get the Corps committed early in the game to the 
Arkansas River Project with the recognition that an early 
commitment on their part would not only give it much needed 
prestige but would make it more difficult for them to oppose 
it at a later date. He recognized the close relationship 
between the Corps and the Public Works Committees of Congress 
and that a "partnership" between the two would be advantageous 
to both sides. The committee by "adopting" the agency could 
protect it from other agencies and from a certain amount of 
executive control while on the other hand the agency could 
perform services for the members of the committee. In his 
role as chairman of the Rivers and Harbors Subcommittee Kerr 
was able to develop this type of relationship and obtain the 
much needed assistance of the Corps. He was able to use his 
influence upon the Corps not only to move the Arkansas Pro­
ject to completion in a relatively short period but also to 
obtain the needed economic justifications for projects 
desired by those colleagues willing to "horse trade" with 
him. At the height of his power, according to Don McBride, 
Kerr became the spokesman for the Corps. "He had the power 
to reject or push Corps proposals. They had to come to him
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with hat in h a n d . "8
Kerr likewise displayed an exceptional ability to 
get changes written into the law that would ultimately 
result in justification for the entire comprehensive program. 
In addition to his early efforts to obtain approval for the 
Inter-Agency Study Commission on the Arkansas-White and Red 
River Basin, which he felt would provide overall economic 
justification for the entire program, he attempted to get 
included in the annual flood control bills specific projects, 
such as the substitution of Keystone Reservoir for three 
smaller dams in 1950, that would be of value to the compre­
hensive Project. He took every opportunity to urge upon 
the Congress the inclusion of study projects and authoriza­
tions as often as possible. According to Don McBride, "We 
endeavored to get some project in each Flood Control Act
that came along— ultimately to lead to a comprehensive 
9program."
Periodic estimates of the benefit-cost ratio as 
determined by the Corps of Engineers was requested by the 
Congress— especially by the House Appropriations Committee.
As costs continued to rise after construction began in 1957, 
Kerr was quick to recognize the needs to maintain an econom­
ically justifiable ratio so as to counterbalance the arguments 
of those demanding stoppage of the Project. Beginning in
p
Interview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971. 
*Ibid.
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1957 steps were taken to persuade the Congress to make needed 
changes in the law authorizing the Engineers to include 
additional factors in the calculating of benefits to be 
derived from the multi-purpose reservoirs. Between 1957 and 
1961 the Senator introduced legislation to change the benefit- 
cost formula to include the value of the storage of water for 
municipal and industrial use, to include the recreation 
benefits of the reservoir, and to change the useful life of 
a project from 50 to 100 years. Despite considerable oppo­
sition from many sources he was able to persuade the Congress 
to enact these changes into law. They provided the basis for 
the continued economic justification of the individual pro­
jects and in fact increased the benefit-cost ratio of the 
overall Project from a low of 1.1 to 1 in 1955 to 1.5 to 1 
in 1962.
Much of his success in persuading Congress to make 
these and other changes came from the Senator’s ability to 
bargain with his colleagues and to help them in return for 
help given him when needed. He let it be known within the 
ranks of the "world’s most exclusive club" that there was 
nothing he wouldn’t do for a fellow member. He helped push 
Public Works projects in other sections of the country (for 
example the Niagara Project in New York, the St. Lawrence 
Seaway, the Central Arizona Project, the Columbia River 
Storage Reservoir, the Hell’s Canyon Reservoir, the Glen 
Elder Dam in Kansas, flood control projects in Connecticut,-
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just to list a few) and as a result built up a reservoir of 
good will among his colleagues. He aided his Texas neigh­
bors in such projects as the Trinity River Project and the 
location of the NASA Space Center, and as a result won the 
assistance of such powerful men as Albert Thomas, Sam Rayburn, 
George Mahon and, of course, Lyndon Johnson. He "always had 
something for the other guy in exchange for his help,"
commented former Senator Monroney. "He would fight for any
10that wanted water and conservation help from him."
Kerr carried his "horse trading" into the conference
committee meetings of 1955-1957 when the final decisions
regarding appropriations for reservoir construction were
being made. In the conference he was always dealing with
individuals with sufficient power to block his program if
they wished. These were the "key" individuals that Kerr
recognized must be dealt with and persuaded to go along with
his proposals. While the nature of the specific "agreements"
with these individuals remain a secret, he and his staff felt
that he was most successful in winning over their support in
these meetings and was often able to obtain far more than
11had been expected in the course of normal bargaining.
Majority Leader Carl Albert conceded, "We (the Oklahoma 
delegation) traded everything we had in our hip pocket, in 
our pocket book, and so forth. And we finally got it (the
10Interview with Mike Monroney, April 6, 1971,
11Confidential communication.
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Arkansas River P r o j e c t ) . "^2
What conclusions may be drawn from our study of the 
career of Robert S. Kerr and from the events surrounding the 
construction of the Arkansas River Navigation System? First, 
it seems evident that if any man could be called the "father" 
of this giant waterway it would have to be Robert Kerr.
While others contributed from time to time— often in critical 
moments— it was Kerr whose day in, day out determination 
nursed the Project along and gave it legislative sustenance. 
While others, both in and out of government, made valuable 
contributions to the effort. Bob Kerr was the acknowledged 
captain of the team. While the success of any team depends 
upon the ability and effort of all the members, the leader­
ship quality of the captain is perhaps the single most 
important ingredient in the success of the endeavor. His 
ability to set forth clearly the goals to be attained and to 
effectively coordinate the efforts of the team in achieving 
that goal is vital to the accomplishment of the given task.
Kerr’s success in accomplishing what he set out to 
accomplish resulted from a unique combination of institu­
tional positions, personal skills and a driving ambition to 
make a "dream" come true. He was a big enough man to "dream" 
of "steamboats coming around the bend" and was able to 
obtain enough power to turn that dream into a real live
12Quoted on the ABC Television Special, "The Arkansas 
River Navigation System," June 4, 1971.
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project. He gained access to key points of decision-making 
within the Congress and possessed the needed resources and 
skills CO bring into reality what previously had been only 
hypothetical. If, as one senator put it, "a man in the 
Senate has just as much power as he has the sense to use,” 
then Robert Kerr showed a remarkable understanding of the 
essence of power in the Senate and a remarkable ability to 
use it properly.
Kerr's success with the Arkansas Navigation System 
illuminates not only his particular skills and powers, but 
the fundamental principles of all "pork barrel” legislation: 
the pork barrel works best when those with an interest in it 
help one another, A climate of mutual helpfulness is 
essential if a senator is to convince a number of potential 
supporters that he is likely to cooperate with them when 
they need help. As chairman of the Senate's Rivers and 
Harbors Subcommittee and acting chairman of the Public Works 
Committee, Kerr was in the right position to put the prin­
ciple to work. Any other lawmaker yearning for a project 
back home automatically fell into Kerr's debt, and his 
associates remember that he was a hard-boiled creditor.
If we define a leader as one who has unusual 
influence— who has the capacity to make people behave differ­
ently than they would have otherwise— the question remains 
how are we to establish that a leader had "decisive influ­
ence” or that a leader's work would not have been done by
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others? How do we know that Senator Kerr was "indispens­
able" to the Arkansas River Project? How do we know that 
the Project might not have been accomplished without him?
It seems obvious that no study of this scope and 
nature could conclusively answer the above questions. The 
nature of our social system and the complex and incomplete 
nature of the data available precludes the possibility of 
controlled experiments that would be necessary to satisfac­
torily determine the "decisive influence" of a particular 
leader. About all that can be done is to prove that the 
individual had a decisive impact upon events as they actually 
happened and that given the data available his work could not 
have been duplicated by others.
Fred Greenstein in his recent work Personality and 
Politics discusses the importance of personality as a deter­
minant of political behavior and argues that under certain 
circumstances the individual actor can have a significant 
impact upon events. In answering the contention by some that 
personality is not of interest to political analysts because 
individual personalities are severely limited in the impact 
they can have on events, Professor Greenstein argues that the 
likelihood of personal impact varies with (1) the degree to 
which the actions take place in an environment which admits of
restructuring, (2) the location of the actor in the environ-
13mint, and (3) the actor's peculiar strengths or weaknesses.
13Fred I. Greenstein, Personality and Politics 
(Chicago: Markham Publishing Co., 1969), p. 42.
212
Professor Greenstein’s first proposition is that the 
likelihood of personal impact increases to the degree that 
the environment admits of restructuring. Situations or a 
sequence of events in which modest interventions can produce 
disproportionally large results he calls an "unstable" 
environment. Unlike the "stable" environment where a variety 
of factors press toward the outcome so that the outcome can 
be expected to occur even if some of the contributing factors 
are eliminated, the unstable environment supposes a pre­
carious equilibrium where the specific action of an actor 
is indispensable to a specific course of events.
An examination of the general structure and decen­
tralized nature of the U. S. Senate during the years when 
Bob Kerr served in that body reveals a climate conducive to 
the specific actions of the individual actors. This cer­
tainly seemed to be the case in regard to Senate action on 
large public works projects, such as the Arkansas River 
Project, where those seeking to obtain authorization of and 
appropriations for such projects were operating in an 
essentially "unstable" environment. Success in bringing 
about such a massive project was certainly not "inevitable" 
(as in a stable environment) but required specific, vigorous 
action to "move the keystone" and start the project in 
motion. It seems to be well established that the specific 
actions of Robert Kerr were essential to this end. He was 
the leader without which the Project most probably would not
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have occurred,
Greenstein next reasons that to shape events, an 
action must be performed not only in an unstable environment, 
but also by an actor who is strategically placed in that 
environment. An actor that is in the middle or lower ranks 
of an institution is often unable to accomplish much singly, 
since he is frequently restrained or inhibited by others.
Here again, as has been previously shown, Robert Kerr was in 
an ideal position in so far as committee and party assign­
ments, seniority, majority party affiliation and the like to 
permit him to individually have a major influence in the 
events that brought the Arkansas Navigation Project to 
fruition.
Professor Greenstein's last proposition is that the 
likelihood of personal impact varies with the personal 
strengths or weaknesses of the actor himself. He illustrates 
this observation (and the previous ones) with an analogy from 
the poolroom:
In the game of pocket billiards, the aim of the player 
is to clear as many balls as possible from the table.
The initial distribution of balls parallels my first 
observation about the manipulability of the environment. 
With some arrays a good many shots are possible; perhaps 
the table can be cleared. With some arrays no successful 
shots are likely. The analogy to point two— the strategic 
location of the actor— is, of course, the location of 
the cue ball. As a final point, we may note the politi­
cal actor's peculiar strengths or weaknesses. In the 
poolroom, these are paralleled by the player's skill or 
lack of skill. Skill is of the utmost importance, since 
the greater the actor's skill, the less his initial need 
for a favorable position or a manipulative environment, 
and the greater the likelihood that he himself will 
contribute to making his subsequent position favorable
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and his environment manipulable. By the same token, a 
singularly inept politician may reduce the manipula­
bility of his environment.Ï4
The evidence seems overwhelming that Bob Kerr possessed the
needed skills to "make the difficult shots," As previously
discussed, his personal qualities and skills enabled him to
accomplish what would have been virtually impossible for one
of fewer talents to achieve.
In a similar approach to the importance of person­
ality as a determinant of political behavior, Sidney Hook in 
The Hero in History argues that about all the researcher can 
do to determine the impact of a single individual is to 
"think away" the existence of the particular leader and con­
sider what might have happened if the leader had not lived. 
The reader bent on verification may object to such "judg­
mental-probabilistic" consideration of what might have been, 
in contrast to what was, as merely a futile effort of con­
sidering the if* s of history. Recognizing this problem, 
Andrew McFarland argues,
He who does not consider the "if's" of history is at 
best a journalist of the duller sort. He who considers 
the "if's" of history is analyzing; he is considering 
variations of effects and variations in causes, how one 
factor in a system varied with another . . . .  Dealing 
with "if's" of history is analogus to conducting con­
trolled experiments, although of course the verifiability 
of the conclusions of such mental experiments is 
extremely tenuous. Thus, in a controlled experiment, 
the analyst sets up two runs, in which all factors are 
duplicated except for one, which presumably accounts 
for any observed difference in the results of the run.
In the mental experiment, the analyst may vary a single
14̂ Ibid.. p. 45.
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factor, and relying on judgmental-probabilistic reason­
ing, posit varying outcomes.
Recognizing the limitations of such hypothesizing, 
an attempt to "think away" Robert Kerr leads us to such 
questions as who would have taken his place in bringing 
about the Arkansas Navigation Project? Was Kerr the "indis­
pensable actor" or were there others on the political scene 
willing to devote the time and energy necessary to see the 
program through and did they possess the resources to enable 
them to do so?
Statements from those who worked most closely with 
Kerr on the Project are unanimous in their feeling that his 
leadership was indispensable. Mike Monroney, who helped 
carry the Project through to completion after the death of 
Senator Kerr, declares that "there would have been no Arkan­
sas River Project without him. He brought it from the
*16hypothetical to the practical." Representative Tom Steed
felt he was the only man in the Oklahoma delegation who
could put it together and make it "jell." "Albert, Belcher
and others helped— but Kerr was the leader. He set the 
17pattern." Representative Ed Edmondson was convinced that 
Kerr was the catalyst needed at the time to bring it about.
15Andrew S. McFarland, Power and Leadership in 
Pluralist Systems (Stanford, California: Stanford University
Press, 1969), p. 161.
Interview with Mike Monroney, April 6, 1971.
^^Interview with Tom Steed, April 7, 1971.
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i8"It might have come. But not as extensive and not as soon,"
And the man who is generally credited with picking up the
mantle of leadership after Kerr's death, John McClellan,
remarked that "while the project was started before Kerr—
there had been no aggressive leadership from Oklahoma to
19give it the needed push. He did that,"
It seems obvious that leadership from an Oklahoma 
senator was necessary if the Project was to win its way 
through Congress, Senators McClellan and Fulbright of 
Arkansas were important in the struggle for the Basin Pro­
ject, but were, understandably, primarily concerned with 
projects in and benefits to their own state. It seems highly 
doubtful "if there had been no Kerr" they would have been 
inclined to exert the vast amount of effort necessary to 
bring navigation as far inland as Tulsa, Oklahoma, Neither 
made public works matter his chief area of interest and 
neither possessed assignment to the Public Works Committee 
that proved of such immense value to Robert Kerr,
Elmer Thomas, who represented Oklahoma in the Senate 
from 1927 to 1951, took the lead along with McClellan in 
obtaining authorization of the Project in 1946, His insti­
tutional position as chairman of the Senate Subcommittee on 
Appropriations for the Army placed him in a post where he
18Interview with Ed Edmondson, April 5, 1971,
19Quoted on ABC Television Special, "The Arkansas 
River Navigation System," June 4, 1971,
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was able to obtain planning funds for two of the key reser­
voirs— Keystone and Eufaula. Yet his advanced age— 74 at the 
time of his defeat in 1950— coupled with his defeat by Mike 
Monroney meant that the leadership role would have to be 
borne by another. Monroney's opposition to the Arkansas 
Project, until persuaded otherwise by Kerr in 1955, likewise 
eliminated him from the leadership role during the early 
critical years.
Valuable contributions were indeed forthcoming from 
several members of the Oklahoma House delegation— Ed Edmond­
son, Carl Albert and Page Belcher in particular. Without 
their support the Project would indeed have had far more 
difficult going than it did have. However, it seems only 
remotely likely that any member of the House could have pro­
vided the overall leadership needed to bring the Project to 
completion. Representative Albert possessed the institu­
tional power to guide the program through the House, but 
lacked sufficient time and resources to initiate such a 
navigation project. He, along with other representatives, 
lacked the state-wide constitutency so necessary in winning 
support for such a massive program. Success depended not 
only upon support from within the Congress but upon support 
on the state and local level as well. Kerr possessed state­
wide exposure and state-wide connections not possessed by 
the individual representatives. His previous experience 
with conservation matters as governor of the state, his
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valuable business connections statewide, and his experienced 
staff and unofficial advisers on conservation matters gave 
him valuable resources not possessed by others in the Con­
gress.
Should we attempt to "think away" Kerr in the 1948 
senatorial election it seems equally evident that no leader 
deeply concerned with conservation and public works matters 
was on the horizon. Both of his major opponents in the 
senatorial election attacked Kerr's stand on a major naviga­
tion and flood control project and criticized as impractical 
and wasteful such a program.
It thus seems improbable that wihout Robert Kerr, 
the necessary leadership to accomplish the enormous task of 
bringing to fruition the Arkansas River Project would have 
appeared upon the scene. No readily apparent leader seems 
to have possessed the necessary combination of resources, 
personality, institutional power and determination needed 
to bring it about as Kerr was able to do. While the Project's 
time might have come in the not too distant future, the 
evidence at hand seems to indicate that it would not have 
come as soon or in such a magnitude without Robert Kerr.
Not only is there value in our analysis in "thinking 
away" Robert Kerr in the past and trying to determine if an 
event would have occurred without him, but there also seems 
to be value in considering the "if s" of the future. What 
would have happened if Robert Kerr had lived past January 1,
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1963? What happened to the Arkansas Project after his 
death? Was his leadership missed or did things continue on 
about the same without him?
As was true in the previous case, the verifiability 
of the conclusions of such a mental experiment is extremely 
tenuous. Yet, there seems to be a certain amount of value 
in looking at events after Bob Kerr passed from the scene.
It seems logical to assume that the loss of a valued leader 
would result in a certain amount of dislocation and re­
arranging of plans and priorities. If his presence altered 
the course of events then his sudden absence should likewise 
affect future happenings.
An examination of events concerning the Arkansas 
Project since 1963 reveals that the Senator’s basic goal of 
a comprehensive waterway from the mouth of the Arkansas 
River to Catoosa, Oklahoma was indeed accomplished. In
addition, his goal of final completion of the Project by
201970 was likewise met. This was done despite a threatened 
reduction of funds in 1964 by the Johnson Administration 
that would have delayed the completion date past 1970.
When the President failed to include in his 1964 budget $14 
million needed to keep the Project on time, a delegation 
of senators and representatives met with the President and
20The waterway was officially declared open by the 
Corps of Engineers on December 31, 1970. First waterborne 
cargo reached the Port of Catoosa on January 20, 1971. The 
Corps, however, anticipates it will be late 1973 or early 
1974 before all construction along the canal is completed.
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21persuaded him to restore the deleted funds. His agreement 
to do so marked the last major attempt to slow down construc­
tion work. When Richard Nixon campaigned in Oklahoma in the 
fall of 1968 and called for a halt to wasteful "pork barrel" 
projects, he was asked by a reporter if this included the
Arkansas River System. Nixon replied that the Arkansas
22Project was too far along to stop.
A second Kerr "timetable," however, was not met.
This involved the Central Oklahoma Extension of the waterway 
from Eufaula Reservoir along the Deep Fork River to the 
Oklahoma City area. Just prior to his death he launched a 
drive to obtain authorization of the extension by 1964, with 
anticipated completion by the time the original canal reached 
Catoosa in 1970. This half-billion dollar addition to the 
original waterway was only one of several extensions under 
serious consideration by Kerr just prior to his death.
A survey report on navigation to Central Oklahoma 
submitted in 1964 by the Engineers was returned in 1966 for 
further study. The original report was later rejected and a 
second preliminary study begun. This study is scheduled for 
completion in 1972 with the completion of more detailed
23studies and submission of a report expected by fiscal 1975.
21Interview with Mike Monroney, April 6, 1971.
22Reported in "Power Politics Helped Bulldoze 
Channel," Tulsa World, June 4, 1971, p. 25C.
^^"Will the Waterway Be Extended," Tulsa World, 
June 4, 1971, p. 36C.
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Authorization of the project is, therefore, several years
away with its future greatly in doubt. Opposition has
developed in the Congress over spending more funds, now
estimated at $550 million, for another "pork barrel" project
in Oklahoma. Likewise, major opposition has developed in
Oklahoma from land owners, business interests, railroads,
and representatives of various wildlife and conservation 
24groups.
The failure of the Central Oklahoma Extension to
obtain the needed support after 1963 to make it a reality
seeins to indicate that Robert Kerr’s presence was sorely
missed. Two of his close associates attributed its delay to
the fact that no one was able to step in and supply the
"leadership and coordination" necessary to guide it to com­
pspletion. While it is obviously conjecture to assume that 
Kerr would have succeeded in convincing all those involved 
in the process to support the project so that it could reach 
completion by 1970, the events since 1963 do indicate that 
without Kerr’s presence the Extension has been seriously 
delayed and its ultimate future is in serious doubt.
Other goals set by Kerr as a byproduct of the 
Arkansas Navigation Project have yet to be realized— although 
the final chapter has not been written on most of them. He
^"^"Central Oklahoma Project Draws Praise, Opposition," 
The Daily Oklahoman. March 25, 1971, p. 37.
25Confidential communications.
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anticipated the mass movement of industry into the state as 
a result of the introduction of cheap water transportation 
and other advantages offered these new businesses. He saw 
the state taking its place as a center of the space industry 
with the waterway giving Oklahoma access to all the impor­
tant facilities in the "space crescent"— the manned-space- 
flight center in Houston, the complex of rocket plants near 
New Orleans, the big test facility on the Pearl River in 
Mississippi, and the launching pads of Cape Canaveral. Kerr 
pictured the opening of numerous plants by space contractors 
along the waterway and the movement of gigantic rockets and 
other hardward required for flights to the moon and beyond 
down the waterway to any point in the space crescent.
While numerous industries, such as North American Aviation, 
Melpar, General Electric and Ling-Tempco-Vought, have indeed 
moved to Oklahoma, the wholesale influx of industry Kerr 
foresaw and worked diligently for has not yet materialized. 
While other factors— such as the recent curtailment of the 
space programs by the federal government— have obviously had 
an impact on industrial expansion, the death of the state’s 
chief "salesman" may also have been a contributing factor.
Another Kerr goal seems at least partially obtained, 
and that is a reversal of Oklahoma's declining population. 
After the state lost 4 per cent of its population between
Report, p. 69,
26"Seaports For Oklahoma," U. S. News and World
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1940 and 1950, the trend was reversed and the 1960 census
showed an increase of 4 per cent during the decade of the
1950*s. As a direct result of the completion of the Arkansas
Project and the anticipated arrival of new industry into the
state, the Senator predicted a 15 per cent growth in popula-
27tion between 1960 and 1975. Although the rate of increase 
in the state between 1960 and 1970 was substantial— 7.3 per 
cent— it seems unlikely that the amount of growth predicted 
by Kerr will be achieved. Here again, it is recognized that 
many factors contribute to the growth or decline of a state's 
population over an extended period of years and our "prob­
abilistic" consideration of what might have happened if Kerr 
had lived is not based, nor can it be based, on substantial 
evidence.
The aforementioned attempts by Robert Kerr to bring 
industry and growth to the state of Oklahoma leads the 
researcher to certain conclusions about Kerr's motives for 
devoting a major portion of his Senate career to the Arkansas 
River Project. He has been accused by critics of being 
interested only in the financial reward that would accrue to 
his business, Kerr-McGee Oil Company, and to himself. Others 
have attributed to him a desire for self-aggrandizement and 
a desire to build a "memorial" in his lifetime that will 
stand in honor of Bob Kerr for years to come.
While there seems to be elements of truth in both
2?Ibid.
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viewpoints, other motives seem equally important. Kerr seems
to have been genuinely dedicated to bringing to his beloved
state of Oklahoma the greatest opportunities possible for
sustained growth, for industrial expansion and for prosperity
for her citizens. His colleague Tom Steed felt this love of
Oklahoma and this desire to bring industralization and hence
prosperity to her people was his main objective throughout
28his public career. Kerr was frank to admit he was in 
Congress to do what he could for his home state and felt this 
was consistent with the nature of representative democracy 
in America. He felt that Oklahoma had been neglected by the 
federal government in not only public works projects but in 
virtually every other federal program and he dedicated him­
self to help the state "catch up" with her sister states.
When criticized by opponents for using his position on the 
Public Works Committee to disproportionally benefit his own 
state he readily agreed this was the case.
I will agree that perhaps on a population or other 
irrelevant basis we receive more than our share of 
federal funds for resource development and conservation, 
but why shouldn't we? On any basis of comparison with 
similar areas, we have gotten there "fustest with the 
mostest." We have more completed projects, we have more 
authorized projects, we have more planned projects, we 
have more applications for planning, we have more 
organized districts.
However, we are not satisfied just to be ahead. We 
will not be satisfied until every possible means for 
developing this region has been utilized. I am com­
mitted to this view, which is in the process of being
fulfilled.29
28interview with Tom Steed, April 7, 1971.
29xerr Papers, Speech to 8th Annual Meeting of the
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Kerr did not deny the accusation that his rule of thumb was
to give his own state of Oklahoma 10 per cent of the total
"pork barrel," and indeed the accusation was affirmed, rather
30proudly, by his close associate Don McBride.
While Kerr may have been primarily interested in
building the Arkansas Navigation Project for the economic
benefit of his home state, he was certainly not adverse to
getting credit for it. According to a Capitol Hill observer
who watched Kerr and the Arkansas Project for several years,
"Kerr doesn't want money; Kerr wants that project. He wants
31to build in his own lifetime, a memorial to himself."
When the comment was relayed to Kerr, he said, "The man
responsible for TVA was George Norris— from Nebraska, a
thousand miles away from Tennessee. When there's a TVA on
the Arkansas River, I don't want it said that the man respon-
32sible came from a thousand miles away." A man of Kerr's 
large ego demands and vast self-confidence did indeed seem 
to thrive on the recognition that came to him from this
Poteau River Watershed Council, May 12, 1961.
30Interview with Don McBride, March 12, 1971. A 
check by the author of the total Public Works Appropriations 
for fiscal 1961 and 1952 show projects located in Oklahoma 
received 8.2% and 8% respectively in these two years. These 
figures include only those projects physically located in 
Oklahoma, and do not include projects considered in the 
Arkansas Basin located in the state of Arkansas.
^^Quoted in Joseph Kraft, " 'King' of the U. S. Senate," 





A final motive must also be mentioned. This was his
genuine concern for the waste and destruction that resulted
from an untamed river, and the never ending cycle of too
much water followed by too little water. He had a "genuine
concern for the plight of those who suffered from periodic
flooding and drought, and had a genuine desire to see the
33forces of nature harnessed for the benefit of mankind."
His lasting interest in the conservation of all of nature’s 
resources— but especially water— seems to have been a genuine 
motive behind his efforts to harness the waters of the 
Arkansas River.
In conclusion, what generalizations are we able to 
draw from this study of power in the political process? Can 
this study of power exercised by an important U. S. Senator 
in regard to a specific public works project b« taken as a 
pattern to be applied to other projects of a similar nature?
Just as the qualities needed by a leader vary with the 
specific situation and specific problem, so do the qualities 
that make for success vary with the specific public works 
project and the specific environmental situation. Robert S. 
Kerr seemed to possess the needed qualities and institutional 
positions to bring to fruition the Arkansas River Navigation
33Interview with Carter Bradley, a former staff 
member and close friend to Bob Kerr, and presently Executive 
Director of the Higher Education Alumni Council, Oklahoma 
City. Interview was conducted on January 14, 1972.
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Project under the particular circumstances that existed at 
the time. Key institutional positions gave him access to 
the centers of decision-making in the Congress while his 
personal qualities and skills supplemented his formal powers. 
This is not to imply, however, that the same combination of 
positions, resources and skills can be taken as the only way 
or necessarily the best way to achieve similar results in 
other situations. A comparative study of other public works 
projects might well reveal that another type of leader with 
different individual traits, positions, and the like, is 
just as successful in the exercise of power in his specific 
circumstances as Kerr was in regard to the Arkansas Project. 
It is therefore most hazardous to generalize that those who 
wish to obtain power and exert legislative leadership in the 
area of public works legislation would do well to emulate 
Bob Kerr. The validity of this generalization would require 
a great deal more investigation than is possible in the 
limited scope of this paper. Perhaps future Investigators 
will find this an area for fruitful research.
While it seems prudent not to claim too much as a 
result of our detailed analysis of the exercise of power in 
the case study just concluded, neither do we want to dismiss 
it as an insignificant exercise. The data seems to clearly 
justify the contention that Robert Kerr followed one path to 
success in the area of public works legislation. He was 
indeed able to generally accomplish what he sought out to do
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while others before and since have failed in similar circum­
stances.
A comparison of Kerr's success with that of others 
during the period helps illustrate this point. During the 
period of the mid 1940's three major river projects were 
authorized by the Congress in addition to the Arkansas River 
Project. The Flood Control Act of 1944 authorized the 
Missouri Basin Development Program— a major flood control 
and navigation project similar to the Arkansas River Project. 
The Project was estimated to cost about 1/3 billion dollars 
with initial funds for construction appropriated in 1945.
By 1969 the bulk of construction was completed with final 
attainment of a 9 foot deep channel running the length of 
the river due for completion in 1971 or 1972.^^
A comparison of the Missouri Basin Program and the 
Arkansas River Project shows a great similarity of problems 
and opposition to the two projects. While a detailed study 
of the two projects would be necessary to determine the 
many factors involved in the completion of each, a comparison 
of the time and money involved in completing each project 
shows the far more expensive Arkansas project reaching com­
pletion much more rapidly than the Missouri Project. First 
funds for the $1.2 billion Arkansas Project were obtained in
34Paul D. Scheele, "Resources Development Politics 
in the Missouri Basin: Federal Power Navigation, and Reser­
voir Operation Policies, 1944-1968," Unpublished Ph.D. 
dissertation. University of Nebraska, 1969, pp. 85-86.
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1956 with construction completed in approximately fourteen 
years. It took approximately 25 years to obtain the $350 
million needed to construct the Missouri Basin Project.
A second major project authorized in the 1940’s was 
the Cross-Florida Barge Canal. Authorized in 1942, the 
Canal was to consist of a series of locks and dams across 
northern Florida and was designed primarily as a navigation 
and recreation project. Estimated to cost over $200 million, 
work was not begun on the canal until 1964. In early 1970 
the federal government ordered a delay in construction of 
the Project for fifteen months while further studies were 
conducted to determine the feasibility of continuing con­
struction. The future of the Project is presently uncer­
tain.^^
A third major project authorized in the 1940’s was 
the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway running from Pickwick Lake 
on the Tennessee River to Deraopolis, Alabama on the Tombigbee 
River. Suggested in 1808 and authorized by the Flood Con­
trol Act of 1946, the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway is 
estimated to cost $486 million when completed. Although 
receiving its first appropriations in 1962 major construc­
tion did not begin until 1970. It is scheduled for completion
35NBC Network Television Special, ’In Which We Live," 
June 21, 1970, and Elizabeth B. Drew, "Dam Outrage: The
Story of the Army Engineers," The Atlantic. Vol. 225, No. 4 
(April 1970), p. 59.
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in 1980.36
A comparison of these three major construction pro­
jects with' the vastly more expensive Arkansas Projects shows 
that despite the fact that they were all authorized during 
the early and middle 1940's, only one project— the Arkansas—  
has been completed. While many factors obviously played a 
major part in explaining why the one project was able to 
obtain needed funds in a shorter period to bring it to 
completion, our study would seem to indicate that the leader­
ship of a Bob Kerr was very likely the major factor. Although 
a comparative study of the many variables involved in each 
individual project would be necessary to fully sustain our 
contention, the generalization does not seem implausible.
In fact, a study done on the Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway in 
1968 lists as one of its conclusions the contention that 
"the trouble the waterway encountered— was due to the fact
that it did not have the kind of team behind it that the
37magnitude of the project required." The author argues 
that no effective leader was on the scene during the really 
critical years of the Project.
A comparison of other navigation projects— such as 
the Trinity River Project and the Red River Canal— both of
36William H. Stewart, "The Tennessee-Tombigbee Water; 
A Case Study in the Politics of Water Transportation," 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Alabama, 1968, 
p. 250, and "Nixon Gets Warm Welcome," The Dallas Morning 
News, May 26, 1971, p. 1.
37Stewart, "The Tennessee-Tombigbee Waterway," p. 177,
231
which were in the planning stages during the Kerr years and 
both of which obtained their first construction funds in 
1969, would very possibly strengthen our contention that the 
leadership of Robert Kerr was the significant difference in 
the success of the Arkansas Project.
The areas of our ignorance about many aspects of the 
legislative system are vast. Intense analysis of specific 
cases provides us with the data necessary to make meaningful 
comparisons and hopefully contributes to the development of 
a general theory concerning the legislative process. In our 
study we have attempted to examine the unique factors and 
complex relationships which resulted in the adoption by the 
Congress of a massive and controversial public works project 
and the role played in the drama by a single senator. The 
study has illustrated that the impact of personality on 
politics is important and that under certain circumstances 
the individual actor can have a significant influence upon 
events. It seems beyond dispute that Bob Kerr of Oklahoma 
was able to obtain the considerable power and to exert the 
necessary leadership needed to accomplish what he sought out 
to achieve in a specific area of legislation.
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APPENDIX A
Questionnaire
1. How would you rank Senator Robert Kerr at the time of his 
death in so far as overall power and influence within the 
Senate?




2. Vi/hat do you consider to be the main source (or sources) 
0‘£ Senator Kerr's effectiveness as a Senator?
3. What technique of persuasion would the Senator most often 
tend to use, in your judgment?
 Promise of reward if you supported him
Threat of sanctions if you opposed him
jOther (please specify).
4. Check below the way or ways you believe most Senators 
felt about Senator Kerr:
 Respected  Liked by those on both







5. In the area of public works and conservation how would




6. Senator Kerr was especially interested in the Arkansas 
River Basin project (constructing reservoirs, promoting 
navigation, etc., on the Arkansas River.) Did you tend
to favor or oppose such projects prior to your
relationship with Bob Kerr? How did your relationship 
with Senator Kerr affect your attitude toward such public 
works projects?
 no appreciable change in attitude
 tended to favor such projects more often
tended to oppose such projects more often
7. In regard to such public works projects as the Arkansas 
River project, St. Lawrence Seaway, Hell's Canyon Dam, 
etc., did you generally
 work actively for such measures
work actively against such measures 
_remain inactive prior to a vote on such measures
8. How often was Senator Kerr sought out by other Senators 
for advice?
 about as often as the average Senator
jnore often than the average Senator 
_less often than the average Senator
9. Which of the following characteristics seem to best fit 
Senator Kerr?
 knowledgeable  selfish  gregarious
reliable___________ intelligent  forthright
_arrogant ____ persuasive  intolerant
ruthless
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10. Which of the following best fit your relationship with 
Senator Kerr?
 Had only a greeting acquaintance
 Stopped and talked with him regularly
_Aided each other in common activities through 
actual personal contact
_Visited or entertained in each others home, ate 
meals together, etc., as well as aided each 
other in common activities
To the best of your knowledge how would Senator Kerr rate on 
the following qualities of conduct:
11. Served a proper "apprenticeship” in the Senate; was 
willing to learn from more senior senators did not 
rush into a leadership role
  High  Medium  Low  No Knowledge
12. Devoted a great amount of his time to "doing his home­
work"— taking care of the routine work that needed to 
be done
 High  Medium  Low  No Knowledge
13. Tended to specialize, to focus his attention and energy 
on a relatively few matters rather than a wide variety 
of measures
 High  Medium  Low  No Knowledge
14. Did not let political disagreements influence his per­
sonal feelings toward a colleague
 High  Medium  Low  No Knowledge
15. Tended to help out a colleague whenever he was in a 
position to do so
 High  Medium  Low  No Knowledge
16. Lived up to his "bargains" with others
 High  Medium  Low  No Knowledge
17. Believed in the Senate as the greatest legislative body
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in the world; revered its personnel, organization and 
traditions
 High  M e d i u m  Low  No Knowledge
18, Overall, how would you rate Bob Kerr in so far as his 
conforming to the customs and traditions of the Senate
Your signature to this questionnaire would be greatly appre­
ciated although it is certainly not necessary
Signature
Please do not quote me or use my name in regard to my 
answers to this questionnaire.
You may quote me.
